### DRAFT

# FOR DISCUSSION ONLY

# NON-PARENTAL CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT

# NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW

November 20-21, 2015 April 1-2, 2016 Drafting Committee Meeting

With Prefatory Note, Reporter's Notes, and Comments

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# NON-PARENTAL CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT

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# INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE -FROM THE REPORTER

This draft includes preliminary "Comments" [or "Drafters' Notes"] that, in final form, will be published with the act.

In addition, this draft includes "Reporter's Notes." These notes are intended to help guide our discussions, but generally will not be part of the final act. <u>I anticipate that all or most of the current "Reporter's Notes" will be removed before the act goes to the Conference for its First Reading in Summer 2016.</u>

This draft also used uses brackets in some sections. At this stage, the most of the bracketed materials are not intended to be part of the final act. The brackets are intended to show alternative language, and the committee will decide which language to use. Some final drafts of uniform acts do utilize brackets to provide legislators with options for handling particular issues, but usually it is best when drafting uniform acts to not use brackets or to keep their use to a minimum.

Jeff Atkinson Reporter

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#### PREFATORY NOTE

[This is a partial draft of the Prefatory Note. The reporter will update commentary and data as the project proceeds.]

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This act provides procedures and factors for courts to apply when asked to grant custody or visitation to non-parents. The act seeks to balance, within constitutional restraints, the interests of children, parents, and non-parents with whom the children have a close relationship.

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Continuation of a relationship between a child and a non-parent can be an important – and even vital – interest, both for the child and the non-parent. When deciding whether to grant relief to a non-parent, courts must, of course, consider the rights of parents. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a right of a fit parent to make decisions regarding the rearing of his or her child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000). In Troxel, the Court struck down Washington State's grandparent visitation statute, as applied, holding the trial court did not give sufficient deference to the decision of a fit parent to decide the amount of contact the children would have with grandparents. The Supreme Court also stated the trial court's "order was not founded on any special factors that might justify the State's interference with [the mother's] fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her two daughters." *Id.* at 68.

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Justice Connor observed in her plurality option in *Troxel*: "The demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The composition of families varies greatly from household to household." *Id.* at 63.

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The U.S. Census Bureau reports that the unmarried partner population "grew 41 percent between 2000 and 2010, four times as fast as the overall household population." U.S. Census Bureau, "Households and Families: 2010" at p. 3 (C2010BR-14) (Apr. 2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf.

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Opposite-sex unmarried partner households increased by 40 percent since 2000; same-sex households increased by 80 percent. Id. at p. 6.

30 31 32

In 2012, the Census Bureau reported that there were 73,817,000 children in United States under age 18. Of that number, the breakdown for the children's living arrangements was:

33 34 35

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Living with both parents:—___50,267,000
Living with mother only:—___17,991,000
Living with father only:—___2,924,000
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- 36
- 37
- Living with neither parent:— 2,634,000 38 39 Of the children living with neither parent, 1,494,000 were living with grandparents.

40 41

U.S. Census Bureau, America's Families and Living Arrangements: 2012, Table C2, Household

42 Relationship and Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years, by Age and Sex: 2012 43

available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/families/data/cps2012.html.

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1	A nonprofit organization, Generations United, issued a report regarding foster care,
2	kinship care, and "grandfamilies." The report contains the following information:
3	
4	"Grandfamilies or kinship families are families in which children reside with and are
5	being raised by grandparents, other extended family members, and adults with whom
6	they have a close familylike relationship, such as godparents and close family friends."
7	
8	· Children raised in grandfamilies or kinship care: 2,485,000
9	
10	· Children raised in foster care: 397,091
11	
12	· Children in foster care who are raised in grandfamilies or kinship care: 108,822 (which is
13	27% of children in foster care)
14	
15	Source: Generations United, "The State of Grandfamilies in America: 2014" –
16	http://www.grandfamilies.org/Portals/0/14-State-of-Grandfamilies-Report-Final.pdf
17	
18	[Additional data regarding foster care and kinship care may be provided by Howard
19	<del>Davidson, Former Director</del> * * * * * *
20	
21	[A summary of key features] of the ABA Center and act will be inserted to the Law, and Heidi
22	Epstein, Director of the ABA Center's Kinship Policy and Assistant Director of State Projects.]
23	<u>Prefatory Note.]</u>

1	NON-PARENTAL CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT
2	SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This [act] may be cited as the Non-Parental Child
3	Custody and Visitation Act.
4	Reporter's Note: Our liaison to the ULC Style Committee, Debra Behr, advised me that
5	the Style Committee may prefer the word "Non-Parental" without a hyphen. She notes
6	that Washington State statutes do not use a hyphen for "Nonparental." Wash. Code 26.10
7	(2016) (chapter entitled "Nonparental actions for child custody." See also 23 Pa. Stat.
8	Reporter's Note
9	and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5327 (West 2016) (making reference to presumptions in cases
10	involving a "nonparent"). My preference is to keep the hyphen. I think it makes the
11	word easier to read and understand. Illinois' Family Law statute uses hyphens for some
12	of its Family Law terms – e.g., "non-marital property." 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/503(a)
13	(2016). Changes to titles of acts (apparently including on issues related to hyphen) need
14	to be approved by the Executive Committee.
15 16	While the subject metter of this tonicast was under review by a LH C the Study
17	While the subject matter of this topicact was under review by a ULC the Study Committee, the subject matter was referred to as "Third Party Custody and Visitation." The term
18	"Non-Parental Rights" seems more precise.
19	Tron Turental regitts seems more precise.
20	At the March 2015 first two Drafting Committee meetingmeetings, some participants
21	favored utilizing a term other than "Non-Parental," although there was not a consensus on
22	what that term would be.
23	
24	SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS. In this act:
25	(1) -"Child" means an unemancipated individual who is less than the age of majority.:
26	[Reporter's Note: The Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act, § 102(3) (2012)
27	defines "child" as follows:
28	(A)- an unemancipated individual who has not attained [18] years of age; or
29	(B)- an adult son or daughter by birth or adoption, or under law of this state other
30	than this [act], who is the subject of a court order concerning custodial responsibility.
31 32	(2) -"Custody" means physical custody, legal custody, or both. The term includes joint
33	
33	custody or shared custody as defined by the law of this state other than this [act].
34	(3) -"De facto parent-of the child" means an individual who [:

1	(A) that, within the last two years : , the petitioner has completely undertaken
2	permanent, unequivocal, committed parental responsibility in the child's life. Such a finding
3	requires a determination by the court that:
4	(A)(i) the petitioner (i) has had the support and consent of the child's parent or
5	parents, if the child has more than one parent, to foster the formation and establishment of a
6	parent-like relationship between the child and individual;
7	(ii) has exercised parental responsibility for reasons primarily other than financial
8	compensation; and
9	(iii) has acted in a parental role for a lengthhas resided with the child for a
10	significant period of time sufficient to have;
11	(ii) the petitioner has engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
12	(iii) the petitioner has established a bonded and dependent relationship
13	with the child-that, the relationship was supported by another parent of the child, and the
14	petitioner and the other parent have accepted that relationship or behaved as though the petitioner
15	is parental in nature; or a parent of the child;
16	(B) has exercised(iv) the petitioner has accepted full and permanent
17	parental responsibility without expectation of a financial compensation; and
18	(v) the continuing relationship between the petitioner and the child
19	pursuant is in the best interests of the child; or
20	(B) that before or after the child's birth, the petitioner entered into an agreement
21	in a record or orally with each parent of the child to accept full and permanent parental
22	responsibility and to raise the child together, except that if a parent has completely failed to a
23	court order; exercise parental responsibility, the consent of the parent who failed to exercise

1	parental responsibility is not required.
2	Reporter's Note: At the November 2015 Drafting Committee meeting, we decided to
3	move the definition of "de facto parent" to Section 5. After review of the act for style,
4	however, the definition will stay in this section since the term is used in multiple sections
5	As agreed at the November 2015 Drafting Committee meeting, the definition of "de factor
6	parent" is now based on the Maine statutory definition. The definition reduces some of
7	the redundant words in the Maine statute – i.e., the phrases "fully and completely,"
8	"fostered or supported," and "understood, acknowledged or accepted that or behaved as
9	though the individual is a parent of the child." Ms. Behr also noted the issue of
10	redundant words. See Appendix B of ULC Drafting Rules which is entitled "Do Not Use
11	Redundant Couplets." The definition in this act uses the term "parental responsibility"
12	(which we have been using and have separately defined in our act) rather than the Maine
13	act's term of "parental role."
14	det 5 term of parental fole.
15	(4) -"Detriment to the child" means adverse effect [harm] to the child's physical or
16	psychological well-being, including adversethe effects resulting from interruption of a
17	substantial beneficial relationship with the child or removal of the child from a stable placement
18	of a child with a non-parent.
19	(5) "Domestic violence" means domestic violence as defined in [cite to definition of
20	"domestic violence" in law of this state other than this [act]].
21	(6) "Electronic" means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic,
22	wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
23	(7) "Legal custody" means the power to make important decisions regarding a child.
24	Reporter's Note: Deborah Behr comments: "Definition of "Legal custody" is quite
2 <del>4</del> 25	broad. Covers teachers, judges, etc." Our earlier definition was more specific, although
26	the opening phrase is broad: "'Legal custody' means the power to make important
20 27	decisions regarding a child, including decisions regarding the child's education, health
28	care, and extracurricular activities.—.") Such a definition of "legal custody" is used in
28 29	many states.
30	many states.
31	<del>(6)</del>
32	(0)
33	(8) "Non-parent" mean an individual other than a parent, including a child's
34	grandparents, great-grandparents, step-parents, and siblings.

1	<del>(7)</del>
2	
3	Reporter's Note: Ms. Behr raises the questions of whether we wish to include domestic
4	partners in the definition. That seems reasonable to me. (I note that now that same-sex
5	couples can marry, there are likely to be fewer people seeking domestic partnerships (or
6	civil unions). She also notes that the definition is broad – "[i]ncludes any person in the
7	world." The definition is broad, in part, out of necessity to meet a variety of
8	circumstances that may arise, and, in any case, before "non-parents" can obtain custody
9	or visitation under this act, they must meet many criteria besides being a non-parent.
10	
11	(9) "Parent" means a person defined recognized as a parent under finsert reference to
12	other law in the of this state that defines "parent."] other than this [act].
13	<del>(8)</del>
14	
15	Report's Note: At the November 2015 Drafting Committee meeting, the committee
16	asked that two alternative definitions of the following term "parental responsibility"
17	be placed in brackets. The committee will choose between them, and perhaps fine-tune
18	the selection at the April 2016 meeting. I lean toward the second option, which is more
19	precise, although I do not think we need the word "mental" as part of the definition.
20	From my view, "mental needs" is an awkward phrase and is probably encompassed by
21	"emotional, developmental, and educational needs."
22	
23	(10) "Parental responsibility" means-the
24	Alternative A
25	[exercising care and control to provide for the health and welfare of the child in a manner
26	that provides.]
27	Alternative B
28	[providing for a child's well being, including the child's necessary physical needs, including
29	food, clothing and shelter, and provides for the mental and emotional health and development of
30	the child., mental, emotional, developmental, and educational needs].
31	(9) End of Alternatives
32	(11) "Parenting time" means parenting time as defined in [cite to definition of "parenting
33	time" in law of this state other than this [act].

1	(12) "Physical custody" means day-to-day care and supervision of a child-[.
2 3 4 5	Reporter's Note: Ms. Behr comments: "Definition of 'physical custody' seems broad. Looks like it covers daycare services." Perhaps we could add "by a person acting in a parental role." We also could add "pursuant to a court order."  (13) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that
6	is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
7	(14) "Sexual assault" means sexual assault as defined in [cite to definition of "sexual
8	assault" in law of this state other than this [act]].
9	(15) "Stalking" means stalking as defined in [cite to definition of "stalking" in law of this
10	state other than this [act]].
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Reporter's Note: Two definitions of "visitation" are offered. The first is the brief Black's Law Dictionary definition. The second provides a little more detail. Ms. Behr notes that the definition "seems broad [] covers school nurses for a majority of the child's time].physicals." As with the definition of "physical custody," we could add the phrase "pusuant to a court order."  (10)  (16) "Visitation" means
20	Alternative A
21	[access to thea child]
22	Alternative B
23	Reporter's Note
24 25	——————————————————————————————————————
	(CT ) (22
26	"Foster parent"
27	————"Kinship care provider"
28	
29	The federal government's definitions of these terms are provided in a memo from the
30	reporter to the Drafting Committee entitled "Additional Issues for the Drafting Committee."
31	[End "Reporter's note]
32	[the right to spend time with a child, which, may include overnights.]
33	End of Alternatives

Reporter's Note: Ms. Behr raises the issue of whether the act needs a definition of "state." I don't think so. This is not a jurisdictional act in which we are dealing with issues of recognition of out-of-state orders and need to clarify if Puerto Rico, the Virgin Island, and U.S. territories should be considered states. When we use the term "state," it is in brackets and is part of a direction to insert citation to other law within the state. A U.S. territory could insert its definition, if the territory adopts the act).

Comment

The definition of "child" is "an unemancipated individual who is less than the age of majority." same as that used in the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act, § 102(3) (2012). The age of majority in most states is 18, although some states set the age of majority at 18 or graduation from high school, and a few states set the age higher than 18. The (B) portion of the definition includes adult children who are the subject of a court order concerning custodial responsibility, such as persons with a developmental disability. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) defines "Child" as "an individual who has not attained 18 years of age." UCCJEA, § 102(2). The definition in this act adds the word "unemancipated" in order to make the definition more precise. [The first definition of "child" does not include an adult child with a developmental disability. Rights to custody of and visitation with adult children may be governed by a state's guardianship laws.]

# Reporter's Note regarding definition of "child"

The committee should decide whether the definition of "child" will include adult disabled children (like the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act) or not include adult disabled children (like the UCCJEA).

[End "Reporter's Note"]

The definition of "De facto parent of the child" is based on 13 Del. Code § 8-201(e) (2015). This In Family Law, the terms "custody" and "visitation" are flexible concepts. In most states, there is not a fixed amount of time the child spends with a parent who has "custody" or "visitation," although some states utilize guidelines to specify the time the child spends with the noncustodial parent. Nonetheless, a person with "custody" provides the child with a home or primary home. The drafters anticipate that visitation granted to non-parents will be decided on the facts of each case rather than by guidelines. The definition of "custody" includes joint custody or shared custody as defined by other state law. Thus, under this act, courts have the option of granting a non-parent joint custody or shared custody (as well as sole custody).

The definition of "de facto parent" is based on Maine Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1891 (2015), which also is similar to the definition in Delaware -- 13 Del. Code § 8-201(c) (2015). The Delaware definition includes the element that the person seeking status as a de facto parent "has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature." Some states set specific time periods before a person may obtain custody as a de factor facto custodian – e.g., six months or more if the child is under three years old, and one year or more if the child is three years of age of older.

See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.270 (2012); S.C. Code § 63-15-60 (2012). At least eleven states allow a non-parent to seek visitation if the child has lived with a person for a certain period of time, such as six or 12 months.

The Washington Supreme Court in the case of *In re Parentage of L.B.*, 122 P.3d 161, 163 (Wash. 2005) held that the state's "common law recognizes the status of de facto parents and grants them standing to petition for a determination of the rights and responsibilities that accompany legal parentage in this state." To establish standing as a de facto parent, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the following criteria:

- \_(1)—\_the natural or legal parent consented to and fostered the parent-like relationship,
- (2)—the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household,
- (3)—\_the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood without expectation of financial compensation, and
- (4)—\_the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature.

*Id.* at 176 (citations omitted).

The American Law Institute Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.03(1)(c) (2002) defines a de facto parent as "an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a significant period of time not less than two years, (i) lived with the child and, (ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions, (A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child, or (B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived."

# Reporter's Note regarding definition of "De facto parent of the child"

At the last Drafting Committee meeting, we decided to move the definition of "de facto parent" to the section on "Standing." However, since the term is now used in more than one section, the definition should remain in the "Definitions" section. [End "Reporter's Note"]

In Family Law, the terms "custody" and "visitation" are flexible concepts. In most states, there is not a fixed amount of time the child spends with a parent who has "custody" or "visitation," although some states utilize guidelines to specify the time the child spends with the noncustodial parent. Nonetheless, a person with "custody" provides the child with a home or primary home. The drafters anticipate that visitation granted to non-parents will be decided on the facts of each case rather than by guidelines. Some of the phrasing in the definition of "de facto parent" also is drawn from the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, § 2.03(1)(b) (2002). That section provides, as one of the alternative definitions of "parent by estoppel": "an individual who, though not a legal parent, . . . (iii) lived with the child since the child's birth, holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child's legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a child together each with full parental rights and responsibilities,

when the court finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child's best interests."

This section provides two alternate bases by which a petitioner can be determined by the court to be a de facto parent. There is overlap between the bases, as well as a difference between the bases. The first basis [subsection (a)] requires that "the petitioner has completely undertaken permanent, unequivocal, committed parental responsibility in the child's life," and requires that the court make five findings. The second basis [subsection (b)] requires that there be "an agreement . . . to accept full and permanent parental responsibility and to raise the child together." Both bases require agreement or consent of the parents for the petitioner to become a de facto parent (except consent of a parent is not necessary under the second basis if a parent has completely failed to exercise parental responsibility). The first basis focuses the quality and duration of the petitioner's relationship with the child. The second basis focuses on the existence of an agreement, and the agreement could be enforced soon after the child's birth even if the child and petitioner have not had a long-term relationship.

The definition of "Detriment to the child" is based on Cal. Fam.

Code § 3041(c) (2016) (a section entitled "Custody award to nonparent; findings of court; hearing"). That section provides: "As used in this section, 'detriment to the child' includes the harm of removal from a stable placement of a child with a person who has assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of his or her parent, fulfilling both the child's physical needs and the child's psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period of time. A finding of detriment does not require any finding of unfitness of the parents."

The definitions of "electronic" and "record" are the definitions provided by the Uniform Law Commission "Drafting Rules," Rule 304 (2012).

The definition of "legal custody" is "the power to make important decisions regarding a child, including." Such decisions regarding include the child's education, health care, and extracurricular activities." The list is non-exclusive, but it does not explicitly. "Legal custody" might include the power to enroll a child in a religious training, school, but it normally should not include selection of a child's religion since most courts have held both parents have a right to expose their child to his or her religious beliefs (or lack of religious beliefs). See, e.g., Felton v. Felton, 383 Mass. 232, 418 N.E.2d 606 (1981); In re Marriage of Mentry, 142 Cal. App 260, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1983); Hansen v. Hansen, 404 N.W.2d 460 (N.D. 1987).

The definition of "Detriment to the child" is based, in part, on Cal. Fam. Code § 3041(c) (2012) (a section entitled "Custody award to nonparent; findings of court; hearing").

The definition of "parent" is "a person defined recognized as a parent under the law of this state." other than this [act]." The sources of the definition of "parent" may include the state's parentage statutes, divorce statutes, and case law. In most states, "parent" would include biological parents, adoptive parents, and men who have acknowledged paternity (even though they are not biologically related to the child). "Parent" also might include persons who agree to conceive a child through assisted reproductive technology or by use of surrogates. Generally, a person ceases to be a parent if his or her rights have been terminated. In addition, a man who

donates sperm or a woman who donates an egg usually are not considered to be parents.

The definition of "parental responsibility" is based, in part, on Del. Code Ann. tit. on 13 Del. Code § 1101(10) (2015).13, § 1101(10) (2016), which provides: "Parental responsibilities' means the care, support and control of the child in a manner that provides for the child's necessary physical needs, including adequate food, clothing and shelter, and that also provides for the mental and emotional health and development of such child." Payment for the child's food, clothing, shelter, and other physical needs is not enough, by itself, to constitute exercise of parental responsibility.

# Reporter's Note about definition of "parent" and other terms

The Drafting Committee has been directed not to modify the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) (2002) regarding the definition of "parent." The UPA – which has been enacted in nine states – provides the following provisions regarding the definition of "parent":

§ 102(13) provides: "Parent" means an individual who has established a parent-child relationship under Section 201."

§ 201 regarding "Establishment of Parent-Child Relationship," provides:

- (a) The mother-child relationship is established between a woman and a child by:
  - (1) the woman's having given birth to the child [, except as otherwise provided in [Article] 8];
  - (2) an adjudication of the woman's maternity; [or]
  - (3) adoption of the child by the woman [; or
  - (4) an adjudication confirming the woman as a parent of a child born to a gestational mother if the agreement was validated under [Article] 8 or is enforceable under other law].
- (b) The father child relationship is established between a man and a child by:
  - (1) an unrebutted presumption of the man's paternity of the child under Section 204:
  - (2) an effective acknowledgment of paternity by the man under [Article] 3, unless the acknowledgment has been rescinded or successfully challenged;
  - (3) an adjudication of the man's paternity;
  - (4) adoption of the child by the man; [or]
  - (5) the man's having consented to assisted reproduction by a woman under [Article] 7 which resulted in the birth of the child [; or
  - (6) an adjudication confirming the man as a parent of a child born to a gestational mother if the agreement was validated under [Article] 8 or is enforceable under other law].

Delaware amended the state's Uniform Parentage Act to add to the list of bases for establishing a parent-child relationship "[a] determination by the court that the woman [or the man] is a de facto parent of the child." Del. Code The definition of "parenting time" is made with reference to law of the state other than this act. The term is a comparatively modern term

designed to supplement or replace the terms "custody" and "visitation," particularly in disputes between parents. The term is used to focus on parenting of the child and allocation of time with the child rather than which parent has "custody." The Illinois definition of "parenting time" is: "the time during which a parent is responsible for exercising caretaking functions and nonsignificant decision-making responsibilities with respect to the child." 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/600 (e) (2016). **Reporter's Note:** Regarding the section on "Pleadings," the Drafting Committee agreed that pleadings should include information required by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The committee also asked that the reporter prepare an alternate "Pleadings" section, which would include an "ideal" list of specific items to be included in pleadings, taking into consideration the suggestions of the National Organization for Women Foundation. Below are two alternatives: Alternative A, which is the original pleadings section with the addition of reference to the UCCJEA, and Alternative B, which includes a more detailed list specific items to be included in the pleadings. tit. 13, § 8-201 (2015). The earlier version of the Uniform Parentage Act, § 1 Act (1973) — which was adopted in 14 states and portions of it adopted in other states - provides: "As used in this Act, 'parent and child relationship' means the legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes the mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship." The Drafting Committee discussed using the term, and having a definition of, "legal parent." If the definition of "parent" is "a person defined as a parent under the law of this state," we probably do not need the term "legal parent." For the committee's reference, here are related definitions and commentary from other uniform acts and from Black's Law Dictionary: The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), § 2(14) (1997) provides: "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of a child." The Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act (UDPCVA), § 102 (2012)

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(2) "Caretaking authority" means the right to live with and care for a child on a day-to-day basis. The term includes physical custody, parenting time, right to access, and visitation.

provides the following definitions:

(5) "Custodial responsibility" includes all powers and duties relating to caretaking authority and decision-making authority for a child. The term includes physical custody, legal custody, parenting time, right to access, visitation, and authority to grant limited contact with a child.

(6) "Decision-making authority" means the power to make important decisions regarding a child, including decisions regarding the child's education, religious training, health care, extracurricular activities, and travel. The term does not include the power to make decisions that necessarily accompany a grant of caretaking authority.

# A Comment to the definition section of the UDPCVA states:

1 2

"The UDPCVA establishes one umbrella term, "custodial responsibility," for all issues relating to custody, including the responsibility often referred to in other state custody law as physical custody, visitation, and legal custody. The Act also establishes three subcategories of custodial responsibility that can be transferred to others during deployment: "caretaking authority," "decision-making authority," and "limited contact." The terminology used for each of these sub-categories is original to the UDPCVA. The term "caretaking authority" is meant to encompass the authority to live with, spend time with, or visit with a child. States often use a number of terms that fall within this definition, including "primary physical custody," "secondary physical custody," "visitation," and "possessory conservatorship." All these are meant to be subsumed under the term "caretaking authority."

In contrast, the term "decision making authority" means the authority to make decisions about a child's life beyond the authority that ordinarily accompanies a transfer of caretaking authority under state custody law. This term is meant to encompass the authority referred to in many states as "legal custody," including the authority reasonably necessary to make decisions such as the ability to enroll the child in a local school, to deal with health care, to participate in religious training, and to allow the child to engage in extracurricular activities and travel.

Finally, the term "limited contact" refers to a form of visitation with the child given to nonparents on the request of a deployed service member. This type of visitation allows the service member to sustain his or her relationship with the child through designating either a family member or other person with whom the child has a close relationship to spend time with the child during the service member's absence. The limited contact definition allows the possibility that it may be granted to minors as well as adults. Thus a minor half sibling or step sibling of the child could be granted limited contact during a service member's deployment. This type of contact with the child is a more limited form of visitation than courts usually grant to parents or grandparents outside the deployment context."

Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) provides definitions of the following terms:

"Physical custody" — "The right to have the child live with the person awarded custody by the court."

"Visitation" "A relative's, esp. a noncustodial parent's, period of access to a child. Also termed parental access; access; parenting time; residential time."

1	SECTION 3. PLEADINGS. A petition for
2	Alternative A
3	[The individual requesting custody or visitation shall befile a verified and specifypetition
4	specifying the factual basisfacts on which relief is sought, including the request is based. The
5	facts must include the nature the relationship between the petitioner and the child-and the
6	information required by [cite to Section 209 of this state's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
7	and Enforcement Act]].
8	Alternative B
9	[The individual requesting custody or visitation shall file a verified petition specifying the
10	facts on which the request is based. The facts must include:
11	(1) the nature the relationship between the petitioner and the child;
12	(2) if applicable, the nature of any agreement between the parties regarding care for the
13	child and contact with the child;
14	(3) attempts to obtain visitation or other contact with the child;
15	(4) the detriment to the child if the custody or visitation requested by the petitioner is not
16	granted; and
17	(5) the information required by [cite to Section 209 of this state's Uniform Child Custody
18	Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act]].
19	End of Alternatives
20	Comment
21 22 23 24 25 26	In the <u>U.S. Supreme</u> Court's plurality opinion in <u>Troxel v. Granville</u> , Justice O'Connor stated: "As Justice KENNEDY recognizes, the burden of litigating a domestic relations proceeding can itself be 'so disruptive of the parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain basic determinations for the child's welfare becomes implicated." 530 U.S. at 75, <i>quoting</i> Kennedy, J. at 530 U.S. at 101. Requiring verified pleading and specificity in pleadings is intended to reduce actions that are not meritorious and facilitate

1	Reporter's Note: Two alternatives are presented for the Drafting Committee to consider
2	regarding the following section on "Jurisdiction." Alternative A is based on the language
3	used in the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act, Section 5(a) (2006) after a style-
4	edit by Ms. Behr's to delete the phrase "at issue" and to make the sentence active rather
5	than passive. The language of Section 5(a) of the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention
6	Act is: "A petition under this [act] may be filed only in a court that has jurisdiction to
7	make a child-custody determination with respect to the child at issue under [insert
8	citation to Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act or the Uniform
9	Child Custody Jurisdiction Act]." The substance of Alternative B is the same and is
10	perhaps a little more reader-friendly (particularly for non-lawyers).
11	permaps a major reader intendry (particularly for non-law yels).
12	SECTION 4. JURISDICTION. A petition seeking non-parental custody or visitation
13	may be filed only in a court that has jurisdiction under [insert citation to the Uniform Child
14	Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act].
15	Alternative A
16	[The individual requesting custody or visitation shall file a petition only in a court that
17	has jurisdiction to make a child-custody determination with respect to the child under [cite to this
18	state's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act]].
19	Alternative B
20	[The individual requesting custody or visitation shall file a petition only in a court that
21	has jurisdiction under [cite to this state's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
22	Act]].
23	End of Alternatives
24	Comment
25	The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (1997) has
26	been adopted in 49 states. As of October 2015 February 2016, Massachusetts is the only state
27	that has not adopted the UCCJEA, although Massachusetts did adopt the Uniform Child Custody
28	Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). The Uniform Law Commission has promulgated a 2013 version of
29	the UCCJEA (to cover international issues) as well as domestic issues. As of October
30	2015 February 2016, the 2013 UCCJEA has not been adopted in any states.
31	2010 2010 and 2010 0 000 11 has not been adopted in any states.
32	If at the time a petition is filed under this act, an action is already pending regarding the
33	same child, the petition should be filed as part of the pending action (assuming the pending


1	action is filed in compliance with the UCCJEA).
2	Indialization and Nation Associated distance in account that the Indian Child Welfers And
3 4	Jurisdiction over Native American children is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act,
5	25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. (2015).
	Departure's Notes. Derhans the preceding contained (or concept) should be in the text of
6	Reporter's Note: Perhaps the preceding sentence (or concept) should be in the text of
7	the act. Ms. Behr asks if we "need a scope section for whether Indian children covered
8	by the Indian Child Welfare Act are included under the Act?"
9	Inclusion of such a scope section seems like a useful reminder to litigants and courts
10	(although, in a technical sense, the scope section is not necessary since the Indian Child
11	Welfare Act preempts any inconsistent state law). The Uniform Child Custody
12	Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) has a scope provision. Section 104(a) of
13	the UCCJEA – entitled "Application To Indian Tribes" – provides: "A child-custody
14	proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25
15	U.S.C. 1901 et seq., is not subject to this [act] to the extent that it is governed by the
16	Indian Child Welfare Act." On the other hand, the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody
17	and Visitation Act and the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act do not have such a a
18	<u>provision.</u>
19	
20	SECTION 5. PERSONS WHO MAY BRING ACTION [STANDING]. INITIAL
21	PETITION BY DE FACTO PARENT.
22	[A non-nount way being an action for [may analy] and a dy an visitation]
22	[A non-parent may bring an action for [may seek] custody or visitation]
23	[A non-parent has standing to seek custody or visitation] if:
23	174 Hon-parent has standing to seek custody of visitation; in:
24	(1) before the child's birth, the non-parent entered into a written [or oral] agreement with
<b>∠</b> ¬	(1) before the child's offth, the non-parent effected into a written [of orar] agreement with
25	the child's parent or parents, if the child has more than one parent, to accept full and permanent
23	the enite is parent of parents, if the enite has more than one parent, to accept full this permanent
26	responsibilities as a parent and to raise the child together;
20	responsionates as a parent and to raise the emit together,
27	(2) the non-parent(a) An individual who has served as a de facto parent of the may file an
	(2) the new parent with many than server as were parent of the many than the server parent of the many than the server parent of the se
28	initial petition for custody of or visitation with the child:
29	(3b) The court shall adjudicate a petitioner to be a de facto parent if the court finds by
30	clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is a de facto parent.
31	(c) A petitioner adjudicated to be a de facto parent has the same right to custody,
32	visitation, or parenting time as a parent.
33	Reporter's Note: Ms. Rehr comments that although some sections refer to "Initial

Petition[s]," there is no mention of "Subsequent Petitions." (The differentiation the 1 2 Drafting Committee made was between "Initial Petition[s]" and actions to modify 3 existing orders." Ms. Behr suggested we might use the word "commence" for initial 4 actions. I think that verb has some ambiguity since both an initial action and a modification action can be "commenced." For this draft, I tried to deal with Ms. Behr's 5 concern by keeping the phrase "Initial Petition" and adding the phrase "Petition to 6 7 Modify." 8 9 Commentboth parents are deceased, incapacitated, for unfit, or there has been a complete 10 failure of the parents to exercise parental responsibility [and a substantial relationship exists 11 between the child and the non-parent]; or 12 (4) denial of "De facto parent" is defined in the definition section of this act [Section 2(3)]. As noted 13 14 in the Comment to that section, a trend in the law is to grant rights by statute or case law to de facto parents to seek custody or visitation to the non-parent would be a detriment to the child, 15 16 and a substantial relationship exists between the child and the non-parent. 17 Comment 18 The requirement of a standing [The designation of . States which provide that de facto parents (or persons who may bring an action) serves to protect the interests of parents and filter 19 20 out cases in which the non-parent does not have a meritorious claim, while at the same time 21 allowing the opportunity to preserve relationships between children and non-parents within 22 whom the children have a particularly close relationship. Many states provide that a non-parent 23 has standing if that person has served as a de facto parent (or stood in loco parentis) to the child— 24 e.g.,) have standing to seek custody or visitation include: AZ, CT, DE, HA, IN, KY, MN, MT, 25 PA, WA. A related concept is that the an individual may seek visitation (or custody) if the child 26 has been residing with the person seeking custody individual for a certain period of time – e.g., 27 CA, MI, NV, WI. In Illinois, a non-parent has standing if the child is not in custody of a parent. 28 29 The act provides four alternative bases for standing.

The first basis for standing 30 an agreement to prior to the child's birth for the non-parent to accept responsibilities as a parent 31 —right of de facto parents to seek custody or visitation applies to couples of the same sex or different sex who agree to raise a child together, even though only one of the parties is related to 32 33 the child by genetics, adoption, or other bases for parenthood recognized by the state. Some of 34 the phrasing in this subsection is drawn from the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law 35 of Family Dissolution, § 2.03(1)(b) (2002). That section provides, as one of the alternative definitions of "parent by estoppel": "an individual who, though not a legal parent, ... 36 with the child since the child's birth, holding out and accepting full and permanent 37

responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child's legal parent 1 2 (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a child together each with full parental 3 rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is in 4 the child's best interests." 5 6 Regarding This section [coupled with the second basis for standing service as a 7 definition of "de facto parent—if a state's law already" in Section 2(3)(b)] provides that a de 8 facto parent is a "who has entered into an agreement with the parent," then that existing law 9 gives the de facto parent standing, and this act would not apply. 10 fA comment is likely "to be inserted about third basis of standing "accept full and permanent 11 parental responsibility and to raise the child together" "has the same right to custody, visitation, 12 13 or parenting time as a parent." Agreements between parents regarding custody of children have 14 been held to be of "constitutional magnitude" and entitled to presumptive enforcement. In re Marriage of Coulter and Trinidad, 2012 IL 113474, 364 III. Dec. 59, 976 N.E.2d 337, 342 15 16 (enforcing an agreement between parents regarding future relocation of the children). See also Frazier v. Goudschaal, 296 Kan. 730, 295 P.3d 542 (2013) (enforcing a coparenting agreement 17 between members of a same-sex couple); Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 973 A.2d 347, 350 18 (2009) (enforcing parents' agreement to arbitrate a custody dispute). both parents are deceased, 19 20 incapacitated, [or unfit], or there has been a complete failure of the parents to exercise parental responsibility [and 21 22 In this section (as well as in Section 6 and 7) the standards for being able to obtain 23 24 custody or visitation are the same. 25 26 SECTION 6. INITIAL PETITION BY NON-PARENT OF CHILD IN CUSTODY 27 OF PARENT OR DE FACTO PARENT. (a) If a child is in the custody of a parent or de facto parent, a non-parent requesting 28 29 custody or visitation may file an initial petition with the court for custody of or visitation with 30 the child if the non-parent demonstrates: (1) a substantial relationship exists between the child and the non-parent. , and 31 32 (2) the denial of custody or visitation to the non-parent would be a detriment to 33 the child. 34 (b) In a proceeding under subsection (a), a rebuttable presumption exists that the parent's or de facto parent's decision about custody and visitation is in the best interests of the child. To 35 36 rebut the presumption, the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that:

1 (1) denial of custody or visitation to the petitioner is a detriment to the child, and 2 (2) custody or visitation to petitioner is the best interests of the child. 3 Proof of parental unfitness is not required to rebut the presumption described in subsection (b). 4 **Comment** The fourth basis for standing provides that a non-parent party has standing to seek 5 6 custody or visitation if "denial of custody or visitation to the non-parent would be a detriment to the child, and a substantial relationship exists between the child and the non-parent." That 7 8 criteria is designed to reflect the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville, 530 9 (2000), in which the Court struck down Washington State's third party visitation statute as 10 applied. Justice O'Connor, in a plurality decision, said "The Superior Court's order was not founded on any special factors that might justify the State's interference with Granville's 11 12 fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her two daughters." Id. at 68. 13 14 The statutes of many states specify categories of persons who may seek visitation. E.g., 15 grandparents, great grandparents, stepparents, siblings, or persons who have raised the child for a certain period of time. In addition, This section governs requests for custody or visitation by a 16 non-parent when the child is in the custody of a parent or de facto parent. Section 2(8) defines 17 18 "non-parent" as "an individual other than a parent, including a child's grandparents, greatgrandparents, step-parents, and siblings." The most common persons seeking custody or 19 20 visitation will be one of the specifically listed categories of individuals, but the definition allows 21 others to seek custody or visitation if the requirements of the act are met. 22 23 The statutes of many states specify the circumstances in which visitation may be sought – circumstances which often involve some disruption of the family – e.g., divorce, separation, 24 25 death of a parent, or a child born outoutside of wedlockmarriage. These The categories of 26 persons who may seek visitation and the broad description of circumstances in which visitation 27 may be sought do not, by themselves, provide a reliable indicator of whether non-parental 28 visitation (or custody) should be allowed. It is preferable to focus on the factors used to decide 29 visitation or custody, particularly the closeness of the relationship between the child and the non-30 parent. 31 32 This act does not set a maximum number of persons who may obtain rights of custody or 33 visitation. In most cases, the number of actively involved parental figures probably will not be 34 large. As courts sort through complex family structures, the number of persons acting in a parental role is a factor that should be considered -- but without applying a fixed rule about how 35 many parental figures with rights to time with the child is too many. The focus needs to remain 36 37 on the best interests of the child. 38 The presumption 39 Reporter's Note 40 41 Additional comments and other options regarding standing: 42



4	(ii) has exercised parental responsibility for the child; and (iii) has acted in a parental role for a ength of time sufficient to have established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child
ŧ	that is parental in nature").
1	8. Note that an enforceable agreement to raise a child together could be viewed as an elternative to (or a bypass of) adoption laws—at least for the purpose of custody and visitation. Presumably this act—which focuses on custody and visitation—will not modify other areas of aw, such as Probate Law and rights to compensation for personal injury.
1	9. A prior draft of the third basis for standing [regarding both parents being deceased or incapacitated] also required that "a substantial relationship exists between the child and the non-parent." Perhaps it is better to leave out that requirement in order to allow for cases in which the parents are deceased or incapacitated; the child needs to be placed somewhere; and the non-parent seems to be good candidate for custody, even if the non-parent's relationship with the child is not currently substantial.
1 5	10. An interesting issued related to this section (or another section): How to handle cases in which the non-parent's level of relationship with the children varies. For example, assume the grandparents helped raise a child who is now 10 years old and have a very close relationship with that child. The parents have a second child, who is one year old at the time the grandparents seek visitation. The grandparents have a moderate relationship with the second child, but never raised the child on a day-to-day basis. If the grandparent can meet the criteria for visitation with the first child, should they also be able to obtain visitation with the second child, or should they be prevented from doing so?
	11. Another issue: What if non-parents (e.g., grandparents) sought to have substantial relationship with child, but were not able to because parent(s) unreasonably blocked the relationship? To what degree does <i>Troxel</i> permit fit parents to be arbitrary in their decisions?
- <del>\</del>	12. Should non-parent visitation be allowed to continue following adoption of a child by a relative? (Many state laws so provide.)
1	13. A broad issue for consideration by the Drafting Committee will be the mpact of the U.S. Supreme Court decision on same sex marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges). [The ULC has recently established a study committee that will follow developments at the Supreme Court and make recommendations as to whether the Uniform Parentage Act or other ULC acts should be revised in light of the Supreme Court decision.] [End "Reporter's Note"]
	SECTION 6. PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN INITIAL
7	ACTIONS. In initial actions for custody or visitation:
	(a) Agreement to raise a child together. A non-parent found by [a preponderance of the
	evidence   [clear and convincing evidence] to have entered into a written [or oral] agreement

1 under Section 5(1) before the child's birth has the same right as the parent to obtain custody and 2 visitation. (b) Initial action for custody between parent and non-parent. In other actions for custody 3 4 of a child between a parent and a non-parent, there is a rebuttable presumption that parental 5 custody is in the best interests of the child. The non-parent seeking custody must rebut the 6 presumption by [clear and convincing evidence] [a preponderance of the evidence] that custody 7 with the non-parent is in the best interests of the child and that custody with the parent would be a detriment to the child. Proof of parental unfitness is not required to rebut the presumption. 8 9 (c) Initial action for custody between two or more non-parents. In an initial action for 10 custody of a child between two or more non-parents, there is no presumption that custody should 11 be given to a particular party. The burden of persuasion to show the best interests of the child is 12 by [a preponderance of the evidence] [clear and convincing evidence]. If an action for custody 13 between two or more non-parents is brought under law of this state other than this act, the other 14 law applies. 15 (d) Initial action for visitation when child in custody of parent or non-parent under 16 agreement to raise child together. In an initial action regarding visitation when the child is in the custody of a parent or a non-parent who has been found to have entered into a written [or oral] 17 18 agreement Section 5(1)to raise a child together, there is a rebuttable presumption that the 19 custodian's decision about visitation is in the best interests of the child. To rebut the presumption, the non-parent seeking visitation must establish by [clear and convincing evidence] 20 [a preponderance of the evidence] (i) that absence of visitation will be a detriment to the child [or 21 that special factors exist to justify the visitation probably delete this bracketed phrase and (ii) 22 that the visitation will be in the best interests of the child. 23

[Reporter's query to the Drafting Committee: Did the Committee wish to include de facto 1 2 parents in this section so that the categories of persons entitled to a presumption in favor of their 3 decisions will include: (1) parents, (2) non-parents who have been found to have entered into a 4 valid written [or oral] agreement to raise a child together under Section 5(1), and (3) de facto 5 parents? If so, subsection (e) also will need to be revised.] 6 7 (e) Initial action for visitation when child in custody of non-parent with no agreement to 8 raise a child together. In an initial action regarding visitation with a child when the child is in the 9 custody of a non-parent with whom there is not an agreement to raise the child together, the court 10 must allow visitation by a non-parent if the party seeking visitation establishes by [a preponderance of the evidence [clear and convincing evidence] that visitation is in the best 11 12 interests of the child. 13 Comment 14 This section governs initial actions by non-parents for custody and visitation. 15 Modification of orders is governed by Section 7. 16 17 Subparagraph (a) provides that a non-parent who has entered into a valid written [or oral] 18 agreement with a child's parent(s) to raise a child together have the same rights to obtain custody 19 and visitation as the parent. Agreements between parents regarding custody of children have been held to be of "constitutional magnitude" and entitled to presumptive enforcement. In re 20 Marriage of Coulter and Trinidad, 2012 IL 113474, 364 III. Dec. 59, 976 N.E.2d 337, 342 21 22 (enforcing an agreement between parents regarding future relocation of the children). See also Frazier v. Goudschaal, 296 Kan. 730, 295 P.3d 542 (2013) (enforcing a coparenting agreement 23 24 between members of a same-sex couple); Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 973 A.2d 347, 350 (2009) (enforcing parents' agreement to arbitrate a custody dispute). 25 26 27 The presumption and burden of proof in subparagraph (b) recognize the superior right of 28 parents to custody of their children in custody disputes with non-parents, and also provides that 29 the superior right or presumption can be overcome. The standard in subparagraph (b) is similar to Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 5327(b) (2015). 30 31 32 As stated in Black's Law Dictionary, "The Burden of proof includes both the burden of 33 persuasion and the burden of production." Black's Law Dictionary (7<sup>th</sup> ed. 1999). 34 35 The presumption and burden of proof in the first two sentences of subparagraph (c), 36 regarding custody disputes between non-parents, is based on Pa. Stat. tit. 23, § 5327(c) (2015). The third sentence of subparagraph (b) provides: "If an action for custody between two or more 37 third parties is brought under a law other than this act, the other law shall govern." Thus, if a 38 39 state has law governing custody of children who are in foster care, the foster care law of that

state would govern. If an action is brought under a state's guardianship laws, the guardianship laws would control.

The presumption and burden of proof in subparagraph (d), regarding visitation disputes between a parent and a non-parent, applies the standard in is designed to meet the requirements of *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), in which the Supreme Court struck down Washington State's third party visitation statute as applied. Justice O'Connor, in a plurality decision, said the Washington statute "contains no requirement that a court accord the parent's decision any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever." *Id.* at 67, 120 S.Ct. at 2061. "The Superior Court's order was not founded on any special factors that might justify the State's interference with Granville's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her two daughters." *Id.* at 68, 120 S.Ct. at 2061.

In the years since *Troxel* was decided, state courts have generally held that a grandparent's claim that they have the grandparent has a positive relationship with their the grandchild is not sufficient to justify an order of visitation over the objection of a parent. *See*, *e.g.*, *Neal v. Lee*, 2000 Ok 90, 14 P.3d 547 (2000); *State Dept. of Social and Rehabilitative Services v. Paillet*, 16 P.3d 962 (2001); *Flynn v. Henkel*, 227 Ill.2d 176, 880 N.E.2d 166 (2007). On the other hand, if the grandparent has a substantial relationship with the grandchild – such as raising the child for a few years – that can be the basis for granting visitation to the grandparent over the parents' objection. *See*, *e.g.*, *Rideout v. Riendeau*, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000) (the grandparents had helped raise their grandchildren for the first seven years of the oldest grandchild's life and for lesser periods for the younger grandchildren); *E.S. v. P.D.*, 8 N.Y.3d 150, 863 N.E.2d 100 (2007) (grandparents cared for children while the mother was dying of cancer).

Subparagraph (e) governs initial actions for visitation when child in custody of non-parent with no agreement to raise a child together. Since This act does not set a maximum number of persons who may obtain rights of custody or visitation. In most cases, the number of actively involved parental figures probably will not be large. As courts sort through complex family structures, the number of persons acting in a parental role is a factor that should be considered -- but without applying a fixed rule about how many parental figures with rights to time with the child is too many. The focus needs to remain on the best interests of the child.

# SECTION 7. INITIAL PETITION BY NON-PARENT OF CHILD NOT IN

# **CUSTODY OF PARENT OR DE FACTO PARENT.**

- (a) If the child is not in the custody of a parent or de facto parent, a non-parent requesting
- 38 <u>custody or visitation may file an initial petition with the court for custody of or visitation with</u>
- 39 the child if the non-parent demonstrates a substantial relationship exists between the child and
- 40 the non-parent.

1 (b) In an initial proceeding for custody of or visitation with a child between two or more 2 petitioners who are non-parents, a presumption does not exist that custody or visitation should be 3 given to the petitioner. 4 (c) To obtain custody or visitation, the non-parent must establish by clear and convincing 5 evidence that custody or visitation for the non-parent is in the best interests of the child. 6 Comment 7 This section governs custody and visitation disputes when the child is not in the custody 8 of a parent or de facto parent. The non-parent needs to demonstrate a substantial relationship 9 exists between the child and the non-parent and establish by clear and convincing evidence that 10 custody or visitation for the non-parent is in the best interests of the child. If the petitioner does not prove his or her case by clear and convincing evidence, other laws – such as guardianship 11 laws – are available to decide custody and visitation issues. In cases in which the dispute does 12 13 not involve a parent, the Supreme Court's holding in *Troxel* regarding giving deference to a 14 parent's decision does not apply, and visitation may be granted if it is in the best interests of the 15 child to do so. ..... 16 17 Subsection (b) is similar to 23 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5327(c) (West 2016), which provides: "In any action regarding the custody of the child between a nonparent and 18 19 another nonparent, there shall be no presumption that custody should be awarded to a particular 20 party." 21 22 **Reporter's Note:** Before review for style, this draft had a subsection (d), which 23 provided: "If a non-parent's petition for custody or visitation is filed under law of this 24 state other than this act, the other law applies." Ms. Behr commented: "Not needed. Covered by other law." 25 26 27 We discussed having a section which would give standing to a non-parent based on the 28 non-parent having exercised parental responsibility pursuant to a court order. 29 Presumably, a non-parent would have standing under whatever law that granted them parental responsibility (as well as potential standing under this act if the person if the 30 31 criteria of this act were met). 32 33 We have discussed, but not firmly decided, whether to explicitly deal with situations in 34 which "both parents are deceased, incapacitated, [or unfit], or there has been a complete failure of the parents to exercise parental responsibility [and a substantial relationship 35 exists between the child and the non-parent]." These situations could be covered by 36 Sections 5-7. 37

38

# 1 SECTION 8. HISTORY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT, OR

- **STALKING.** There is a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interests of a child to
- 3 grant legal custody, physical custody, or visitation to a non-parent who has a history of
- 4 perpetrating domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking against the other parent, the child, the
- 5 child's siblings, or a child's custodial guardian.

- **Reporter's Note:** The above language was proposed by the ABA Commission on Domestic Violence and Sexual Violence. The ABA Commission also proposes language that would create a rebuttable presumption against custody or visitation for parents who have engaged in domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking. In addition, the Commission proposes language to create a rebuttable presumption against granting legal or physical custody to "A non-parent whom has kinship or other significant ties to a parent or person who has committed domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking against the other parent, the child, the child's siblings, or a child's custodial guardian."
- From my view, standards for parental custody or visitation are beyond the scope of this act.

Regarding a non-parent's kinship or other significant ties to a person who has committed domestic violence, etc., I agree that should be a relevant factor in the non-parent's request for custody or visitation (and it is listed as a factor in Section 9). If a proposed custodian is living with an abuser or would expose the child to an abuser, that would be a strong negative factor against the proposed custodian. If, however, the proposed custodial (or visitor) has a relative or friend who has abused somebody, but the proposed custodian or visitor agrees not have the child in the company of that person (or not to have the child in the company of that person without others around), I view the non-parent's significant ties to the abuser to be a less relevant factor. The proposed language creating a rebuttable presumption against custody or visitation for a person who has "kinship or other significant ties" to someone who has engaged in abuse, is unduly broad.

Ms. Behr proposes that the list of persons against whom domestic violence has been perpetrated include "domestic partners." That seems like a reasonable suggestion. Alternatively, she asks if the phrase "family members" would work (as a substitute for the more detailed list of persons). [The potential problem with the phrase "family members" is that the phrase is somewhat vague. Does it, for example, include third cousins or inlaws?]

	<u>Alternative A</u>
	As stated in Black's Law Dictionary, "The Buren of proof includes both the burden of
	persuasion and the burden of production." Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999).
	Reporter's Note
	Additional question and comment (applicable to this section and other sections): In order for relief to be granted (custody or visitation), should a showing of harm be required?
	[The U.S. Supreme Court in <i>Troxel</i> did not require that, although some states have required a
	showing of harm—e.g., Connecticut, Illinois, and Washington.
	— David Biklen, a member of the Drafting Committee and a member of the Style
1	Committee has given an informal suggestion to provide a separate section number for each of the
	Five bases for standing. This draft places the five bases in a single section and gives
,	subparagraphs for each of the bases for standing. We may wish to discuss this issue, although
1	ultimate resolution of the issue is likely to be determined by the Style Committee.
	SECTION 7. MODIFICATION. Custody and visitation orders entered under
	this act may be modified[When determining whether to grant custody or visitation under this
	[act], the court shall consider the best interests of a child. In determining the best interests of a
	child, the court shall consider:
	(1) the quality of the relationship between the child and the parent;
	(2) the quality of the relationship between the child and petitioner, including whether the
	petitioner has served as a de facto parent of the child;
	(3) the frequency and continuity of contact between the child and the petitioner,
	including the period of any disruption in the contact and the reasons for the disruption;
	(4) the views of the child, having regard to the child's age and maturity;
	(5) the willingness and ability of the parent and petitioner to facilitate, a positive
	relationship among the child, parties to the proceeding, and family members of the child, except
	that the court may not consider this willingness and ability if the parent or custodian of the child

1	shows that the petitioning party has engaged in domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking
2	against the parent, child, child's siblings, or custodial guardian, and that a continuing relationship
3	with the petitioner party will affect negatively the health or safety of the parent, child, child's
4	siblings, custodial parent, or custodial guardian;
5	(6) the child's adjustment to the child's current and proposed home, school, and
6	community;
7	(7) the mental and physical health of the child and parties to the proceeding, including
8	alcohol abuse and drug abuse by the child or parties to the proceeding;
9	(8) a history of or threat of child abuse, child neglect, domestic violence, sexual assault,
10	or stalking towards a parent, the child, child's siblings, or custodial guardian (A) by application
11	of [insert citation to the state's lawthe petitioner or (B) by an individual with whom the petitioner
12	has kinship or a significant relationship;
13	(9) the reasons for the parties' positions in the proceeding regarding modification of
14	custody and visitation-orders applicable to-;
15	(10) an agreement among the parties regarding custody or visitation; and
16	(11) any other relevant factor affecting the best interests of the child.]
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Reporter's Note: At the November 2015 Drafting Committee meeting, the committee discussed several possible additions to the list of factors. The additions generally could be viewed as sub-categories of the existing factors, particularly the first three factors. We agreed to list the possible additional factors in the next draft and then decide whether to include them, balancing the desire compehensiveness and precision with a desire not to make the list too unwieldy. The proposed additional factors are:
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29	<ul> <li>(A) specific parent-like activities undertaken by the non-parent;</li> <li>(B) nature and extent of parental involvement by the non-parent;</li> <li>(C) any significant absence of the parent from the child's life;</li> <li>(D) death of a parent.</li> </ul>
29 30	Ms. Behr comments that the ULC has a preference for use of the singular in technical drafting. Thus, the Style Committee may prefer the term "best interest" rather than "best

1 2	interests." She also notes that statutes and court cases have used both terms. From my review of statutes and case law, the plural "best interests" is much more widely used
3	than "best interest," and for that reason, I favor use of "best interests."
4 5	Alternative B
6	[When determining whether to grant custody or visitation under this [act], the court shall
7	consider the factors specified in [cite to law of this state other than this [act] for deciding custody
8	or visitation disputes between parents].]].
9	End of Alternatives
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Legislative Note: The act offers two alternatives for a list of factors a court shall consider when determining whether to grant custody or visitation to non-parents. Alternative A lists 11 factors, which are similar to the lists of factors in the 36 states that have factors in statutes pertaining non-parental visitation and custody. Alternative B provides a cross-reference to the state's existing factors that are considered in disputes between parents regarding custody, visitation, or parenting time. Before using Alternative B, drafters should ascertain if the list of factors in parental disputes is applicable to disputes involving non-parents. Some factors may be specific to parents, such as the wishes of the parents regarding custody or the willingness of the parents to encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other parent.
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29	Reporter's Note: I suggest the Drafting Committee adopt Alternative A (listing 11 factors for the court to consider). There are at least two reasons for this approach. First, when states enacted third party visitation statutes, 36 states listed specific factors for consideration – thus reflecting a preference by legislatures for use of specific factors rather than just a cross-reference to another portion of the state's Family Law statutes. Second, when a state lists factors to be considered in disputes between parents, the factors often are phrased in terms of the parents' conduct or relationship with the child – rather than a more generic factor that would be equally applicable to disputes between two parents versus a parent and a non-parent (or two or more non-parents).  As the drafting process proceeds, official "comments" will be included regarding the "Factors
31	Considered." The comments will note the number of states that have listed factors in the state's
32	non-parental visitation (and custody) statutes. The comments also may address specific factors.
33	Comment
34	SECTION 10. PETITION TO MODIFY CUSTODY OR VISITATION. A petition
35	to modify a custody or visitation order entered under this [act] shall be decided under [cite to the

1 law of this state other than this act for modification of a custody, visitation, or parenting time 2 order applicable to a dispute between parents). 3 Comment 4 This section makes reference to a state's existing law regarding modification of custody 5 and, visitation, or parenting time orders applicable to disputes between parents. In most states, 6 that standard is a showing of substantial change of circumstances coupled with a showing that modification is in the best interests of the child (although a few states have different standards, 7 8 such as requiring a showing of endangerment if modification is sought within two years of a 9 prior order). See Jeff Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice - Second Edition, §§ 10.1 -10 10.13 (LexisNexis 20142015). Under this approach, a custody or visitation order in favor of a 11 non-parent generally would stay the same unless the substantial change of circumstances and best interests of the child were shown. 12 13 14 SECTION 8. FACTORS CONSIDERED. 15 Alternative A When determining whether to grant custody or visitation under this act, the court must 16 17 consider the best interests of the child and: 18 (1) the quality of relationship between the child and the parent and between the child and 19 non-parent, including whether the non-parent has served as a de facto parent of the child; 20 (2) the frequency and continuity of contact between the child and the non-parent; (3) the views of the child, having regard to the child's age and maturity; 21 (4) the willingness of the parent and non-parents to facilitate, as appropriate, a positive 22 23 relationship among the child, the parties to the proceedings, and family members of the child; 24 (5) the child's adjustment to the child's current and proposed home, school, and 25 community; (6) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; 26 (7) a history of or threat of domestic violence, child abuse, or child neglect; 27 (8) the reasons for the parties' positions regarding custody and visitation; 28

1	[(9) an agreement between the parties regarding custody or visitation;] and
2	(10) any other relevant factor affecting the best interests of the child.
3	Alternative B
4	When making any determination under this act, the court must consider the factors
5	specified in [insert citation to the state's factors used for deciding custody disputes
6	between parents].
7	End of alternatives
8	Reporter's Note: Ms. Behr raises the issue of whether a "judgment" as well as an "order"
9	<u>needs</u> Comment
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	I suggest the Drafting Committee adopt the first alternative (listing specific factors to be considered). There are at least two reasons for this approach. First, when states enacted third party visitation statutes, 36 states listed specific factors for consideration—thus reflecting a preference by legislatures for use of specific factors rather than just a cross-reference to another portion of the state's Family Law statutes. Second, when a state lists factors to be considered in disputes between parents, the factors often are phrased in terms of the parents' conduct or relationship with the child—rather than a more generic factor that would be equally applicable to disputes between two parents versus a parent and a non-parent (or two or more non-parents).  — One additional factor the Drafted Committee discussed was an agreement between the parties. Some members of the committee believed the factor could be useful and could help resolve disputes. Others were concerned agreements could be coerced and that circumstances may change between the time of the agreement and the time at which enforcement of the agreement is sought. It also was noted that if the parties come to court with an agreement regarding custody or visitation, many (or most) states would treat the agreement as presumptively valid.
27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36	Some members of the Drafting Committee proposed use of language in the introduction to covered by this section along the lines of "factors such as" or "factors, including." I believe the final factor ("any other relevant factor affecting the best interests of the child") provides flexibility. The language, of course, can be reworked if the committee wishes I think the word "order" covers judgments."  As the drafting process proceeds, official "comments" will be included regarding the "Factors Considered." The comments will note the number of states that have listed factors in the state's non-parental visitation (and custody) statutes. The comments also may address specific factors.—[End Reporter's Comment]

1	SECTION 911. TEMPORARY ORDER.—
2	(a) On motion of a party and] after hearing and establishment of a prima facie case or the
3	court's own motion, the court may enter a temporary order while the action proceeding is
4	pending.
5	(b) An order entered under this section has no presumptive effect and is not determinative
6	when the court considers petitions for other orders under this [act].
7	Comment
8 9 10 11 12	This section makes explicit that the court has the power to enter temporary, as well as permanent, orders. The factors listed in Section 8 apply to both temporary and permanent orders. Subsection (b) is similar to Va. Code Ann. § 20-103(E) (West 2015), which provides: "An order entered pursuant to this section shall have no presumptive effect and shall not be determinative when adjudicating the underlying cause."
13 14 15 16	The details of what must be shown to obtain a temporary order is left to local practice – e.g., use of affidavits, need for hearing, elements of proof.
17 18	The factors listed in Section 9 apply to both temporary and permanent orders.
19 20 21 22	Reporter's Note: Ms. Behr asks the question: "What are the temporary orders about? Do they have any specific standards – like TRO?" I believe the Drafting Committee intended to leave the issue of standards for temporary orders to local practice. I have added a "comment" to that effect.
23 24	SECTION 12. EFFECT OF ADOPTION OF CHILD BY A RELATIVE. The
25	adoption of a child by a relative, including a stepparent, does not preclude granting custody or
26	visitation to a petitioner who is a non-parent.
27	<u>Comment</u> <u>SECTION 10.</u>
28 29 30 31 32	As of 2013, the statutes of 24 states explicitly allow visitation for non-parents if the child has been adopted by a relative, including a stepparent. Jeff Atkinson, <i>Shifts in the Law Regarding Rights of Third Parties to Seek Visitation and Custody of Children</i> , 47 Fam. L. Q. 1, 20-23 (Spring 2013).
33	<b>SECTION 13.</b> APPOINTMENTS AND COURT SERVICES. To the extent available
34	in other cases involving custody and visitation of children, the court may do one or more of the

1	following:
2	(1)- appoint a child's attorney, guardian ad litem, child's representative, or similar
3	personnel;
4	(2)- order mediation, but a party who has been the victim of domestic violence by another
5	party to the proceedingsproceeding, shall not be required to participate in mediation;
6 7 8 9 10 11	[Reporter's noteNote: The Drafting Committee discussed bracketing a portion of subsection (2) or including additional language in the subsection – perhaps to allow for mediation in jurisdictions that have appropriate protections for victims of domestic violence – e.g., shuttle mediation in which the parties do not have direct contact with each other.] [End Reporter's Note].
12	(3) -order evaluations or home studies of the child, parent, de facto parent, or petitioners
13	who are non-parents; and
14	(4) -allocate payment <u>among the parties to the proceeding</u> of fees for the services listed in
15	this section.
16	Comment
17 18 19 20	A variety of personnel and court services may assist the court in making decisions regarding non-parental custody and visitation. This act does not mandate the creation of new services in jurisdictions where no similar services exist, but the act does make such services available if the services already are utilized in other custody and visitation cases.
18 19	regarding non-parental custody and visitation. This act does not mandate the creation of new services in jurisdictions where no similar services exist, but the act does make such services
18 19 20 21	regarding non-parental custody and visitation. This act does not mandate the creation of new services in jurisdictions where no similar services exist, but the act does make such services available if the services already are utilized in other custody and visitation cases.
18 19 20 21 22	regarding non-parental custody and visitation. This act does not mandate the creation of new services in jurisdictions where no similar services exist, but the act does make such services available if the services already are utilized in other custody and visitation cases.  SECTION 11. CHILD SUPPORT. The court may order a party receiving visitation
18 19 20 21 22 23	regarding non-parental custody and visitation. This act does not mandate the creation of new services in jurisdictions where no similar services exist, but the act does make such services available if the services already are utilized in other custody and visitation cases.  SECTION 11. CHILD SUPPORT. The court may order a party receiving visitation under this act to pay child support and the cost of providing transportation in connection with
18 19 20 21 22 23 24	regarding non-parental custody and visitation. This act does not mandate the creation of new services in jurisdictions where no similar services exist, but the act does make such services available if the services already are utilized in other custody and visitation cases.  SECTION 11. CHILD SUPPORT. The court may order a party receiving visitation under this act to pay child support and the cost of providing transportation in connection with visitation.  14. CHILD SUPPORT; VISITATION COSTS.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	regarding non-parental custody and visitation. This act does not mandate the creation of new services in jurisdictions where no similar services exist, but the act does make such services available if the services already are utilized in other custody and visitation cases.  SECTION 11. CHILD SUPPORT. The court may order a party receiving visitation under this act to pay child support and the cost of providing transportation in connection with visitation.  14. CHILD SUPPORT; VISITATION COSTS.  (a) The obligation of an individual adjudicated to be a de facto parent under this act is
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	regarding non-parental custody and visitation. This act does not mandate the creation of new services in jurisdictions where no similar services exist, but the act does make such services available if the services already are utilized in other custody and visitation cases.  SECTION 11. CHILD SUPPORT. The court may order a party receiving visitation under this act to pay child support and the cost of providing transportation in connection with visitation.  14. CHILD SUPPORT; VISITATION COSTS.  (a) The obligation of an individual adjudicated to be a de facto parent under this act is governed by [cite to law of this state other than this [act] governing a child support obligation of

1 transportation. 2 Comment 3 The court has discretion Individuals adjudicated to order a party receiving visitation be de 4 facto parents under this act have the same obligation to pay child support or as parents. 5 Individuals who are not de facto parents who receive visitation under this act may, in the court's 6 discretion, be required to pay the cost of providing transportation in connection with facilitating 7 visitation. Factors in setting child support, if any, would include the resources of the parties, the 8 needs of the child, and, including the cost of transportation. The state's presumptive guidelines 9 for child support paid by a non-custodial parent to the custodial parent would not apply to this 10 determination. 11 12 Reporter's Note 13 14 The Drafting Committee began discussion of child support issues, but didthose 15 individuals may not reach final conclusions. Several members of the committee seemed to agree 16 on two propositions: (1) if a person is regarded as a parent under state law, then the state's child 17 support guidelines would apply (and this act would not apply); (2) for most non-parents, the 18 state's child support guidelines should not apply . . . although there was some support for 19 applying child support guidelines to persons who were found to have entered into an agreement 20 to raise a child together. [End Reporter's Note] be required to pay child support. 21 22 SECTION 1215. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. The court may allocate and order 23 payment of attorney fees, including interim fees, and costs- among the parties to the proceeding 24 under this [act]. 25 Comment 26 Litigating issues of non-parental custody and visitation can be financially burdensome, 27 including to the parent. This section gives the court discretion to order payment of attorney fees 28 and costs. An award of such fees may deter non-meritorious cases. 29 30 **Reporter's Note** 31 When the ABA Section of Family Law drafted a third party custody and visitation act, it adopted a similar provision regarding attorney fees and costs and added the phrase "as equity 32 33 may require." Another possible addition to the provision is that fees and costs may be ordered 34 "to a prevailing party." [End Reporter's Note] 35

1	[SECTION 1316. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. When
2	making a decision under this [act <sub>7</sub> ], the court [on request of a party to the proceeding] shall make
3	findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record in support of its decision.
4 5 6	Legislative Note: This section is placed in brackets because in some states, a requirement (or lack of requirement) of making findings of fact is governed by court rule rather than statute.
7 8 9	Reporter's Note: Does the Drafting Committee wish to require findings of fact and conclusions of law in all cases – or just those cases in which a party requests them?
10	Comment
11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Requiring findings of fact has several benefits. The fact-finding process structures the court's review so that the court is less likely to overlook important facts or apply bias in reaching its decision. Careful fact-finding by the trial court also facilitates appellate review and may assist the parties in accepting the decision. At least twenty states and the District of Columbia require the trial court to make findings of fact in custody cases. See Jeff Atkinson, <i>Modern Child Custody Practice - Second Edition</i> , § 12-45 (LexisNexis 20142015).
18	[SECTION 1417. PRIORITY ON COURT CALENDAR. A case proceeding arising
19	under this [act] must be given priority on the court calendar and handled expeditiously.]
20	Comment
21 22 23 24 25 26	The phrase "Section 107 of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997) provides that if a question of jurisdiction "is raised in a child-custody proceeding, the question, upon request of a party, must be given priority on the calendar and handled expeditiously" is the same phrase used in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, § 107 (1997)"
27	Reporter's Note
28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36	John Sebert Reporter's Note: Members of the Drafting Committee were ambivalent about including this section in the act. Several members noted that it is common for states to give "priority" to many types of proceedings, and, as a result, such provisions have little effect. John Sebert, former Executive Director of the ULC commented: "Folks representing the judicial system, such as the National Center for State Courts, often object to this type of provision, and I expect they would do so here. Having a priority provision in an act that governs determining jurisdiction is one thing; putting it in this act is very different."
37	Savaral members of the Drafting Committee noted that it is common for states to give

1	"priority" to many types of proceedings, and, as a result, such provisions have little effect.
2 3	SECTION 15 SECTION 18. APPLICATION TO ABUSED, NEGLECTED, OR
4	<b>DEPENDENT CHILDREN.</b> This [act] does not apply if the child is the subject of a
5	proceeding under [cite to law of this state other than this [act] regarding custody and visitation of
6	abused, neglected, or dependent children].
7 8	<u>Comment</u>
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	This act does not provide for granting non-parental custody or visitation for children who are the subject proceedings for abused, neglected, or dependent children. Such laws and related regulations have their own provisions regarding where a child will be placed and who may have contact with the child. The abuse, neglect and dependency laws usually are in a different portion of the statutes than laws pertaining to divorce, parentage, and non-parental rights. The drafters of this act do not wish for this act to conflict with or interfere with the abuse, neglect, or dependency laws. When a child is no longer the subject of such proceedings, relief may be sought under this act. The provision in this section is similar to Or. Stat. § 109.119(9) (West 2015). See also Minn. Stat. Ann. § 257C.08(4) (West 2015) (excluding foster parents from coverage under the state's non-parental visitation law).  SECTION 19. OTHER RIGHTS AND REMEDIES. The rights and remedies of this lact] are not exclusive and do not preclude other rights and remedies under law of this state other.
22	than this [act].
23	Comment
24 25 26 27 28 29	The law regarding families is more dynamic than many areas of law. The drafters of this act do not wish to preclude the development of additional rights and remedies in this area. Principles of law in some states [insert citations to Family Law cases in which the court denied equitable or common law relief because a statute granted rights to certain categories of individuals, but not other categories of individuals].
30 31 32	Reporter's Note: Ms. Behr comments: "Please explain the special need for this provision in light of Rule 502. Full Style Committee is likely to have a concern with the provision."
33 34 35	Uniform Law Commission, Drafting Rules, Section 502 (2012) provides:
36 37 38	RULE 502. PROVISION DUPLICATING GENERAL PROVISION OF LAW.

1 (a) Do not include a provision concerning civil, criminal, administrative, 2 or appellate procedure unless the act is intended to establish a procedure different 3 from general procedures. 4 5 (b) Do not include a provision stating that the act is supplemented by 6 common-law principles unless, without such an affirmative statement, the act is 7 likely to be construed as occupying the field, displacing common-law principles. 8 9 [ULC] Comment 10 11 The incorporation of procedural provisions may impair the enactability of a 12 uniform or model act. Repetition of general procedural provisions especially 13 creates problems in states in which such procedures are established by court rule 14 rather than by legislation. 15 16 State statutes are usually presumed to be supplemented by the common law. The rare exception is an act, such as a workers' compensation act, that is intended to 17 preempt the field and displace common-law remedies. Unless there is a 18 19 legitimate concern that a uniform or model act, although not intended to occupy 20 the field, will nevertheless be so construed, it is unnecessary and confusing to 21 include a provision that repeats this settled principle of common law. 22 23 SECTION 20. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION. In 24 applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote 25 uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it. 26 **Reporter's Note:** Ms. Behr asks: "Do you need standard provision in [ULC] Rule 602 27 regarding electronic signatures? Courts are moving to electronic filing or petitions." I am not an expert on the law of electronic signatures, but I doubt that the ULC boilerplate 28 signature section (quoted below) is necessary in this act. It appears that the electronic 29 30 signature section is necessary in acts that specifically deal with recognitions of certain 31 classes of documents, such as commercial paper and the signatures on those documents. 32 Rule 602 provides for using the electronic signature section if the act contains a provision "requiring a notice or other record or a signature." Our act does not have such a 33 34 provision. There is a trend toward electronic filings for legal actions (in general), but I 35 believe that is an issue for local rules and statutes, not for our uniform act. The ULC electronic signature section provides as follows: "RELATION TO ELECTRONIC 36 37 SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT. This [act] modifies, limits, or supersedes the Electronic Signatures in Global and National 38 39 Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seg., but does not modify, limit, or supersede

SECTION 1621. TRANSITIONAL PROVISION. A petition or other request for

Section 101(c) of that act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001(c), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103(b) of that act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7003(b)."

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- 1 relief regarding a non-parent's request for custody and visitation which was commenced before
- 2 the effective date of this act is governed by the statutes in effect at the time the petition or other
- 3 request was made.
- Reporter's Note: The Transitional Provision is ULC boiler-plate, which has been used in many uniform acts. I note that there is another way to handle transitions that might be simpler for courts to apply and that may advance the application of the new act to more cases: "This [act] applies to all pending actions and proceedings commenced prior to its effective date with respect to issues on which a judgment has not been entered." See, e.g., 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/801(b)(2016).

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SECTION 1722. REPEALS; CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

12 (a) . . . .

- 13 (b) . . . .
- 14 (c) . . . .
- 15 **SECTION 1823. EFFECTIVE DATE.** This [act] takes effect . . . .