DR AFT

FOR DISCUSSION ONLY

RELOCATION OF NON-UTILITY EASEMENTS ACT

[Tentative new name: EASEMENT RELOCATION ACT]

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS

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[EASEMENT RELOCATION OF NON-UTILITY EASEMENTS ACT]

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[EASEMENT RELOCATION OF NON-UTILITY EASEMENTS-ACT]

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1	RELOCATION OF NON-UTILITY EASEMENTS ACT
2	[EASEMENT RELOCATION ACT]
3	[ARTICLE] 1
4	SHORT TITLE AND DEFINITIONS [GENERAL PROVISIONS]
5	SECTION 101. SHORT TITLE. This [Actact] may be cited as the Easement
6	Relocation of Non-Utility Easements Act.
7	SECTION 102. DEFINITIONS. In this [Actact]:
8	(a) "Conservation easement" means a negativean easement that is [[granted in perpetuity,
9	and]] ¹ created for conservation purposes or preservation purposes, andand whose easement
10	holder is a government entity or a conservation organization. "Conservation purposes" include
11	(b) "Conservation organization" means a charitable organization, entity, corporation, or
12	trust or government entity, jurisdiction, or agency organized for or whose powers or purposes
13	include conservation purposes.
14	(c) "Conservation purposes" means:
15	(1) retaining or protecting the natural, scenic, or open-space valuevalues of
16	land, real property;
17	(2) assuring the availability of landreal property for agricultural, forest,
18	recreational, or open-space use;
19	(3) protecting natural resources, [, including plant and wildlife habitats and
20	ecosystems, and];
21	(4) maintaining or enhancing air or water quality [or supply. "Preservation
22	purposes" include];

¹ This double bracketed languaged is included at the suggestion of the Land Trust Alliance.

1	(5) preserving the historical, architectural, archeological, or cultural aspects of
2	real property-; and
3	(b) "Conservation organization" means a charitable corporation, charitable association, or
4	charitable trust whose purpose or powers include conservation purposes or preservation
5	purposes.
6	(e(6) accomplishing any other purpose specified in the law governing
7	conservation easements of this state. ²
8	(d) "Dominant estate" means the estate or interest in real property that is benefitted by an
9	easement.
10	(de) "Easement" means a nonpossessory affirmative right to enter and use real property
11	owned by or in the possession of another and that which obligates the owner or possessor of
12	thatthe real property not to interfere with (1)-the uses permitted by the instrument creating the
13	easement, or (2), in the case of a non-express easement, the uses authorized by law. As used in
14	this [Act], an easement The term includes:
15	(1) an irrevocable license to enter and use the real property owned by or in the
16	possession of another;
17	(2) an appurtenant easement that provides a right to use and enter a servient estate
18	which is tied to or dependent upon ownership or occupancy of a particular unit or parcel of real
19	property; and
20	(3) an easement in gross that provides a right to enter and use a servient estate
21	which is neither tied to nor dependent upon ownership or occupancy of a particular unit or parcel

² Section 301(c) is new and is intended to make the definitions found in Sections 301(a) and (b) more concise. The content of Section 301(c) was found in earlier versions of the act and is largely taken from UCEA, with some modifications, particularly subsection (c)(6), suggested by the Land Trust Alliance and will be discussed at the next Drafting Committee meeting.

1	of real property. [As used in this [Act], an easement excludes a negative easement and a utility
2	easement.]
3	(ef) "Easement holder"," except as otherwise provided in this subsection, means thea
4	person entitled to enforce an easement. In the case of an appurtenant easement, the easement
5	holder is term means the owner of the dominant estate. In the case of an easement in gross, the
6	easement holder is the term means a person entitled to enjoy the benefit of the easement. In the
7	case of a conservation easement, the term means a conservation organization or a governmental
8	entity empowered to hold an interest in real property under the laws of this State or the United
9	States.
10	(fg) "Negative easement" means an easement whose primary purpose is to impose on the
11	owner of thea servient estate a duty not to engage in certain uses of that the estate. For the
12	purposes of this subsection, a conservation easement is a negative easement.
13	(gh) "Person" means an individual, firm, partnership, estate, business or nonprofit entity,
14	<u>public</u> corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, government or governmental
15	subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or other legal entity. It includes a trustee, receiver,
16	assignee, or similar representative of any of them.
17	(hi) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored
18	in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
19	(ij) "Servient estate" means thean estate or interest in real property that is burdened by an
20	easement.
21	(j) "Utilityk) "Public utility easement" [has the meaning set forth in the laws of this state]
22	[means an easement created for the purpose of furnishing or transmitting utility services. For
23	purposes in favor of this subsection, "a publicly regulated utility that provides services on a non-

1	discriminatory basis].
2	(1) "Utility services" means:
3	(1) any product, services, or equipment related to energy, power,
4	telecommunications communications, water or storm or sanitary sewerage, and
5	(2) any product, services or equipment of a transmitting utility as defined in
6	Uniform Commercial Code Article 9, Section 102(a)(81).
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Legislative Note: The bracketed language in Section 102(c) — "including plant and wildlife habitats and ecosystems" and "or supply" — comes from the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.6 (2000), which in turn follows the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA) Section 1 (1981, amended 2007). The additional language was likely added to the Restatement to make the latter more expansive. States may chose whether to include the slightly more expansive language found in the bracketed subsections. The bracketed language found in Section 102(k) gives a state the option of using its own
15 16	definition of a public utility easement rather than the default definition supplied by the act.
17	Comment
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	The foundational definition of "easement" in <u>subsection Section 102(de</u>) is based on the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.2(1) (2000) (hereinafter "Restatement"). The definitions of "appurtenant easement" and "easement in gross" that are embedded in <u>subsection Section 102(de</u>) are based on Restatement § 1.5(1)-(2). The definitions of "dominant estate" and "servient estate" in <u>subsections Sections 102(ed</u>) and <u>102(i(j)</u> are derived from Restatement § 1.1(1)(b)-(c). The term "real property" is used in Section 102(e), instead of the term "land" as found throughout the Restatement, because an easement will sometimes benefit or burden real property interests other than ownership of land – for example, condominium units or parts of buildings owned by condominium associations.
28 29 30 31 32 33 34	The definition of conservation easement in subsection 102(a) is derived largely from Restatement § 1.6, but it adds the requirement that the easement is "granted in perpetuity" and also specifies that a conservation easement is held by a "conservation organization." As the Restatement explains, a "conservation organization" is a "charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust whose purpose or powers include conservation or preservation purposes." Restatement § 1.6(2).
35 36 37 38 39	The definitions of "conservation easement," "conservation organization" and "conservation purposes" in Sections 102(a) through (c) generally mirror the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA) Section 1 (1981, amended 1987), with minor modifications In particular, the core definition of "conservation purposes" is taken almost word for word from the list of conservation purposes used in UCEA Section 1(1). The phrase "assuring the

availability of real property for," used Section 102(c), has been slightly modified from both UCEA Section 1(1), which states "assuring its availability for" various uses, and Restatement § 1.6, which similarly states "assuring the availability of land for" various uses. The qualification in Section 102(a) that a conservation easement is "granted in perpetuity" reflects a fundamental characteristic of conservation easements under contemporary easement conservation law. The final clause in Section 102(c) referring to "any other purpose specified in the law governing conservation easements of this state" has been added to reflect that the purposes of conservation easements are dynamic as states continue to recognize new purposes for conservation easements. The touchstone of a conservation easement, however, remains constant. It is an easement that primarily imposes limitations, and occasionally related affirmative obligations, on the burdened estate to serve an actual conservation purpose.

The term "negative easement" is generally synonymous with the term "restrictive covenant." Restatement § 1.3 cmt (c). For a discussion of the historical evolution of negative easements and restrictive covenants at common law, see Restatement § 1.2, cmt₋ (h). Section 1.3(3) of the Restatement defines a "restrictive covenant" as a "negative covenant that limits permissible uses of land" and explains that a "'negative easement' is a restrictive covenant.".." Restatement § 1.3(3). See also As the Restatement § 1.3 cmt. C ("[n]egative easements are the same as restrictive covenants"). As the comments to the Restatement further explain, "[t]he most common uses of negative easements in modern law have been to create conservation easements and easements for view." Restatement § 1.2, cmt. (h). The definition of "negative easement" used in subsection Section 102(f) of the actg) offers an even more precise definition of the term by borrowing from Article 706 of the Louisiana Civil Code. See, which defines "[n]egative La. Civ. Code art. 706 ("Negative servitudes are" as "those that impose on the owner of the servient estate the duty to abstain from doing something on his estate". La. Civ. Code art. - Such are the servitudes of prohibition of building and of the use of an estate as a commercial or industrial establishment.").706. For a similar explanation of the distinction between affirmative and negative easements, see JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 179 (4th ed. 2014) ("A right to do something on someone else's land is an affirmative easement. A right to prevent others from doing something on their own land is either a negative easement or restrictive covenant.").

The act has been drafted with the specific intention to exempt both conservation easements and utility easements from its scope. This intention is realized in two ways. First, this section defines negative easements to include conservation easements and then it excludes negative easements, along with utility easements, from the definition of "easement." *See* subsections 102(d) and (f). Second, the act specifically exempts both negative easements and utility easements from its scope in subsections 201(b)-(c). *See* Reporter's Note following Section 201 of this act.

The definition of "utility easement" and "utility services" in subsection 102(j) is adapted from Va. Code § 55-50.2 (2006).

 The definition of "easement holder" in Section 102(f) is derived from Restatement $\S 1.5$ but also incorporates the definition of an easement "holder" as defined in UCEA Section 1(2)(i).

The definition of "person" in Section 102(h) follows the standard definition of person used by the Uniform Law Commimssion and thus includes not only individuals and private

1 entities but also governmental entities as they can be holders of both conventional affirmative 2 easements and conservation easements. 3 4 The definitions of a "public utility easement" and "utility services" in Sections 102(k) 5 and (1) are adapted from Va. Code § 55-50.2 (2006) and also incorporate the definition of a "transmitting utility" from U.C.C. § 9:102(a)(81) ("Transmitting utility means a person primarily 6 7 engaged in the business of: (A) operating a railroad, subway, street railway, or trolley bus; (B) 8 transmitting communications electrically, electromagnetically, or by light; (C) 9 transmitting goods by pipeline or sewer; or (D) transmitting or producing and transmitting 10 electricity, steam, gas, or water.") 11 12 The term "real property" is used in subsection 102(d) instead of the term "land," as found 13 14 in the Restatement, because an easement will sometimes benefit or burden real property interests 15 other than ownership of land - for example, condominium units or parts of buildings owned by 16 condominium associations 17 18 Reporter's Note 19 20 I decided to use the definition of "conservation easement" and related definitions from the Restatement rather than the definition formulated by the Land Trust Alliance (See Land Trust 21 22 Alliance letter dated August 16, 2018, available in our on-line ULC folder), because the former 23 is more general in scope and the Land Trust Alliance definition cross-references provisions of 24 the Internal Revenue Code, a source outside the act. If there were ever changes to the Internal 25 Revenue Code this could undermine our objective of exempting conservation easements from the 26 act. I underscore that our clear intention is to exclude all negative easements, including all 27 conservation easements, from the scope of the act. Nonetheless, the drafting committee should 28 carefully consider the language offered by the Land Trust Alliance. 29 30 ARTICLE 2 31 **SCOPE** 32 SECTION 201. GENERAL APPLICABILITY, - NATURE OF EASEMENT. 33 (a) Other than Except as set forth in subsections 201(b) and (c) below, otherwise 34 provided, this [Actact] applies to all easements, whether created an easement established by 35 express contract, grant or reservation or by prescription, implication or, necessity, or estoppel. 36 (b) This [Actact] does not apply to a public utility easements.] casement. 37 (c) This [Actact] does not apply to a conservation easement. 38 (d) This [act] does not apply to a negative easements. easement.

	1	Comment
	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	This section is intended to make plainSection 201 specifies the limited scopecategories of the easements eligible and ineligible for relocation under section 301Section 302 of the act. The only easementskind of easement eligible for relocation are an affirmative easements easement other than a public utility easements. Subsection (easement or a conservation easement. Section 201(a) underscores that all affirmative, non-express easements, including thoseother than the excluded categories, whether created by express grant or reservation or by prescription, implication, or-necessity, or estoppel, are eligible for relocation under Section 301302 of the act. UtilityPublic utility easements, conservation easements and negative easements are specifically excluded under subsectionSections 201(b) through (d) and are thus not eligible ineligible for relocation under Section 301 of the act. Likewise, negative easements, including by definition
	12 13	conservation easements, are specifically excluded under subsection 201(c) and thus not eligible for relocation under Section 301 of the act. 302.
	14 15 16	Reporter's Note
	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	I recognize that subsections (b) and (c) are arguably redundant in that utility easements and negative easements, including specifically conservation easements, are expressly exempted from the definition of "easement" under subsection 102(d). However, out of an abundance of eaution, and to make our intentions perfectly clear, I have also <i>provisionally</i> included these exclusions in this section on scope of the act. An alternative approach would be to eliminate either the definitional exclusions in the last sentence of subsection 102(d) or the exclusions from scope in this section. SECTION 202. GENERAL APPLICABILITY TO EXISTING EASEMENTS.
	26	TIME OF CREATION OF EASEMENT. This [Actact] applies to an easement eligible for
	27	relocation under Section 301 of the [Act] even if the easement was created before, on, or after
	28	[the effective date of the [Act].this [act]].
l	29	Comment
	30 31 32	This section clarifies that the act is intended to will have retroactive effect and thus will apply to all easements created prior to the effective date of the act-
	33 34	Reporter's Note

During our June conference call, as well as easements created on or after the drafting eommittee decidedeffective date of the act. As a servient estate owner can only obtain judicial approval for a proposed relocation in the face of an easement holder objection by satisfying the criteria set out in Section 302, a servient estate must demonstrate that the act should have retroactive effect. Without retroactive effect, we reasoned, relocated easement will continue to deliver to the easement holder the same affirmative, easement-related benefits that flowed to the easement holder at the easement's original location. Section 306 enumerates detailed factors that will assist a court in making this determination of functional equivalency in terms of affirmative, easement-related benefits.

As the easement holder will not be deprived of any of the functional benefits of the easement upon relocation, the easement holder will suffer no loss, regardless of whether the act might not be worth pursuing because many of the knotty problems created by old easements would remain unresolved under applies to an easement created before, on or after the effective date of the easement. Consequently, an easement holder will not suffer an uncompensated taking of a property interest upon a relocation undertaken pursuant to the act. See Statewide

Construction, Inc. v. I believe that reasoning to be sound. However, if we maintain that approach, we must still keep in mind that the decision to give the law retroactive effect will be one of the most important policy choices we will be called upon to defend.

Some may say Pietri, 247 P.3d 650, 656-57 (Idaho 2011) (holding that application of an Idaho statute, I.C. § 55-313, giving servient estate owners the right to relocate a motor vehicle access easement on terms similar to those found in Restatement § 4.8(3), was not an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation under either the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or the Idaho Constitution because the statute expressly requires that making the act retroactive eliminates the freedom of an easement holder the change must be made in a way "as not to obstruct motor vehicle travel, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such access" and because any relocation authorized by the statue will "provide the dominant estate holders with the same beneficial interest they were entitled to under an existing express easement to bargain for consent to relocation—a bargaining the easement by its original location"); M.P.M. Builders L.L.C. v. Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1058-59 (Mass. 2004) (observing that an "easement is created to serve a particular objective, not to grant the easement holder the power that may have been understood by all parties at the time to veto other uses of creation of an express easement. Eliminating this opportunity to bargain for relocation could, in theory, create windfall gains for the servient estate owner, according to several academic and judicial critics of the Restatement approach to easement relocation that do not interfere with that purpose"). See John V. Orthalso Susan French, Relocating Easements, A Response to Professor French,: Restatement (Third), Servitudes § 4.8(3), 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & Tr. J. 643, 646-48 (2004); Jon W. Bruce & James W. ELY, Jr., Law of Easements 1, 5 and LICENSES IN LAND § 7.17 (2018); Herren 9 (2003) (responding to critique » Pettengil, 538 S.E.2d 735, 736 (Ga. 2000); AKG Real Estate L.L.C. v. Kosterman, 717 N.W.2d 835, 844-47 (Wis. 2006) (criticizing Restatement approach as "a means for purchasers of servient estates to reap a windfall at the expense of owners of dominant estates").

The primary countervailing arguments against the claim that the Restatement approach ereates to easement relocation could lead to windfall gains for servient estate owners are as

follows: (1) the likelihood by observing that (i) in most easement negotiations the parties 1 2 gavegive little, if any, attention to the future location of thean easement or to the issue of 3 relocation rights unless there is some specific language in the agreement indicating to the 4 contrary; (2) if a servient estate owner satisfies the, (ii) if requirements imposed by section 4.8(3) 5 (or Section 301 of our act) and demonstrates that the new location continues to provide the same 6 easement related benefits as the original location, then the relocated easement will increase "are 7 satisfied, the relocated easement increases overall utility" without decreasing the easement's 8 utility to the easement holder; and (3iii) if the easement holder really hadhas some non-access 9 related interests in mind at the time of creation—if the easement holder wanted to obtain some 10 broader veto power over development on the servient estate—there are well recognized private 11 land use restrictions that can accomplish this result, most notably, those interests can be served 12 by restrictive covenants. See Susan French, Relocating Easements: Restatement (Third), 13 Servitudes § 4.8(3), 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 5, 9 (2003). For a more detailed discussion 14 of this debate, see my December 2, 2010 Memorandum to Wilson Freyermuth (2010 Memo), 24-15 27, previously distributed and included in our online ULC folder. 16 It should also be noted that the concern about eliminating the right to bargain for consent 17 18 to relocation of an easement or release of any other aspect of an agreement with respect to 19 existing easements worried the Law Commission of England and Wales when it considered the 20 same subject. In the end, that Law Commission recommended to the House of Commons that 21 easements and profits be subject to judicial modification under a statutory changed conditions 22 analysis (just as restrictive covenants have been ever since adoption of Section 84 of the Law of 23 Property Act 1925), but it also recommended that this change in the law should only be given 24 prospective effect. Law Comm'n of Eng. and Wales, Making Land Work: Easements, 25 COVENANTS AND PROFITS À PRENDRE 164 (2011), at.). 26 27 SECTION 203. APPLICABILITY TO **EASEMENTS**EASEMENT WITH 28 **GENERAL MUTUAL CONSENT CLAUSE AND EASEMENT WITH SPECIFIED** 29 **LOCATIONS** LOCATION. This [Actact] applies to an easement eligible for relocation under 30 Section 301302 even if: 31 (a1) the instrument creating the easement contains language requiring consent of the 32 parties to amend (i) generally, the terms of the easement, or (ii) specifically, the location of the 33 easement; or

36 Comment

34

35

some other agreement, previous conduct of the parties, or acquiescence.

(b2) the location of the easement has been fixed by the instrument creating the easement,

1	This section Section 203 first clarifies that even when an easement contains a general
2	clause requiring mutual consent to amend an easement and even if this mutual consent clause
3	specifically references an easement's location, the easement will be eligible for relocation under
4	Section 301 of the act. Subsection (b)302. This section next specifies that even when an
5	easement has been localized by a metes and bounds description in the instrument that creates the
6	easement, by another agreement, by previous conduct of the parties, or by acquiescence, the
7	easement remains subject to relocation under Section 301 of the act.302. Accordingly, subsection
8	(b) makes clear that this act Section 203(2) specifically rejects the narrow approach to easement
9	<u>relocation</u> adopted by the New York Court of Appeal in <i>Lewis v. Young</i> , 705 N.E.2d 649 (N.Y.
10	1998), which limited application of section 4.8(3) of the Restatement to an undefined
11	easement, i.e., one that lacks a metes and bounds description or other indication of the
12	easement's original location.
13	
14	ISECTION 204. NON-WAIVER. A right to seek relocation of an easement under
15	Section 302 may not be excluded or restricted by legal transaction.] ³
16	Legislative Note: Section 204 is bracketed to indicate that a state may remove the non-waiver
17	provision of the act or, in the alternative, allow parties to agree that a newly created easement is
18	not subject to relocation for a limited time, after which an eligble easement will be subject to
19	relocation under the act regardless of any provision in an easement agreement to the contrary.
20	
21	<u>Comment</u>
22	Section 204 explicitly provides that the core relocation right established by the act is not
23	subject to waiver by contracting parties. In other words, a servient estate owner and an easement
24	holder of an easement otherwise eligible for relocation under Section 302 cannot agree ex ante to
25	exclude or restrict application of the act.
26	
27	Parties can, of course, agree to an easement relocation by mutual consent completely
28	outside the act or can agree to take advantage of the process for compensating the easement
29	holder and otherwise protecting the easement holder's rights in the easement after the new
30	location has been agreed by the parties. See infra Sections 301 and 304.
31	[ARTICLE] 3
32	RELOCATION OF AN EASEMENT
33	SECTION 301. RELOCATION OF AN EASEMENT BY CONSENT.
34	(a) An easement holder and a servient estate owner have the right to relocate an easement
35	by mutual consent without regard to this [act].

³ The Drafting Committee should consider whether Section 204 should be subject to legislation deletion or modification at all, as the Legislative Note above indicates, or should essentially be a non-severable provision of the act.

1	(b) An easement holder has the right to consent to a request to relocate an easement on
2	the condition that the relocation is subject to this [act].
3	<u>Comment</u>
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Section 301(a) confirms the freedom of an easement holder and a servient estate owner to agree to relocate an easement on any terms mutually acceptable to both parties outside the provisions of the act. Accordingly, the easement holder and a servient estate owner might agree to move an easement to a mutually acceptable location but also might agree to share the costs of relocation because the relocated easement provides substantial benefits to the easement holder as well as the servient estate owner. Section 301(b) recognizes that once a servient estate owner requests relocation under the terms of this act, the easement holder might agree to move the easement to a specific location but
14	could otherwise condition its acceptance on compliance with the other terms of the act as set
15 16	forth in Section 304.
17	SECTION 302. RIGHT OF SERVIENT ESTATE OWNER. [Unless expressly
18	denied by the terms of the easement pursuant TO RELOCATE EASEMENT. Subject to
19	Section 305-of the [Act],], the owner of thea servient estate is entitled tomay relocate thean
20	easement, at the servient owner's expense, to permit normal use or development of the servient
21	estate or to make improvements on or to the servient estate, but only if the relocation does not
22	materially:
23	(a) significantly 1) lessen the utility of the easement;
24	(b2) increase the burden on the easement holder in its use and enjoyment of the easement;
25	or
26	(e3) frustrate the [[affirmative, easement-related]]4 purpose for which the easement was
27	created either during or after relocation.
28	<u>Comment</u>
29	Comment
30	This section <u>Section 302</u> sets forth the general rule for relocation of an easement under the
	4 This double bracketed language is new and should be discussed by the Drafting Committee

act and largely tracks Restatement § 4.8(3). This section thus seeks to permit development or improvement of the servient estate as long as the objectives set forth in the section can be accomplished without interfering with or harming the affirmative, easement-related interests of the easement holder. M.P.M. Builders L.L.C. v. Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1057 (Mass. 2004); Restatement § 4.8(3), cmt- (f), at 563. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts explains, this rule "maximizes the over-all property utility by increasing the value of the servient estate without diminishing the value of the dominant estate" and provides the additional benefit of minimizing "the cost associated with an easement by reducing the risk that the easement will prevent future beneficial development of the servient estate" and, thustherefore, "encourages the use of easements." M.P.M. Builders L.L.C., 809 N.E.2d at 1057; see also Roaring Fork Club L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1236 (Colo. 2001) (emphasizing that the Restatement rule "maximizes the overall utility of the land" because the "burdened estate profits from an increase in value while the benefitted estate suffers no decrease") (citing to Restatement § 4.8(3), cmt- (f), at 563).

Currently some form of unilateral easement relocation is permitted in 22 states. Courts in seven states (Colorado, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, South Dakota, Nevada, and Vermont) have expressly adopted section 4.8(3) of the Restatement for relocation of express easements in some form or another. See Roaring Fork Club L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1237-39 (Colo. 2001) (adopting section 4.8(3) to govern applications for relocation of irrigation ditch easements); M.P.M. Builders L.L.C. v. Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1057-59 (Mass. 2004) (adopting section 4.8(3) for all express easements); R & S Invs. v. Auto Auctions Ltd., 725 N.W.2d 871, 879-881 (Neb. 2006) (adopting section 4.8(3) for relocation of sewer lagoon easement); Lewis v. Young, 705 N.E.2d 649, 653-54 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that a servient landowner could relocate a driveway burdened with an *undefined* ingress and egress easement); Stanga v. Husman, 694 N.W.2d 716, 718-720 (S.D. 2005) (approving ex post the modification of an express ingress and egress easement whose location was not specified in the creating instrument); St. James Vill. Inc. v. Cunningham, 210 P.3d 190, 193-196 (Nev. 2009) (adopted section 4.8(3) but limited its scope to situations when the creating instrument does not define the easement through specific reference to its location or dimensions); Rov v. Woodstock Cmtv. Tr. Inc., 94 A.3d 537, 538-40 (Vt. 2014) (adopting section 4.8(3) to permit a servient estate owner to relocate subsurface water line easements to facilitate an affordable housing development on an eight-acre tract of land); but see Sweezev v. Neal, 904 A.2d 1050, 1057-58 (Vt. 2006) (rejecting application of section 4.8(3) for relocation of surface easements).

 Several Illinois appellate court decisions also suggest that Illinois is gradually moving in the direction of adopting section 4.8(3) to approve unilateral easement relocation and other unilateral modifications of an easement. *See McGoey v. Brace*, 918 N.E.2d 559, 563-567 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that the approach of section 4.8(3) comports with prior Illinois precedent allowing either the dominant or servient estate owner to make changes to an easement as long as the changes are not "substantial"); *527 S. Clinton L.L.C. v. Westloop Equities L.L.C.*, 932 N.E.2d 1127, 1138 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (citing *McGoey* and the Restatement to the effect that a servient estate owner may modify or relocate an easement "so long as the changes would not cause substantial harm to the dominant estate").

Kentucky courts have long allowed easement relocation under conditions generally

similar to the Restatement. *Wells v. Sanor*, 151 S.W.3d 819, 823 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005) ("Kentucky follows a minority position that in addition to mutual consent also allows the owner of a servient estate to unilaterally modify or alter the location of a roadway easement so long as it does not change the beginning and ending points and does not result in material inconvenience to the rights of the dominant estate."); *see also Stewart v. Compton*, 549 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); *Terry v. Boston*, 54 S.W.2d 909, 909-10 (Ky. 1932); *but see Adams v. Pergrem*, No. 2006-CA-001861-MR, 2007 WL 4277900, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2007) (citing *Wells* and observing in dicta that "unless a granting instrument provides otherwise, an easement with a fixed location cannot be relocated without the express or implied consent of the owners of both the servient and dominant estates").

Under its Civil Code, Louisiana has long allowed the relocation of both conventional servitudes and servitudes of passage established by law to provide access to enclosed estates. La. Civ. Code arts. 748, 695. The general rule is stated in Article 748: "If the original location [of a servitude] has become more burdensome for the owner of the servient estate, or if it prevents him from making useful improvements on his estate, he may provide another equally convenient location for the exercise of the servitude which the owner of the dominant estate is bound to accept. All expenses of relocation are borne by the owner of the servient estate." La. Civ. Code art. 748.

Courts in six states (Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina) permit servient owners to relocate non-express easements of some form or another (easements by necessity, easements implied by recorded plats or prior use, or prescriptive easements), in some cases relying on the Restatement, in others not. See Enos v. Casey Mountain Inc., 532 So. 2d 703, 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing unilateral relocation of easements implied by reliance on recorded subdivision plat); Millison v. Laughlin, 142 A.2d 810, 813-816 (Md. 1958) (holding that servient estate owner could relocate utility pole easement implied by prior use to reduce danger and annoyance and given that termini would remain unchanged); Bode v. Bode, 494 N.W.2d 301, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (relying on equitable principles to hold that where the location of an easement by necessity has not been established by agreement of the parties, trial court has power to establish the location in a place desired by the owner of the servient estate); Huggins v. Wright, 774 So. 2d 408, 412 (Miss. 2000) (servient tenant could be granted the option of relocating easement by necessity for utilities and ingress/egress, at its expense, in part because old, existing roadway in which original easement of necessity was located divided property in half); Taylor v. Hays, 551 So. 2d 906, 908-10 (Miss. 1989) (same); Soderberg v. Weisel, 687 A.2d 839, 842 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (recognizing possibility of unilateral relocation of a prescriptive easement if new easement location is as safe as the original, the relocation is a *relatively minor change* and the reasons for relocation are substantial); Goodwin v. Johnson, 591 S.E.2d 34, 37-39 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (applying Restatement § 4.8(3) to approve unilateral relocation of easement of necessity).

Courts in three more states (Oregon, Missouri, and New Jersey,) have allowed limited balancing of the equities when easement holders have sought injunctive relief in response to proposed or completed relocations. *See Vossen v. Forrester*, 963 P.2d 157, 161-62 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing relocation of a beach access easement when the servient owner mistakenly built a house that minimally encroached on the easement, the cost of removing the house would have

been substantial, and the easement holders knew of the encroachment at the time construction began); S. Star Cent. Gas Pipeline Inc. v. Murray, 190 S.W.3d 423, 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (denying injunction sought by pipeline company several years after it received notice of servient estate owners' expansion of home and encroachment on easement, and noting that the creating instrument did not definitely fix the location and observing that grantee of easement is entitled to a convenient, reasonable, and accessible way within the limits of the grant); Umprhes v. J.R. Mayer Enters. Inc., 889 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (denying dominant estate owner's request for injunction to restore a prescriptive roadway easement to its original position and relegating dominant owner to monetary damages, even though servient owner unilaterally relocated roadway 10-12 feet from its original location, in light of minor injury to dominant estate, original location's lack of uniqueness, and new roadway's close fit to description in original deed on which dominant owners based their interest); Bubbis v. Kassin, 803 A.2d 146, 152 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (denying injunctive relief and, therefore, allowing temporary relocation of an implied beach access easement when the servient estate owner showed that enforcement of the easement in its original location "would have a severe adverse effect upon the [servient owners'] beneficial enjoyment of their property" and that this adverse effect "substantially outweighs the inconvenience to plaintiffs" in being required to walk an additional distance to gain access to the beach and ocean via another route or a substitute easement); Kline v. Bernardsvill Ass'n Inc., 631 A.2d 1263, 1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (compelling relocation of an easement "to advance the interests of justice where the modification is minor and parties' essential rights are fully preserved," but cautioning that relocation should be "an extraordinary remedy and should be grounded in a strong showing of necessity").

Three more states (Idaho, Virginia, and New Mexico) allow relocation by statute for certain kinds of easements provided relocation does not harm the easement holder or dominant estate owner. *See* Idaho Code § 18-4308 (Michie Supp. 2010) (allowing relocation of irrigation ditch easements); Idaho Code § 42-1207 (Michie Supp. 2010) (same); Idaho Code § 55-313 (Michie Supp. 2010) (allowing relocation of motor vehicle access easements); Va. Code § 55-50 (2007) (allowing for judicial relocation on an easement of ingress and egress, provided it has been in existence for ten years); N.M. Stat. § 73-2-5 (allowing relocation of irrigation ditch easements).

Courts in eight states (Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin) have expressly rejected section 4.8(3) of the Restatement. See Tietel v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1276-77 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (declining to apply section 4.8(3) as inconsistent with Alabama law, especially Arp v. Edwards, 706 So. 2d 736, 739 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)); Alligood v. Lasaracina, 999 A.2d 836, 839 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (explicitly rejecting Restatement approach on grounds of "uniformity, stability, predictability and judicial economy"); Herrin v. Pettergill, 538 S.E.2d 735, 736 (Ga. 2000) (expressly rejecting section 4.8(3)); Sloan v. Rhodes, 560 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Ga. 2002) (affirming Herrin v. Pettergill); A. Perin Dev. Co. L.L.C. v. Ty-Par Realty Inc., 667 S.E.2d 324, 326-27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting approach of M.P.M. Builders L.L.C.); McNaughton Props. L.P. v. Barr, 981 A.2d 222, 225-29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (rejecting Restatement approach as applied to express easements as a question of first impression even though 142 acre servient estate owner offered to provide 1.83 dominant estate owner access to public roads that would have been safer

and shorter via new street system proposed for development of servient estate); SweezySweezev v. Neal, 904 A.2d 1050, 1057-58 (Vt. 2006) (rejecting Restatement approach as applied to surface easements but allowing servient estate owner to "bend the easement" around a new addition to his house); Crisp v. Vanlaecken, 122 P.3d 926, 928-29 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); MacMeekin v. Low Income Hous. Inst., 45 P.3d 570, 579 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (expressly rejecting section 4.8(3)); AKG Real Estate L.L.C. v. Kosterman, 717 N.W.2d 835, 842-47 (Wisc. 2006) (rejecting proposed relocation of right of way easement under the impossibility of purpose doctrine as stated in Restatement § 7.10(1), the changed conditions doctrine as stated in Restatement § 7.10(2), and the unilateral relocation rule found in §4.8(3)) (stating that "parties need not include a provision in an express easement to prevent unilateral modification or relocation" and thus "the rule is that the owner of the servient estate cannot unilaterally modify an express easement"); see also Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements AND LICENSES IN LAND § 7.13, 717 (2018) (rejecting and criticizing the Restatement approach and citing other decisions following traditional common law mutual consent rule).

Civil Codes in foreign jurisdictions use varying formulations of the triggering justification for servitude relocation from the servient estate owner's perspective, some even broader than in the Restatement. See, e.g., BGB (Germany) § 1023(1) (trans. Ian S. Forrester et al., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1975) (servitude relocation triggered if "the use on the present location is especially onerous for him") (emphasis added); C.C. (Italy) art. 1068 (trans. and eds Mario Beltrano et al., Oceana 2010) (allowing a servient estate owner to relocate if "original use has become more burdensome for the servient land or interferes with work, repairs or improvements on it,") (emphasis added); C.C. (Brazil) art. 1384 (2004) (same as Italy); C.C. (Switz.) § 742 (trans. Ivy Williams, Oxford 1925) ("Where the servitude affects one part only of the servient property, the servient owner can, by showing that the change would be for his benefit and by undertaking to bear the cost of it, require that the servitude be moved so that it may affect a different part of his property . . . ") (emphasis added). The new Dutch Civil Code does not even state a predicate justification from the servient owner's perspective. It simply allows servitude relocation "provided that this move is possible without diminishing the enjoyment of the owner of the dominant land." NWB Book 5, art. 73.

Reporter's Note

Section 301 makes clear302 implicitly indicates that the right to relocate an easement belongs *only* to the servient estate owner. Accordingly, this section comports with the drafting committee's tentative decision made during our June conference call and The act, therefore, does not change the well-established common law rule that *an easement holder may not* unilaterally relocate an easement without the consent of the servient estate owner unless that right has been specifically reserved or granted in the creating instrument. *M.P.M. Builders L.L.C. v. Dwyer*, 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1057 (Mass. 2004) (citing additional authority for rule that easement holder may not unilaterally relocate an easement); Restatement § 4.8(3), cmt- (f), at 563. *But see McGoey v. Brace*, 918 N.E.2d 559, 563-567 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that the approach of section 4.8(3) comports with prior Illinois precedent allowing either the dominant or servient estate owner to make changes to an easement as long as the changes are not "substantial")").

Unlike the holding in Kline v. Bernardsvill Ass'n Inc., 631 A.2d 1263, 1267 (N.J. Super.

1	Ct. App. Div. 1993), Section 301 makes clear 302 clarifies that "a strong showing of necessity" is
2	not a condition to relocate an easement. <u>Cf. Kline v. Bernardsvill Ass'n Inc.</u> , 631 A.2d 1263,
3	1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). Just like Restatement § 4.8(3) and), Section 301 state 302
4	states that a servient estate owner can seek relocation "to permit normal use or development of
5	the servient estate." Section 301302, however, also allows a servient estate owner to seek
6	relocation to make "improvements on or to the servient estate." This additional justification is
7	borrowed from Article 748 of the Louisiana Civil Code, the source for Restatement § 4.8(3).
8	which provides in pertinent part: "If the original location [of a servitude] has become mo re
9	burdensome for the owner of the servient estate, or if it prevents him from making useful
10	improvements on his estate," La. Civ. Code art. 748 (emphasis added). If the drafting
11	committee believes that the substantive and procedural safeguards now found in Sections 301,
12	302, 303, 304, 306, 307 and 308 are sufficient to prevent any harm to the easement holder, then,
13	arguably, a good reason for relocation should be enough and requiring a strong showing of
14	necessity is unwarranted.). La. Civ. Code art. 748 (emphasis added).
15	
16	SECTION 303. REQUIREMENT OF SERVIENT ESTATE OWNER TO
17	PROVIDE NOTICE OF INTENT TO RELOCATE EASEMENT. A servient estate owner
18	may exercise the right to relocate an eligible easement under Section 302 only if the servient
1.0	
19	estate owner first gives notice in a record to the easement holder and a voluntary lien holder with
20	an interest in the servient or dominant estate. The record must contain:
20	an interest in the servicin of dominant estate. The record must contain.
21	(1) a statement of the servient estate owner's intention to seek relocation and the scope,
22	nature, extent, location, and probable commencement and completion of the relocation;
23	(2) a title report on the servient and dominant estates; and
24	(3) a statement of the reasons the proposed relocation satisfies the requirements of
25	Section 202
25	Section 302.
26	<u>Comment</u>
27	Section 303 clarifies that a servient estate owner may not engage in self-help if it desires
28	to relocate an easement. It codifies the rulings of the highest courts of several states that have
29	adopted the Restatement approach to easement relocation. See Roaring Fork Club L.P. v. St.
30	Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1237-38 (Colo. 2001) (stating that a court is the appropriate forum to
31	resolve disputes over easement relocation and advising that "to avoid an adverse ruling of
32	<u>trespass or restoration – the burdened owner should obtain a court declaration before</u>
33	commencing alterations"); M.P.M. Builders L.L.C. v. Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1059 (Mass.
34	2004) (commenting that "the servient estate owner should seek a declaration from the court that
35	the proposed changes meet the criteria in [section] 4.8(3)" and "may not resort to self-help

1 remedies"). 2 3 The servient estate owner seeking to relocate an easement must give written notice of its 4 intent to relocate the easement. As set forth in Sections 304 and 305, the easement holder then 5 has 60 days to reply to the request for relocation. When the easement holder timely consents to 6 the relocation, the servient estate owner may proceed with the relocation under Section 304. 7 However, as that section explains, the servient estate owner must still comply with all other 8 provisions of the act. 9 10 This section requires that the servient estate owner give notice to a voluntary lien holder 11 with an interest in either the servient or dominant estate affected by a proposed easement 12 relocation. Section 311 clarifies that the relocation of an easement under the terms of the act will generally not constitute a transfer or grant of an interest in either the servient or dominant estate 13 14 for purposes of triggering a default or a due-on-sale clause. The notice requirement under 15 Section 303 of the act will thus give affected lien holders, and especially first lien holders, an 16 opportunity, in the unusual context of a specific loan document that characterizes relocation of 17 an easement as a transfer of or grant of an interest in the relevant property, an opportunity to 18 raise this issue in court. 19 20 SECTION 304. PROCEDURE FOR CONSENSUAL RELOCATION. If an 21 easement holder in a record [[, exercising the right to consent specified in Section 301(b),]]⁵ 22 grants consent to a request to relocate not later than 60 days after receipt of the record described 23 in Section 303, a servient estate owner may proceed with the relocation, subject to Sections 307, 24 308, and 309. 25 **Comment** 26 Section 304 establishes the process for relocating an easement in a manner consistent 27 with the act if the easement holder consents to the proposed easement after receiving the notice described in Section 303. It specifies that the servient estate owner must still comply with all 28 29 provisions in the act intended to protect the interests of the easement holder as detailed in Section 30 307 (payment of costs and expenses resulting from relocation), Section 308 (cooperate in good 31 faith and minimize disruption of use and enjoyment), and Section 309 (execution and recordation 32 of document establishing new easement location). 33 34 SECTION 305. PROCEDURE FOR NON-CONSENSUAL RELOCATION. 35 (a) If an easement holder's identity is unknown or not reasonably ascertainable, or if the

⁵ This double bracketed language is included to highlight for Drafting Committee discussion the relationship between Section 301(b) and Section 304.

1	servient estate owner provides a record described in Section 303 and the easement holder fails to
2	respond to the request to relocate in a record not later than 60 days after receipt of a record
3	described in Section 303, the servient estate owner may bring an action in a court to obtain
4	approval of the proposed relocation.
5	(b) In a proceeding under subsection (a), the court, upon review of the servient estate
6	owner's request to relocate, shall determine whether the easement is eligible for relocation under
7	Section 201.
8	(c) If a servient estate owner provides a record described in Section 303 and the easement
9	holder in a record objects to the relocation not later than 60 days after receipt of the record
10	described in Section 303, the servient estate owner may bring an action in a court to obtain
11	approval of the proposed relocation.
12	(d) If, in a final order or judgment, the court determines that a servient estate owner is
13	entitled to relocate an easement, the servient estate owner may proceed with the relocation,
14	subject to Sections 307, 308, and 309.
15	(e) The court, exercising its equitable powers, may make other orders necessary for the
16	fair and equitable relocation of an easement, including ordering the payment of additional costs
17	associated with maintenance of the relocated easement and any orders addressing the interests of
18	voluntary lien holders in the servient or dominant estate.
19	<u>Comment</u>
20 21 22 23 24	If an easement holder's identity cannot be determined or if an easement holder fails to grant consent to or object to a request to relocate within the 60-day period after receiving notice, Section 305(a) entitles a servient estate owner to proceed with an action to obtain judicial approval to relocate an easement.
25 26 27	Section 305(b) requires the court to review the request for relocation and determine whether the easement at issue is, in fact, eligible for relocation under Section 201; <i>i.e.</i> , that the easement is not disqualified for easement relocation by virtue of being a public utility easement,

a conservation easement or a negative easement. This provision is intended to provide protection for difficult to identify easement holders and, in particular, conservation organizations that have an interest in preserving conservation easements but might lack the organizational capacity to respond to a servient estate owner's notice of an intent to relocate an easement.

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When an easement holder timely objects to relocation, Section 305(c) authorizes the servient estate owner to file what amounts to a declaratory judgement action to obtain judicial approval of the proposed relocation. If judicial approval is granted, the servient estate owner may proceed with relocation but must still comply with all other provisions of the act.

The 60-day notice period specified throughout Section 305 (and in Section 304) is intended to give easement holders a reasonable opportunity to investigate the terms of the proposed easement relocation without causing an undue delay to realization of the servient estates owner's plans for development or improvement of the servient estate and to establish a notice period that is simple and easy to calculate. State statutes that allow easement relocation at the servient estate owner's expense sometimes require notice but do not specify a notice period. See, e.g., Va. Code § 55-50 (merely requiring "petition to the circuit court and notice to all parties in interest"); Idaho Code § 18-4308 (providing for relocation of irrigation ditches at servient estate owner's expense, but not indicating a notice period); Idaho Code § 55-313 (providing for relocation of motor vehicle access easements at servient estate owner's expense, but not indicating a notice period); N.M. Stat. § 73-2-5 (allowing for relocation of irrigation ditches "so long as such alteration or change of location does not interfere with the use or access to such ditch by the owner of the dominant estate," but not indicating whether notice or any special procedure is required).

If a servient estate owner attempts to file an action seeking to relocate an easement and does not provide proof of its attempt to provide notice to the easement holder and of the expiration of the delay period set forth in this section, a court would be entitled to dismiss the action.

Section 305(d) reiterates that even if a court determines that a servient estate owner is entitled to relocate an easement in a non-consenusal proceeding, the servient estate owner must still comply with all provisions in the act intended to protect the interests of the easement holder, including Section 307 (payment of costs and expenses resulting from relocation), Section 308 (cooperate in good faith and minimize disruption of use and enjoyment), and Section 309 (execution and recordation of document establishing new easement location).

Section 305(e) recognizes a court's residual power to issue other incidental orders necessary to implement a fair and efficient relocation that assures the easement holder suffers no material harm upon relocation. It also recognizes a court's power to address what is likely to be the unusual case of a specialized mortgage loan document that characterizes an easement relocation as an event possibly triggering a default or a due-on-sale clause. See infra Section 311 and the comment thereto.

SECTION 306. FACTORS RELEVANT TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN

EASEMENT IS ELIGIBLE FOR RELOCATION. Inln a proceeding under Section 305(b), a

22	Comment
21	<u>Comment</u>
20	the easement.
19	(e7) any other factor that may be material to the easement holder's right to use and enjoy
18	under Section 303 that have not consented to the relocation; and
17	safety6) interests of individuals using parties other than the easement holder entitled to notice
16	(d) whether the proposed relocation will have a significant effect on public safety or the
15	complete;
14	the easement holder's [[affirmative, easement-related]] ⁷ interests once the relocation is
13	(e5) whether, once relocation is complete, there will be a material burden upon or harm to
12	can be minimized and alleviated by the servient estate owner during the process of relocation;
11	estate during the process of relocation and the degree to which any disruption or inconvenience
10	material inconvenience to the easement holder's enjoyment of the easement or the dominant
9	(4) whether the process of relocating the easement will cause a <u>material</u> disruption-or
8	using the easement or public health or safety;
7	(b(3) whether the proposed relocation will materially affect the safety of individuals
6	or width of the easement;
5	(2) whether the proposed relocation will significantly materially affect the route, gradient,
4	(a[[(1) whether the easement is eligible or ineligible for relocation under Section 201;]] ⁶
3	<u>factors</u> :
2	under Section 301 of this [Act], a court shall give consideration to 302, consider the following
1	court shan, in determining whether a servient estate owner is entitled to may relocate an easement

 ⁶ Section 306(1) has been included at the request of the Land Trust Alliance and should be discussed by the Drafting Committee.
 7 This double bracketed language is new.

This section identifies specific factors relevant to the determination under Section 301 of the act as to whether a proposed new location of an easement will provide the same general utility to the easement holder without causing any harm to the easement holder. The enumerated factors represent an illustrative, but not an exhaustive, list of factors that parties and courts should consider. Subsections (a) (d) are intended to channel a court's exercise of the discretion afforded by Section 301 of the Act into four primary streams of factual analysis. Subsection (e) preserves a court's freedom to consider any other factors that have not been anticipated by the act.

In states in which unilateral easement relocation is permitted either by judicial precedent or by statute, courts have considered a number of factors in determining whether to allow a proposed easement relocation or modification to proceed. Those factors include all aspects Section 306 sets forth specific factors that a court should consider in determining whether to allow an easement relocation to proceed under Section 302 act in an action authorized by Section 305(b). Of course, some factors may not be relevant to a particular relocation dispute, and thus a court may always indicate that one or more factors is not relevant to a particular matter.

Section 306(1) focuses the attention of a court on the threshold inquiry of whether a particular easement is the kind of easement eligible for relocation under Section 201(a) or the kind of easement ineligible for relocation under Sections 201(b) through (c). If the latter, the court would have no need to consider the remaining factors.

Section 306(2) requires courts to consider the nature of the quality of the proposed new route for the easement in terms of its route, gradient, and its impact on the width. Courts almost always consider these interrelated factors in deciding whether to allow easement holder. or servitude relocations to proceed. See, e.g., Carlin v. Cohen, 895 N.E.2d 793, 798-99 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (applying M.P.M. Builders L.L.C. and affirming trial court ruling that servient estate owner was entitled to relocate a pedestrian beach access easement because entry point of relocated easement was not more difficult to reach than under original easement, and, even though dominant estate owner would have to walk over a knoll, there was no evidence original easement path was more level); Belstler v. Sheller, 264 P.3d 926, 933 (Idaho 2011) (affirming trial court refusal to approve relocation of express ingress and egress easement under Idaho Code § 55-313 because relocation would have rendered road grades on easement substantially steeper than in original location and would have created hazard for dominant estate owners in using easement); Welch v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n of E. Baton Rouge Par., 220 So. 3d 60, 65-68 (La. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that developer of new subdivision was not justified in unilaterally relocating a servitude under Article 748 of the Louisiana Civil Code because new rights-of-way provided over public roads were only 20 feet wide and thus diminished utility of servitude which provided for 30 foot wide right-of-way benefiting three enclosed lots).

Section 306(3) mandates that courts consider the safety of individuals using the easement and public health and safety. Courts frequently consider these interrelated factors when evaluating the route, gradient and width of a proposed new location for an easement. Courts sometimes take into account the effect of a proposed easement relocation on public health and safety more generally, including the potential for the improved effectiveness of an easement. See R & S Invests, v. Auto Auctions Ltd., 725 N.W.2d 871, 876-78, 881 (Neb. Ct. App. Manning

v.2006) (holding that servient owner could relocate an easement for a sanitary sewer lagoon, even though the new lagoon was located 500 feet farther away from dominant estate than the old one, because the servient owner constructed the new lagoon with greater wastewater capacity and all necessary piping and connections and alleviated serious environmental concerns related to age of old lagoon).

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Section 306(4) requires courts to consider whether the process of relocating the easement will materially disrupt the easement holder's use and enjoyment of the easement during the process of relocation and the extent to which the servient estate owner can abate or minimize this disruption during the process of relocation. This subsection could thus lead a court to require a servient estate owner to complete construction of a new access road or driveway along the route of the relocated easement before diverting traffic away from the original easement location.

Section 306(5) requires courts to consider whether a proposed new location of an easement will provide the same general utility to the easement holder without causing any material harm to the easement holder in connection with the express purpose of the easement. In other words, the subsection focusses judicial attention on the affirmative, easement-related benefits of an easement, rather than any ancillary or incidental advantages that an easement holder might claim in connection with the easement such as preventing the servient estate owner from developing the servient estate. Compare Manning v. Campbell, 268 P.3d 1184, 1187-88 (Idaho 2012) (holding that servient owner was not entitled to relocate a driveway access easement under Idaho Code § 55-313 because the relocated easement would not have connected to any existing route for vehicular travel and would have required dominant estate owners to construct a new driveway on their property across their front lawn, and, thus, would injure the dominant estate owners and their property); Welch v.), and City of Boulder v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n of E. Baton Rouge Par., 220 So. 3d 60, 65-68 (La. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that developer of new subdivision was not justified in unilaterally relocating a servitude under Article 748 of the Louisiana Civil Code because new rights-of-way provided over public roads were only 20 feet wide and thus diminished utility of servitude which provided for 30 foot wide rightof-way benefiting three enclosed lots).

 Courts have also considered factors related to functional utility of the easement, public safety and health. See R & S Invests. v. Auto Auctions Ltd., 725 N.W.2d 871, 876-78, 881 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that servient owner could relocate an easement for a sanitary sewer lagoon because the servient owner constructed a new lagoon with greater wastewater capacity and all necessary piping and connections, alleviated serious environmental concerns related to age of old lagoon, even though the new lagoon was located 500 feet farther away from dominant estate than the old one); City of Boulder v. Farm and Irrigation Co., 214 P.3d 563, 567-69 (Colo. App. 2009) (refusing to allow alteration of ditch irrigation easement under Roaring Fork Club L.P. so that city could build trail extension because alteration would materially and adversely affect the maintenance rights that irrigation company enjoyed by way of easement from state department of transportation); Belstler v. Sheller, 264 P.3d 926, 933 (Idaho 2011) (affirming trial court refusal to approve relocation of express ingress and egress easement under Idaho Code § 55-313 because relocation would have rendered road grades on easement substantially steeper than in original location and would have created hazard for dominant estate owners in using easement).), with M.P.M. Builders L.L.C. v. Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1058-59 (Mass. 2004)

I	lobserving that an reasement is created to serve a particular objective, not to grant the easement
2	holder the power to veto other uses of the servient estate that do not interfere with that purpose").
3	If a dominant estate owner actually wants to obtain a property interest in a servient estate that
4	prevents development of that estate in some manner, the dominant estate owner can always
5	negotiate for and acquire a restrictive covenant or negative easement.
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7	Section 306(7) preserves a court's freedom to consider any other factors not anticipated
8	by the act.
9	SECTION 303307. COSTS AND EXPENSES OF RELOCATION CHARGEABLE
10	TO THE SERVIENT ESTATE OWNER. When If a servient estate owner seeks to relocate an
11	easement under Section 301 of this [Act], the servient estate 302, the owner is responsible for all
12	costs and expenses associated with relocation, including the cost of:
13	(a1) constructing all works or improvements necessary for the use and preservation of the
14	easement in its new location-and, repairing any physical damage to the dominant estate caused
15	by the relocation, and relocating improvements on the dominant estate affected by the relocation;
16	(b2) minimizing and alleviating any temporary disruption that the relocation process may
17	causecauses to the easement holder;
18	(e3) obtaining any planning, zoning or land usegovernmental approvals or permits
19	required by law to relocate the easement;
20	(d) amending any instrument establishing the easement; and
21	(e)(4) preparing, recording, or registering any instrument establishing relocating the
22	relocated easement in the relevant public records for the purpose of assuring to assure that the
23	relocated easement is effective against third parties and successors of the servient estate owner.
24	<u>Comment</u>
25	Comment
26 27 28	This section is intended to give Section 307 provides courts with guidance as to the items that might constitute an expense chargeable to the servient estate owner under Section 301 of the act.302. The enumerated items represent an illustrative, but not an exhaustive, list of such chargeable expenses. The concept of "works or improvements necessary for the use and

preservation of the easement" in subsection (a) is borrowed from La. Civ. Code art. 744 1 2 (providing that normally the owner of the dominant estate has "the right to make at his expense 3 all the works that are necessary for the use and preservation of the servitude."). 4 5 Attorney's fees incurred by the easement holder might well constitute part of the 6 expenses chargeable under the various subsections, particularly under subsections (3) and (4) 7 pertaining to the acquisition of governmental approvals and preparing an instrument for filing in 8 the public records designed to provide third party effect for the relocated easement. Other 9 expenses related to obtaining governmental approval or preparing instruments for filing in the 10 public records, such as obtaining necessary consents from co-owners or other interested parties, could also be chargeable under subsections (3) and (4). 11 12 13 The specific requirements for a notice document that establishes the easement's new 14 relocation and that must be filed in the public records are set forth in Section 309. 15 16 SECTION 304308. DUTY TO COOPERATE ANDIN GOOD FAITH; DUTY TO MINIMIZE AND ALEVIATE DISRUPTION. If an easement holder consents to relocation as 17 18 provided in Section 306(b) of the [Act] or is deemed to have consented to a proposed relocation 19 under Section 306(c) of the [Act], or if the (a) A servient estate owner obtains judicial approval to relocate and an easement under 20 21 Section 306(d) of the [Act], then 22 (a) the servient estate owner and the easement-holder shall have a reciprocal duty to 23 cooperate in good faith to facilitate the swift and safe relocation of thean easement, and. 24 (b) the A servient owner shall have the duty to minimize and alleviate any disruption to 25 the easement holder's use and enjoyment of thean easement or the dominant estate. 26 Comment 27 **Comment** 28 The reciprocal duty of the servient estate owner and easement holder to cooperate in good 29 faith to facilitate a swift and speedysafe relocation of the easement is grounded in an 30 understanding of an easement as a long-term, concurrent property relationship that imposes mutual duties of accommodation on both parties—the servient estate owner and the easement 31 32 holder. For a general discussion of the principle of mutual accommodation in the law of 33 easements and servitudes at common and civil law, see John A. Lovett, A Bend in the Road:

Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 38

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CONN. L. REV. 1, 36-47 (2005).

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For judicial endorsements of the principle of mutual accommodation and the duty to consider the rights and interests of the other party in an easement relationship in the specific context of easement relocation, see Roaring Fork Club L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1232 (Colo. 2001) (explaining that Colorado law increasingly recognizes that when there are two competing interests in the same land, those interests "should be accommodated, if possible," and that inflexible notions of dominant and servient estates do little to advance that accommodation" and explaining that endorsing the Restatement approach to easement relocation is the most as consistent with that "accommodation doctrine"); M.P.M. Builders L.L.C. v. Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1058-59 (Mass. 2004) (opiningobserving that an "easement is created to serve a particular objective, not to grant the easement holder the power to veto other uses of the servient estate that do not interfere with that purpose," and quoting Roaring Fork Club L.P., 36 P.3d at 1237 for the proposition that "[c]learly, the best course is for the owners to agree to alterations that would accommodate both parties use of their respective properties to the fullest extent possible"); R & S Invs. v. Auto Auctions Ltd., 725 N.W.2d 871, 880 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that "Nebraska case law provides that the owner of a servient estate and the owner of a dominant estate enjoy correlative rights to use the subject property, and the owners must have due regard for each other and should exercise that degree of care and use which a just consideration of the rights of the other demands").

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The duty of the servient estate owner to minimize and alleviate any disruption of the <u>use and</u> enjoyment of the <u>easement or the</u> dominant estate is <u>a fundamental an important</u> safeguard <u>ofin</u> the relocation process, particularly if <u>thea</u> dominant estate is already developed for commercial purposes. This safeguard goes above and beyond the safeguards employed in Restatement § 4.8(3) to assure that relocation of the easement does not cause any harm to the <u>dominant estate ownereasement holder</u> and, therefore, should protect the <u>easement holder</u>'s rights of the <u>dominant estate owner</u> both retroactively and prospectively.

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ISECTION 305 – TWO OPTIONS TO CONSIDER OR TO DELETE ENTIRELY

31 Alternative A

ISECTION 305. RIGHT OF PARTIES TO EXCLUDE APPLICATION. The

parties to an instrument creating an easement after the effective date of the [Act] shall have the

right to provide that an easement otherwise eligible for relocation under Section 301 of the [Act]

shall not be subject to the provisions of this [Act].]

1	Alternative B
2	[SECTION 305. RIGHT OF PARTIES TO LIMIT APPLICATION. The parties to
3	an instrument creating an easement after the effective date of the [Act] shall have the right to
4	provide that an easement otherwise eligible for relocation under Section 301 of the [Act] shall
5	not be subject to the provisions of the [Act] for a period of years after the date of the
6	instrument.]
7	End of Alternatives
8	Comment
9 10 11 12 13 14	This section provides that parties to a new instrument creating an easement after the effective date of the act have the power to opt-out of the act's provisions either totally or for a stated number of years. Either option creates a new default regime for easement relocation after the effective date of the act. This new default regime puts the burden on the easement holder to declare its intention that the act not apply to the easement (Option A) or not apply to the easement for a stated number of years (Option B).
6	Reporter's Note
17 18 19 20 20 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29	I have bracketed this entire section because, even though the drafting committee tentatively agreed during our June conference call that parties to an easement should have the right to opt out of the provisions of this act, after further consideration I recommend that the drafting committee delete this section in its entirety. If the substantive and procedural safeguards now found in sections 301, 302, 303, 304, 306, 307 and 308 are sufficient to prevent any harm to the easement holder, then the change in the law effectuated by the act should arguably apply not only retroactively to old easements that contain provisions requiring consent to any amendment of material terms (even ones specifically focused on the location of an easement), but also prospectively to new easements created after the effective date of the act, even if those easement agreements contain similar provisions. This is the approach followed by Article 1023 of the German Civil Code, one of the most influential civil law codifications in the world. See BGB (Germany) § 1023(1) providing:
31 32 33 34 35 36	(1) Where the use of an easement for the time being is restricted to part of the servient plot of land, the owner may require the use to be moved to another place that is equally suitable for the person entitled, if the use in the previous place is particularly arduous for him; he must bear and advance the costs of moving. This also applies if the part of the plot of land to which the use is restricted is determined by legal transaction.
88	(2) The right to move the use may not be excluded or restricted by legal

transaction.

: (emphasis added).

Several other foreign jurisdictions allow a land use right or restriction, including an easement or servitude, to be subject to judicial modification or termination under statutory changed conditions doctrines at any time. See Lovett, December 2010 Memo, at 13-21 (discussing Australia, New Zealand, the Province of British Columbia in Canada, Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Switzerland).

Other jurisdictions, principally Scotland and the Netherlands, allow such modification, but only after the lapse of a specific period of time—five years in Scotland and 20 years in the Netherlands—during which the land use right or restriction is not subject to any form of judicial modification. See Lovett, December 2010 Memo, at 14-15, 20-21, 31-32. This is the approach that I recommended in my 2005 law review article on the subject of easement relocation. John A. Lovett, A Bend in the Road: Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 47-56 (2005). In that article, I described my approach as being based on the "Temporally Constrained Freedom of Contract Model proposed by Professors Carol Rose and Allison Dunham." Id. at 47. I wrote:

Borrowing from these numerous recommendations for temporal restraints on servitude duration that emerged from the servitude reform and unification debate, my first proposal for refining section 4.8(3) seeks to preserve a measure of easement holder certainty while limiting the harmful effects of prolonged and potentially unlimited property rule protection by establishing a fixed period of time (for instance thirty years) during which an easement's initial location could not be changed without the consent of the easement holder.

Id. at 52-53. I justified this proposal in the following terms:

By adding a temporally defined property rule protection phase, followed by a classic pliability rule phase, my version of section 4.8(3) would provide more certain, crystalline incentives for development of dominant estates and the easements that serve them for fixed periods of time and yet still limit "the social deadweight loss" that can result from perpetual and exclusive property rule protection.

Id. at 54-55 (quoting Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, *Pliability Rules*, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 42, 71 (2002)).

If parties are allowed to opt-out of the act's easement relocation regime, it is quite possible—maybe even likely—that in most cases parties to an express easement created after the effective date of the act will do so. This will leave parties to such an easement in the same deadlock position 20 or 30 years from now. Leaving this section in place and allowing parties to opt-out of the provisions of the act for future easements will create the anomalous situation that old easements containing express clauses requiring consent to amendment and specified

easement locations will be subject to relocation, whereas new easements with opt-out clauses will not be subject to relocation. This just seems odd to me and perhaps not defensible in terms of fairness.

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If, however, the drafting committee decides not to delete this section and, thus, makes the act a prospective default regime, I recommend that it consider allowing parties to exclude application of the act only for a finite period of time, after which an easement will automatically become subject to relocation under the terms of the act (Option B). Again, this was my recommendation in 2005.

SECTION 306. PROCEDURES FOR INVOKING THE RIGHT TO RELOCATE.

(a) A servient estate owner may only exercise the right to relocate an eligible easement under Section 301 of the [Act] if the servient estate owner first gives notice in a record to the easement holder of its intention to seek relocation and a statement of the scope, nature, extent and location of the proposed relocation and the reasons that the proposed relocation satisfies the requirements of Section 301.

(b) If the easement holder in a record grants consent to the request to relocate within 60 days after receipt of the record described in subsection 306(a), then the servient estate owner may proceed with the relocation, subject to the provisions of this [Act], including the requirements to: (i) pay all costs and expenses associated with the relocation, as provided in Section 303 of the [Act]; (ii) cooperate in good faith and minimize and alleviate disruption, as provided in Section 304 of the [Act]; and (iii) execute and record a notice document, as provided in Section 307 of the [Act].

(c) If the servient estate owner provides the record described in subsection 306(a) and the easement holder fails to either consent or object to the request to relocate in a record within 60 days after receipt of the record described in subsection 306(a), then the easement holder shall be deemed to have consented to the request for relocation and the servient estate owner may proceed with the relocation, subject to the provisions of this [Act], including the requirements to:

(i) pay all costs and expenses associated with the relocation, as provided in Section 303 of the 1 2

[Act]; (ii) cooperate in good faith and minimize and alleviate disruption, as provided in Section

304 of the [Act]; and (iii) execute and record a notice document, as provided in Section 307 of

4 the [Act].

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(d) If a servient estate owner provides the record described in subsection 306(a), and the easement holder in a record objects to the relocation within 60 days after receipt of the record described in subsection 306(a), then the servient estate owner may bring an action in a court of general or specific jurisdiction to obtain court approval of the proposed relocation. If, in a final order or judgment, the court grants the servient estate owner's request to relocate, then the servient estate owner may proceed with the relocation, subject to the provisions of this [Act], including the requirements to: (i) pay all costs and expenses associated with the relocation, as provided in Section 303 of the [Act]; (ii) cooperate in good faith and minimize and alleviate disruption, as provided in Section 304 of the [Act]; and (iii) execute and record a notice document, as provided in Section 307 of the [Act].

15 Comment

> This section is intended to make clear that a servient estate owner may not engage in self-help if it desires to relocate an easement. It codifies the rulings of the highest courts of several states that have adopted the Restatement approach to easement relocation. See Roaring Fork Club L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1237-38 (Colo. 2001) (stating that a court is the appropriate forum to resolve disputes over easement relocation and advising that "to avoid an adverse ruling of trespass or restoration - the burdened owner should obtain a court declaration before commencing alterations"); M.P.M. Builders L.L.C. v. Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1059 (Mass. 2004) (commenting that "the servient estate owner should seek a declaration from the court that the proposed changes meet the criteria in [section] 4.8(3)" and "may not resort to selfhelp remedies").

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The servient estate owner seeking to relocate an easement must give written notice of its intent to relocate the easement in accordance with subsection (a) of this section. The easement holder then has 60 days to reply to the request for relocation. When the easement holder timely consents to the relocation, the servient estate owner may proceed with the relocation but must still comply with all other provisions of the act.

When an easement holder fails to grant consent or object within the 60-day period, this non-response is deemed to constitute consent to the relocation. In such a case, the servient estate owner may proceed with relocation but must still comply with all other provisions of the act.

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When an easement holder timely objects to relocation, the servient estate owner may file what amounts to a declaratory judgement action to obtain judicial approval of the proposed relocation. If judicial approval is granted, the servient estate owner may proceed with relocation but must still comply with all other provisions of the act.

The 60-day notice period was selected to give easement holders a reasonable opportunity to investigate the terms of the proposed easement relocation without causing an undue delay to realization of the servient estates owner's plans for development or improvement of the servient estate and to establish a notice period that is simple and easy to calculate. State statutes that allow easement relocation at the servient estate owner's expense sometimes require notice but do not specify a notice period. See, e.g., Va. Code § 55-50 (merely requiring "petition to the circuit court and notice to all parties in interest"); Idaho Code § 18-4308 (providing for relocation of irrigation ditches at servient estate owner's expense, but not indicating a notice period); Idaho Code § 55-313 (providing for relocation of motor vehicle access casements at servient estate owner's expense, but not indicating a notice period); N.M. Stat. § 73-2-5 (allowing for relocation of irrigation ditches "so long as such alteration or change of location does not interfere with the use or access to such ditch by the owner of the dominant estate," but not indicating whether notice or any special procedure is required).

Reporter's Notice

I decided to require notice only to the easement holder for simplicity's sake and because all parties with a stake in the dominant estate are protected by the safeguards included in Sections 301, 302, 303, 304 and 307 of the act. Accordingly, other interested parties, including mortgagees, would have no basis for complaining that their interest has been impaired by a relocation undertaken in compliance with the act.

SECTION 307The duty of parties in long-term property relationships to act in good faith is not new to uniform acts promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission. See, e.g., Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act Section 1-113 ("Every contract or duty governed by this [act] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.). See also Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act Section 2-103(i)(b) and Uniform Commercial Code Sections 1-304, 7-404.

SECTION 309. EXECUTION AND RECORDATION OF DOCUMENT

ESTABLISHING NEW LOCATION OF EASEMENT.

- (a) If thean easement holder grants consent to thea relocation as set forth inunder Section
- 306(b) of the [Act], then 304, the servient estate owner and the easement holder shall execute and

1	recording servient estate owner shall cause to be recorded in the relevant public records a
2	document, in. The document must be in the form required by the recording statutes of this state:
3	(i) stating and:
4	(1) state that the relocation was obtained in accordance with Section 306(b) of the
5	[Act];304; and (ii) setting
6	(2) set forth with specificity the new location of the easement.
7	(b) Provided the If a court determines that a servient estate owner has complied with the
8	notice requirements for relocation of is entitled to relocate an easement inpursuant to Section
9	306(a) of the [Act], if the easement holder fails either to consent or object to the request for
10	relocation as set forth in Section 306(c) of the [Act], then 305, the servient estate owner shall
11	execute and record in the relevant public records a document, in. The document must be in the
12	form required by the recording statutes of this state: (i) stating that the relocation was obtained in
13	accordance with Section 306(c) of this [Act]; and (ii) setting forth with specificity the new
14	location of the easement.:
15	(e) If the relocation occurs after completion of a judicial proceeding under Section
16	306(d) of the [Act], then the servient estate owner shall execute and record in the relevant
17	public records a document, in form required by the recording statutes of this 1) state: (i)
18	stating that the relocation was obtained in accordance with Section 306(d) of the [Act];
19	(ii) containing adequate citation to 305;
20	(2) contain a certified copy of the final order or judgment of the court granting the
21	request for relocation; and (iii) setting forth with specificity the new location of the easement.
22	Comment
23	(3) set forth with specificity the new location of the easement.

1	<u>Comment</u>
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	At least one court has required a servient estate owner whothat has satisfied the criteria for easement relocation under section 4.8(3) of the Restatement to execute a new document setting forth the new location and other relevant terms of the relocated easement. <i>R & S Invs. v. Auto Auctions Inc.</i> , 725 N.W.2d 871, 878 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006). This section adopts that approach and specifies the contents of such a document under the threetwo procedural mechanisms set forth for completing relocation of an easement under Section 306 of the actSections 304 and 305.
10	SECTION 308. METHODS 310. METHOD OF NOTICE.
11	([(a) Notice required by Section 303 must be sent by first-class mail addressed to the
12	easement holder at the easement holder's last-known address. If the easement holder's
13	representative has requested in a record notice by electronic mail and has provided the servient
14	estate owner an electronic-mail address, the notice also must be sent to the electronic-mail
15	address.
16	(b) If a servient estate owner does not know the identity of the easement holder and the
17	easement holder's identity cannot be reasonably ascertained, the easement holder does not have a
18	duty to notify the easement holder individually, but a notice must be sent to the address of the
19	dominant estate in the case of an appurtenant easement.
20	(c) If a servient estate owner knows the identity of the easement holder but does not know
21	the easement holder's address, notice must be sent to the address of the dominant estate in the
22	case of an appurtenant easement.]]
23	[[(d) Notice to a person under this [Aetact] must be accomplished in a manner reasonably
24	suitable under the circumstances and likely to result in receipt of the notice.
25	Permissible consistent with service of process in this state.]] ⁸
26 27	<u>Legislative note</u> : <u>Section 310 provides for</u> methods of notice include first-class mail, based on the Uniform Home Foreclousres Procedures Act, Sections 202 and 204 (2015). A
	8 The double brackets for Sections 310(a)-(c) and Section 310(d) indicate a subject for Drafting Committee discussion.

state, however, may decide to employ its own methods of notice consistent with the rules for 1 2 service of process in that state. Hence, the bracketed language at the end of this section is an 3 alternative to subsections (a) through (c). 4 5 **Comment** 6 7 Section 310, setting forth the requirements for pre-litigation notice of an intent to seek 8 relocation of an easement under Section 302, is derived from Sections 202 and 204 of the 9 Uniform Home Foreclosures Procedures Act (2015). It does not displace any other notices 10 required by applicable state law for initiation of a judicial proceeding by personal service. 11 12 Notice under this section must be sent by first class mail. First class mail has the 13 characteristic that it will be delivered to the last known address whether or not the recipient 14 accepts delivery; in person. The servient estate owner may supplement first class mail with 15 certified mail or overnight delivery to the person's last known place, residence or place of 16 business, or a properly directed electronic message but may not rely solely on methods that 17 require the recipient to accept delivery in person. 18 (b) Notice otherwise required under this [Act] need not be provided to a person whose 19 identity or location is unknown or not reasonably ascertainable. 20 Comment 21 22 This section is taken from Section 109 of the Uniform Trust Code. 23 24 Reporter's Note 25 26 Because there are many notice requirements in effect in every jurisdiction, I chose this provision because it is a widely recognized provision in many jurisdictions. As the comments to 27 Section 204 of the Uniform Home Foreclosures Procedures Act indicate, Sections 310(b) and (c) 28 29 of this act address situations that may arise when an easement holder has sold a dominant estate 30 to another person or when the easement holder has died and the interest in the easement has 31 passed to an heir or devisee. In either case, it may be difficult or impossible to identify or locate 32 the easement holder. 33 34 SECTION 311. CHARACTERIZATION OF RELOCATION OF EASEMENT. 35 Relocation of an easement under this [act] is neither a transfer nor a grant of an interest in the 36 servient estate or the dominant estate affected by the easement. 37 Comment 38 39 The relocation of an easement under the act simply redefines where the easement is 40 located. It does not constitute a transfer or a grant of an interest in either a servient estate

1	burdened by the easement or a dominant estate benefited by the easement. As such, an easement
2	relocation that occurs pursuant to this act would not normally trigger a default or due-on-sale
3	clause under an applicable loan document. It is conceivable that a very specialized loan
4	document might characterize an easement relocation as an event triggering a default or due-on-
5	sale clause. In that unusual circumstance, the preemption provisions of the Garn Act, 12
6	U.S.C.A. §1701j-3(b), would allow enforcement of such a clause. However, as most loan
7	documents do not characterize an easement relocation as an event triggering a default or due-on-
8	sale clause, Section 312 clarifies that, in the normal case, an easement relocation cannot be
9	characterized as an event triggering a default or application of such a clause. For a discussion of
10	the enforceability of and restrictions on due-on-sale clauses, see Grant S. Nelson et al., Real
11	Estate Finance Law §§ 5.21-5.26, at 321-61 (6th ed. 2015).
12	
13	SECTION 312.
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15	SECTION 309. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION. In
16	applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote
17	uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among the states that enact it.
18	SECTION 310313. RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL
19	AND NATIONAL COMERCE ACT. This act modifies, limits, or supersedes the Electronic
20	Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq., but does not
21	modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of that act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001(c), or authorize
22	electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103(b) of that act, 15 U.S.C.
23	Section 7003(b).
24	SECTION 311314. REPEALS; CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
25	<u>(a)</u>
26	<u>(b)</u>
27	<u>(c)</u>
28	SECTION 315. EFFECTIVE DATE . This [Actact] takes effect