REVISED UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY RIGHTS AT DEATH ACT (202_)

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS

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January 17, 2020
REVISED UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY RIGHTS
AT DEATH ACT (202_)

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# REVISED UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY RIGHTS AT DEATH ACT (202_)

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REVISED UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY RIGHTS
AT DEATH ACT (202_)

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This act may be cited as the Revised Uniform Community Property Rights at Death Act.

Reporter’s Notes

Pursuant to Section 401 of the Uniform Law Commission’s Drafting Rules, the short title of an act is “its title as approved by the Executive Committee of the Uniform Law Commission. Uniform Law Commission, Drafting Rules: Rules 401 (2012). The short title is to be distinguished from the longer, more detailed title that is often included in bills as they are introduced in state legislatures.” This “short title” includes the term “Revised” to indicate a substantial revision from the original Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act (1971), rather than merely amendments to the existing act. See Uniform Law Commission, Drafting Rules: Rules 409 (2012). This approach is consistent with other uniform act revisions. See, e.g., Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (RUFADAA); Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act; Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA). Although a completely new title could be adopted, it seems preferable in this instance to utilize a term indicating a revision. Ultimately, however, this is a matter for the Executive Committee. See Uniform Law Commission, Drafting Rules: Rules 409 (2012).

SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS. In this act:

1. “Domicile” means the place of an individual’s home or habitual residence, as defined by this State.

2. “Individual” means a human being.

3. “Jurisdiction” means the United States, a state, a foreign country, or a political subdivision of a foreign country.

4. “Partition” means a voluntary severance or division of jointly or commonly held property interests undertaken mutually by both an individual and that individual’s spouse.

5. “Person” means an individual, estate, business or nonprofit entity, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or other legal entity.

6. “Spouse” means an individual who has entered into a valid marriage or a valid domestic or registered partnership under the laws of a jurisdiction and recognized as valid in this
State. The term also includes an individual treated as a putative spouse.

(7) “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes a federally recognized Indian tribe.

Reporter’s Notes

The definition of domicile is the place where a person “usually … has his home.” Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 11 cmt. (a). A person may reside in more than one place, but may have only one domicile. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 11(2) (“Every person has a domicil at all times and, at least for the same purpose, no person has more than one domicil at a time.”). If an individual has multiple residences, that individual’s domicile will be ascertained under the appropriate standards applicable in this state.

The definition of “Person” is a standard definition. See Uniform Law Commission, Drafting Rules: Rules 305 (2012). Because the standard definition of “Person” includes legal entities, the term “Individual” is used to limit the application of this act to human beings who have acquired community property.

The definition of “State” is also a standard definition. See Uniform Law Commission, Drafting Rules: Rules 306 (2012). To ensure the applicability of this act to individuals who acquired community property in a foreign country, the broader term “Jurisdiction” has also been included.

The term “Partition” is defined to mean a severance of collectively or jointly owned property into individually owned shares. A partition does not necessarily occur under this act merely because one spouse takes title to property in a particular form. For a partition to occur, both spouses must agree to the severance of their community property interests. Whether there was an agreement between the spouses to sever their community interests is a factual matter to be ascertained by the courts.

The term “Spouse” is used expansively to include not only married persons, of either sex, but also partners in other arrangements, such as domestic or registered partnerships, under which community property may be acquired. The term also encompasses putative spouses, who may enjoy community property.

SECTION 3. APPLICABILITY; AFFECTED PROPERTY. This act applies to the following property of an individual who was previously domiciled in a jurisdiction in which property could be acquired as community property, provided no partition has occurred:

(1) if an individual is domiciled in this state at the time of death, all or a proportionate
part of each item of personal property, wherever situated, that was characterized as, or acquired
with property that was characterized as, community property by the law of a jurisdiction in
which the individual was previously domiciled;

(2) whether or not an individual is domiciled in this state at the time of death, all or a
proportionate part of each item of real property situated in this state that was characterized as, or
acquired with property that was characterized as, community property by the law of a
jurisdiction in which the individual was previously domiciled;

(3) income, rents, revenues, or profits derived from property included in subsection (a) or
(b); and

(4) property traceable to property included in subsection (a) or (b).

**Reporter’s Notes**

The approach of this revision is to make the act initially applicable to every “individual”
who was previously domiciled in a community property jurisdiction and who acquired personal
property, wherever currently located, either which was characterized as community property by
the law of that community property jurisdiction when it was acquired or which was acquired
with property that was characterized as community property. Under subsection (b), the same
approach applies to real property situated in this state, even if the decedent is not currently
domiciled in this state.

Under subsection (c), income, rents, revenues, or profits derived from property included
in subsection (a) or (b) are also subject to this act. Consequently, subsection (c) extends
applicability of this act to income derived from property that was acquired in this state if that
property was acquired with community property.

Under subsection (d), this act also applies to any property that is a traceable to property in
subsections (a) or (b). Simply stated, property is “traceable” to community property if the
property changes form without changing character. William A. Reppy, Cynthia A. Samuel,
and Sally Brown Richardson, Community Property in the United States 161 (2015)
(quoting W. Brockelbank, The Community Property Law of Idaho 134 (1964)). Thus,
property received in exchange for community property has the same character as the property
given and thus retains a community property character. Tracing, of course, becomes more
complex when community and separate property are comingles. Subsections (a) and (b) make
clear that this act applies to a “proportionate part of each item” of property that is traceable to
community property. Thus, it applies to property that becomes commingled and is traceable to
community property.
Because the term “State” is uniformly defined as a term of the Uniform Law Commission and does not include foreign countries, this provision uses the broader term “Jurisdiction” to indicate that it also applies to individuals who were domiciled in foreign jurisdictions where community property may be acquired.

SECTION 4. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION.

(a) All property acquired by an individual while domiciled in a jurisdiction under whose laws property could then be acquired by that individual as community property is presumed to be community property. This presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.

(b) The fact that property was acquired in a jurisdiction under whose laws property could not then be acquired as community property and is currently held in a form that provides for rights of survivorship or in a form that provides for its transfer or payment on the death of an individual does not create a presumption that the property is not community property.

Reporter’s Notes

This section adopts a blanket presumption in favor of treating all property acquired by an individual while domiciled in a community property jurisdiction as community property, provided, of course, that the laws of the community property jurisdiction allowed community property to “then be acquired by that individual.” In other words, the presumption applies only to those individuals who could acquire community property under the laws of the relevant jurisdiction. Consequently, the presumption does not apply to unmarried individuals or to those who have opted out of the community regime even if they acquire property while domiciled in a community property state, as those individuals could not then acquire community property in that state. Although stated in various ways, the blanket presumption of this section is common in community property jurisdictions. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-12(A) (“Property acquired during marriage by either husband or wife, or both, is presumed to be community property.”); Wisc. Stat. § 766.31(2) (“All property of spouse is presumed to be marital property.”); Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003(a) (“Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property”); La. Civ. Code art. 2340 (“Things in the possession of a spouse during the existence of a regime of community of acquets and gains are presumed to be community, but either spouse may prove they are separate property.”); Cal. Fam. Code § 760; Unif. Marital Prop. Act. § 4(a) (“All property of spouses is marital property except that which is classified otherwise by this Act.”).

Despite the above presumption, a party may prove that the relevant property was separate, even though acquired during the existence of a community regime, such as by demonstrating that the property was acquired by inheritance. Although different community property states provide different standards for rebutting the relevant presumption of community
property, this act adopts a preponderance standard for rebutting the presumption, as have a number of community property states. See, e.g., Marriage of Ettefagh, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3rd 419 (Cal. App. 2007); Talbot v. Talbot, 864 So. 2d 590 (La. 2003); Brandt v. Brandt, 427 N.W. 2d 126 (Wisc. App. 1988); Sanchez v. Sanchez, 748 P.2d 21 (N.M. App. 1987); But see Tex. Fam. Code § 3.03(b) (“The degree of proof necessary to establish that property is separate property is clear and convincing evidence.”); Reed v. Reed, 44 P.3d 1100 (Idaho 2002) (requiring “reasonable certainty and particularity” to rebut the presumption).

Unlike the prior version of this act, this revised act does not impose a presumption against the applicability of this act for property acquired in a non-community property state and held in a form that creates rights of survivorship. Taking title to property in various forms is often a unilateral act that should not by itself serve as a presumption of partition of interests in a community asset. For more on acts that do and do not effect a partition of property interests under this act, see Section 8, infra.

SECTION 5. DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS UPON DEATH. At the death of an individual, the following rules apply:

(1) one-half of the property to which this act applies belongs to the surviving spouse and is not subject to disposition by the decedent through testament, intestate succession, or non-probate transfer on death. If, however, the decedent makes a testamentary or non-probate transfer on death of the property belonging to the surviving spouse and also disposes of other property in favor of the surviving spouse, the court may require the surviving spouse to elect between retaining the disposition or claiming rights under this act.

(2) one-half of the property to which this act applies belongs to the decedent and is subject to disposition by the decedent through testament, intestate succession, or non-probate transfer on death. The one-half of the property that belongs to the decedent is not subject to elective-share rights of the surviving spouse, but nothing in this section limits the rights of a surviving spouse to claim other applicable statutory allowances.

Reporter’s Notes

This section is substantially similar to Section 3 of the prior act. It deviates from the prior act by including “non-probate transfers on death” in the ambit of methods by which property can be distributed. It also makes clear that this subsection (b) does not limit a surviving
spouse’s claim for “other applicable statutory allowances,” such as homestead allowances, allowances for exempt property, and family allowances. See, e.g., UPC §§ 2-402, 2-403, and 2-404.

SECTION 6. OTHER LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES AVAILABLE AT DEATH. At the death of an individual, the personal representative of the decedent may bring an action against the surviving spouse, or the surviving spouse may bring an action against the personal representative of the decedent, for damages or equitable relief in the following circumstances:

(1) in place of a reimbursement claim that, but for a change of domicile, could have been asserted under the law of a jurisdiction in which the surviving spouse or the decedent was previously domiciled.

(2) to assert the fraudulent or bad faith alienation or impairment of property to which this act applies.

Reporter’s Notes

This section confirms that comparable legal and equitable remedies that would be available to protect a spouse in a community property jurisdiction remain available in a common law state under this act. Two remedies often provided by community property jurisdictions are claims for reimbursement and claims for fraud or bad faith management.

Claims for reimbursement are commonly available when community property has been used to satisfy a separate obligation or when separate property has been used to improve community property or vice versa, see, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2364, 2366, and 2367; Cal. Fam. Code § 2640. Different community property states calculate the amount of reimbursement differently. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Hiatt, 487 P.2d 1121 (Idaho 1971) (awarding reimbursement based upon the enhanced value of the property even if it exceeds the amount spent); Portillo v. Shappie, 636 P.2d 878 (N.M. 1981) (assessing reimbursement based upon the enhanced value of the improved property even if it exceeds the amount of money expended); La. Civ. Code art. 2366 (providing for reimbursement based upon the amount expended); Marriage of Sedlock, 849 P.2d 1243 (Wash. App. 1993) (awarding reimbursement based upon the amount spent); Estate of Kobyliski v. Hellstern, 503 N.W.2d 369 (Wis. App. 1993) (assessing reimbursement based upon the greater of the amount spent or the value added). This section grants courts in this State flexibility in assessing the amount of the reimbursement.

Different community property states also provide different remedies to a spouse whose
community property interest has been unduly prejudiced by another spouse with authority to
manage or alienate community property. In California, for example, a court may award a
defrauded spouse a percentage interest or an amount equal to a percentage interest in any asset
transferred in breach of a spouse’s fiduciary duty. Cal. Fam. Code § 1101. In Texas, the
doctrine of “fraud on the community” protects one spouse when the other wrongfully depletes
community property through actual or constructive fraud by allowing a court to allocate other
property to the defrauded spouse through any legal or equitable remedy necessary, including a
money judgment or a constructive trust. See, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code § 7.009; see also Osuna v.
Quintana, 993 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. Corpus Christi 1999) (“The breach of a legal or
equitable duty which violates the fiduciary relationship existing between spouses is termed
‘fraud on the community,’ a judicially created concept based on the theory of constructive
fraud.”). In Louisiana, a spouse may be awarded damages when the other spouse acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. See La. Civ. Code art. 2354 (“A spouse is liable for any loss or
damage caused by fraud or bad faith in the management of the community property.”). In
addition to damages and equitable relief, some community property states statutorily grant courts
authority to add the name of a spouse to a community asset titled solely in the name of the other
spouse in order to protect the interest of the previously unnamed spouse. See, e.g., Cal. Fam.
Code § 1101 (c); Wisc. Stat. § 766.70(3). This Section provides the court with broad authority to
grant damages or to craft any other appropriate equitable remedy necessary to protect a spouse.

The rights granted by this section are operable at the death of an individual and may not
be asserted during the existence of the marriage. This approach is consistent with the law of
various community property jurisdictions. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2358 (“A claim for
reimbursement may be asserted only after termination of the community property regime, unless
otherwise provided by law.”). But see Uniform Marital Property Act § 13 (allowing claims for
breach of the duty of good faith and for an accounting to be brought by spouses during an
ongoing marriage).

SECTION 7. CLAIMS OF SURVIVING SPOUSE AGAINST THE ESTATE OF

THE DECEDENT. To assert rights under this act, a surviving spouse or his successor may
bring an action against the heirs or legatees of the decedent not later than three years after the
death of the decedent. The personal representative of the decedent need not attempt to discover
the applicability of this act unless a surviving spouse or his successor files a written demand
asserting rights under this act not later than six months from the date of death of the decedent.

Reporter’s Notes

This section allows a surviving spouse to protect his rights under this act and provides a
statute of limitation for doing so. Namely, a surviving spouse must institute an action against the
successors of the decedent within three years of the date of death of the decedent. Although not
required, a surviving spouse may also attempt to protect his interest by filing a written demand
with the personal representative of the decedent. Unless the surviving spouse does so within six
months of the date of death of the decedent, the personal representative has no fiduciary duty to
investigate or to attempt to ascertain whether this act applies to any property owned by the
decedent.

SECTION 8. CLAIMS BY HEIRS, LEGATEES, OR CREDITORS AGAINST
THE SURVIVING SPOUSE. To assert rights under this act, the personal representative, an
heir, or a legatee of the decedent may bring an action against the surviving spouse not later than
three years after the death of the decedent. The heirs, legatees, or creditors of the decedent may
also file a written demand asserting rights under this act with the personal representative not later
than six months from the date of death of the decedent. The personal representative of the
decedent shall attempt to ascertain whether the decedent has property rights to which this act
applies.

Reporter’s Notes

This section allows for the personal representative, an heir, or a legatee to protect rights
under this act and provides a statute of limitation for doing so. Namely, an action must be instituted
against the surviving spouse within three years of the date of death of the decedent. Although not
required, the heirs, legatees, or creditors of the decedent may attempt to protect their interests by
filing a written demand with the personal representative of the decedent within six months of the
date of death of the decedent. Unlike in Section 7, the personal representative of the decedent
under Section 8 does have a fiduciary duty to attempt to ascertain whether the decedent has
property rights that should be protected under this act.

SECTION 9. PROTECTION OF BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. A person who
transacts in good faith and for value with an individual acquires rights free of any claims under
this act. A person is in good faith if he has not knowingly been a party to fraud or illegality
affecting the rights of a spouse. A person gives value when property is acquired in exchange for
a binding commitment to extend credit, as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of pre-
existing claims, by accepting delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for purchase, or in
return for any other consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
This section is based upon Section 9 of the Uniform Marital Property Act. It is also informed by similar provisions protecting good faith purchasers in Section 1012 of the Uniform Trust Code and Section 2-803(i) of the Uniform Probate Code, as well as Section 2-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code. This provision deviates from Section 6 of the former act insofar as it adds an obligation of good faith. Although third parties are ordinarily allowed to deal with a spouse who has apparent title concerning a marital asset during the existence of the marriage, no good reason could be found for protecting bad faith third parties with knowledge of the commission of fraud on the rights of the other spouse.

SECTION 10. RIGHTS OF CREDITORS. Except as otherwise provided, this act does not affect the rights of a secured creditor.

To the extent a secured creditor qualifies as a bona fide purchaser under Section 8, his rights are governed by the general laws and procedures available to secured creditors under the laws of this state. This act does not impair or affect the validity or ranking of a security interest granted by one spouse to such a third party. The rights of unsecured creditors may be affected by application of Sections 6 and 7 of this Act.

SECTION 11. EFFECT OF WAIVER OR PARTITION. This act neither prevents the partition of interests in property to which this act applies nor the waiver of rights granted by this act. A unilateral act by an individual, such as the holding of property in the form of a revocable trust or in a form that allows for its payment or transfer on death, shall not constitute a partition of the property or a waiver of rights to property to which this act applies.

If parties have partitioned previously-acquired community property after moving to a common law state, this act would not affect that partitioned property. See, e.g., Section 3 of this Act. Partition is defined in Section 2 of this act as a “voluntary severance or division of jointly or commonly held property interests undertaken mutually by both an individual and the individual’s spouse.” As such, a unilateral act of an individual, such as taking title to property that was previously acquired as community property in the form of a transfer-on-death deed, does not operate as a partition or waiver.
SECTION 12. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION. In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

Reporter’s Notes
This is a “Standard Section” pursuant to Rule 601 of the Uniform Law Commission’s Drafting Rules. Uniform Law Commission, Drafting Rules: Rules 601 (2012).

SECTION 13. REPEALS AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
(a) …
(b) …
(c) …

Reporter’s Notes
This is a “Standard Section” pursuant to Rule 605 of the Uniform Law Commission’s Drafting Rules. Uniform Law Commission, Drafting Rules: Rules 605 (2012).

SECTION 14. EFFECTIVE DATE. This [act] takes effect…

Reporter’s Notes
This is a “Standard Section” pursuant to Rule 606 of the Uniform Law Commission’s Drafting Rules. Uniform Law Commission, Drafting Rules: Rules 606 (2012).