

D R A F T

FOR DISCUSSION ONLY

UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS

WITH PREFATORY NOTE AND COMMENTS

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By

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS

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March 3, 2004

UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT

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UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT

PREFATORY NOTE

In 1972 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act [hereafter referred to as UMIFA (1972)]. At that time uncertainty existed as to the standards that governed directors of charitable corporations in managing and investing the funds of the charitable organizations. Directors of a charity organized as a nonprofit corporation had been held to the investment standards that applied to trustees of private trusts. *See Lynch v. John M. Redfield Foundation*, 9 Cal. App. 3d 293 (1970), (stating that directors of a charitable corporation are essentially trustees and as such are held to an investment duty similar to that of a trustee of a private trust). *See also* Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 389 (1959). For directors of large institutions, the then-current restrictions on trust investing made the use of modern investment strategies problematic.

UMIFA (1972) provided guidance and authority to the governing boards of those charitable organizations within its scope on several issues. The statute gave a governing board broad investment authority and indicated that a governing board was not restricted to investments authorized for trustees. The statute permitted a board to delegate authority to independent financial advisors. With respect to endowment funds, the statute authorized a governing board to expend unrealized appreciation, even if the endowment fund provided only for the distribution of “income.” This provision enabled fund managers to use modern investment techniques such as total-return investing and unitrust-style spending. UMIFA (1972) also permitted the governing board to release restrictions on the use or investment of institutional funds if the restrictions had become “obsolete, inappropriate, or impracticable” and if the governing board could obtain the consent of either the donor or the court. Thus, the statute provided a mechanism for charities organized as corporations similar to the doctrine of cy pres that applies to charitable trusts.

The investment standards adopted by UMIFA (1972) foreshadowed a more extensive treatment of trust investment law in the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (1994) [hereafter referred to as UPIA]. UPIA applies modern portfolio theory to trusts, including charitable trusts. The Uniform Principal and Income Act (1997) furthered the principles of UPIA, providing tools for the use of investment techniques authorized under UPIA. The Uniform Trust Code (2000) [hereafter referred to as the UTC] expanded the application of the doctrine of cy pres. These Uniform Acts have informed the work of the Drafting Committee of the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (200-) [hereafter UMIFA (200-)].

Objectives of the Act. UMIFA (200-) conforms its investment provisions to those of UPIA. The investment standards of UPIA already apply to charitable trusts, so the changes in the Act make the application of these standards consistent regardless of whether a charitable organization is organized as a trust, as a nonprofit corporation or in some other manner. The rules governing expenditures from endowment funds have been modified to give a governing board more flexibility in making expenditure decisions, so that the board can cope with

fluctuations in the value of the endowment. These rules are available to decision makers of charities organized as charitable trusts, as nonprofit corporations, or in some other manner. The provisions governing the release of restrictions have been changed to permit more efficient management of institutional funds.

Other Legal Rules. UMIFA (200-) addresses investment issues and issues relating to endowment funds but is not a comprehensive statute addressing all legal issues that apply to charitable organizations. For matters not governed by UMIFA (200-), a charitable organization will continue to be governed by rules applicable to charitable trusts, if it is organized as a trust, or rules applicable to nonprofit corporations, if it is organized as a nonprofit corporation.

1 **UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT**

2

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.** This [act] may be cited as the Uniform Management of
4 Institutional Funds Act.

5

6 **SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS.** In this [act]:

7 (1) “Charitable purpose” means the relief of poverty; the advancement of education or
8 religion; the promotion of health; the promotion of governmental or municipal purposes; or
9 another purpose the achievement of which is beneficial to the community.

10 (2) “Endowment fund” means an institutional fund, or any part thereof, not wholly
11 expendable by the institution on a current basis under the terms of a gift instrument. The term
12 includes two or more endowment funds collectively managed. The term does not include assets
13 of an institution designated by the institution as an endowment fund for its own use.

14 (3) “Gift instrument” means a record or records under which property is granted to,
15 transferred to, or held by an institution as an institutional fund. The term may include an
16 institutional solicitation in the form of a record from which an institutional fund results.

17 (4) “Institution” means any nonprofit corporation, trust, unincorporated association, or
18 entity organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes. The term includes a
19 government, governmental subdivision or agency, or a governmental organization to the extent
20 that it holds funds exclusively for a charitable purpose. A trust that has both charitable and
21 noncharitable interests becomes an institution after all noncharitable interests terminate.

1 (5) “Institutional fund” means a fund held for the exclusive use, benefit, or purposes of an
2 institution. The term includes two or more institutional funds collectively managed. The term
3 does not include program-related assets and does not include a fund in which a beneficiary that is
4 not an institution has an interest, other than rights that could arise upon violation or failure of the
5 purposes of the fund.

6 (6) “Program-related asset” means an asset held by an institution if the prevailing purpose
7 of the asset is to accomplish a charitable purpose of the institution and not exclusively for the
8 production of income or the appreciation of property.

9 (7) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in
10 an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

11
12 **Comment**
13

14 **Subsection (1). Charitable Purpose.** The definition of charitable purpose uses the same
15 formulation as that in UTC § 405 and Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 368 (1959). The
16 definition is the standard legal definition of charitable purposes, developed from the definition of
17 charity set forth in the English Statute of Charitable Uses, enacted in 1601.
18

19 **Subsection (2). Endowment fund.** An endowment fund is an institutional fund or a part
20 of an institutional fund that is not wholly expendable by the institution on a current basis. A
21 restriction on use that makes a fund an endowment fund arises from the terms of a gift
22 instrument. An institution may manage several funds together if the funds all have the same
23 purpose. These funds would be considered one endowment fund for purposes of this Act.
24

25 Board-restricted funds are institutional funds but not endowment funds. The rules on
26 expenditures and modification of restrictions in this Act do not apply to restrictions placed by an
27 institution on an otherwise unrestricted fund held by the institution for its own benefit. The
28 institution may be able to change these restrictions itself, subject to internal rules and to the
29 fiduciary duties that apply to those that manage an institution.
30

31 If an institution transfers assets designated as an endowment to another institution, then
32 the second institution will hold that fund as an endowment fund.
33

1 **Subsection (3). Gift instrument.** The term gift instrument refers to the records that
2 establish the terms of a gift. As used in this definition, “record” is an expansive concept and
3 means a writing in any form, including electronic. The term includes a will, deed, grant,
4 conveyance, agreement, or memorandum, and also includes writings that do not have a donative
5 purpose. For example, under some circumstances the bylaws of the institution, minutes of the
6 board of directors, or canceled checks could be a gift instrument or be one of several records
7 constituting a gift instrument.
8

9 Solicitation materials may constitute a gift instrument. For example, a solicitation that
10 suggests in writing that any gifts received pursuant to the solicitation will be held as an
11 endowment may be integrated with other writings and may be considered part of the gift
12 instrument. Whether the terms of the solicitation become part of the gift instrument will depend
13 upon the circumstances of the gift and whether a subsequent writing superseded the terms of the
14 solicitation.
15

16 The term gift instrument also includes matching funds provided by an employer or some
17 other person and includes an appropriation by a legislature or other public or governmental body
18 for the benefit of an institution.
19

20 **Subsection (4). Institution.** The Act applies generally to institutions organized and
21 operated exclusively for charitable purposes, using the definition of charitable purposes from
22 UTC § 405. The term includes charitable organizations created as nonprofit corporations, trusts,
23 unincorporated associations, governmental subdivisions or agencies, or any form of entity,
24 however organized, that is organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes. As used
25 in this definition, the term “trust” is intended to mean a trustee acting under a charitable trust.
26 The term includes a trust organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, regardless
27 of whether a charity or a noncharitable corporation such as a bank acts as trustee.
28

29 UMIFA (1972) did not include trusts within its definition of institution. UMIFA (200-)
30 applies to trusts, to nonprofit corporations and to all entities operated for charitable purposes
31 regardless of their form of organization. UMIFA (200-) appropriately includes trusts because the
32 rules for the management and investment of charitable funds should be the same regardless of the
33 organizational structure of the institution. Many of the provisions of UMIFA (200-) come from
34 trust law, so charitable trusts have already been subject to many of these rules.
35

36 The definition of institution includes governmental organizations that hold funds
37 exclusively for the purposes listed in the definition. Some organizations created by state
38 government may fall outside the definition due to the way in which the state created the
39 organizations. Because state arrangements are so varied, creating a definition that encompasses
40 all charitable entities created by states is not feasible. States should consider the core principles
41 of UMIFA (200-) for application to governmental institutions. For example, the control over a
42 state university may be held by a State Board of Regents. In that situation, the state may have
43 created a governing structure by statute or in the state constitution so that the university is, in

1 effect, privately chartered. The drafting committee does not intend to exclude these universities
2 from the definition of institution, but additional state legislation may be necessary to address
3 particular situations.
4

5 **Subsection (5). Institutional Fund.** The term institutional fund includes any fund held
6 by an institution for its own use, benefit, or purposes, whether expendable currently or subject to
7 restrictions. The term also includes a fund held by a trustee that is not an institution, if the fund
8 is held exclusively for the benefit of an institution. UMIFA (1972) excluded funds managed by
9 corporate trustees. The Drafting Committee concluded that the provisions of UMIFA should be
10 available to any fund managed exclusively for charitable purposes.
11

12 A fund held by an institution is not an institutional fund if any beneficiary of the fund is
13 not an institution. For example, a charitable remainder trust held by a charity as trustee for the
14 benefit of the donor during the donor's lifetime, with the remainder interest held by the charity, is
15 not an institutional fund. However, this subsection treats as an institution a charitable remainder
16 trust that continues to operate for charitable purposes after the termination of the noncharitable
17 interests. The Act will have only a limited effect on a charitable remainder trust during the
18 period required to complete the distribution of the trust's property after the noncharitable interest
19 ends. The prudence norm will apply to the actions of the trustee, but the trustee will make
20 decisions about investment and management of funds knowing that the trust will distribute its
21 assets and not continue indefinitely.
22

23 If a governing instrument provides that a fund will revert to the donor if, and only if, the
24 institution ceases to exist or the purposes of the fund fail, then the fund will be considered an
25 institutional fund until such contingency occurs.
26

27 **Subsection (7). Record.** This definition was added to clarify that the definition of
28 instrument includes electronic records as defined in Section 2(8) of the Uniform Electronic
29 Transactions Act (1999).
30

31
32 **SECTION 3. STANDARD OF CONDUCT IN MANAGING AND INVESTING**
33 **INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS**

34 (a) In addition to duties imposed by law other than this [act], each individual responsible
35 for the governance of an institution holding an institutional fund must, in managing and investing
36 an institutional fund, act in a manner the individual reasonably believes to be in the best interests
37 of the institution.

1 (b) In managing and investing an institutional fund, an institution may only incur costs
2 that are appropriate and reasonable in relation to the assets, the purposes of the institution, and
3 the skills available to the institution.

4 (c) Each individual responsible for the governance of an institution must, in managing
5 and investing an institutional fund, act in good faith with the care that an ordinarily prudent
6 person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.

7 (d) The provisions of subsections (e) through (k) are default rules and may be expanded,
8 restricted, eliminated, or otherwise altered by the provisions of a gift instrument.

9 (e) In managing and investing institutional fund the following factors, if relevant, shall be
10 considered:

- 11 (1) the terms of the gift instrument;
- 12 (2) the charitable purposes of the institution;
- 13 (3) the purposes of the institutional fund;
- 14 (4) general economic conditions;
- 15 (5) the possible effect of inflation or deflation;
- 16 (6) the expected tax consequences, if any, of investment decisions or strategies;
- 17 (7) the role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall
18 investment portfolio of the institutional fund;
- 19 (8) the expected total return from income and the appreciation of investments;
- 20 (9) other resources of the institution;
- 21 (10) the needs of the institution and the institutional fund to make distributions
22 and to preserve capital; and

1 (11) an asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the charitable
2 purposes of the institution.

3 (f) An institution's management and investment decisions about an individual asset must
4 be made not in isolation but in the context of the institutional fund's portfolio of investments as a
5 whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably
6 suited to the fund and to the institution.

7 (g) An institution shall make a reasonable effort to verify facts relevant to the
8 management and investment of an institutional fund.

9 (h) In addition to an investment authorized by law other than this [act], and subject to any
10 specific restrictions set forth in law other than this [act], an institution may invest in any kind of
11 property or type of investment consistent with the standards of this section.

12 (i) An institution shall diversify the investments of an institutional fund unless the
13 institution reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the fund
14 are better served without diversifying.

15 (j) An institution has a reasonable time after receiving property to make and implement
16 decisions concerning the retention or disposition of the property, or to rebalance a portfolio, in
17 order to bring the institutional fund into compliance with the purposes, terms, distribution
18 requirements, and other circumstances of the institution and the requirements of this [act].

19 (k) An individual who has special skills or expertise, or is named in reliance upon the
20 representation that the individual has special skills or expertise, has a duty to use those special
21 skills or expertise in managing and investing institutional funds.

22 **Comment**

1
2 **Purpose and Scope of Revisions.** This section adopts the prudence standard for
3 investment decision making. The section directs the governing board to act as a prudent investor
4 would, using a portfolio approach in making investments and considering the risk and return
5 objectives of the fund. The section lists the factors that commonly bear on decisions in fiduciary
6 investing and incorporates the duty to diversify investments absent a conclusion that special
7 circumstances make a decision not to diversify reasonable. Section 3 applies to all funds held by
8 an institution, regardless of whether the institution obtained the funds by gift or otherwise and
9 regardless of whether or not the funds are restricted.

10
11 Section 3 derives its concepts and language from UPIA, which updated trust investment
12 law by adopting modern portfolio theory. See UPIA (1994), Prefatory Note. UPIA drew upon
13 revised standards for prudent trust investment promulgated by the American Law Institute in its
14 Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule (1992). For an explanation of the Prudent
15 Investor Act, see John H. Langbein, *The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust*
16 *Investing*, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 641 (1996).

17
18 The Drafting Committee discussed at great length the standard that should govern
19 nonprofit managers. UMIFA (1972) states the standard as “ordinary business care and prudence
20 under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of the action or decision.” Since the
21 decision in *Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses*, 381 F. Supp.
22 1003 (1974), the trend has been to hold directors of nonprofit corporations to a standard similar
23 to the corporate standard.

24
25 The language of the prudence standard adopted in UMIFA (200-) is derived from the
26 Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act and from the prudent investor rule from trust law.
27 The standard is consistent with the business judgment standard under corporate law, as applied to
28 charitable institutions. That is, a manager operating a charitable organization under the business
29 judgment rule would look to the same factors as those identified by the prudent investor rule.
30 Trust law norms already inform managers of nonprofit corporations. The Drafting Committee
31 decided that by adopting the language of UPIA, UMIFA (200-) could clarify that UPIA’s
32 articulation of the standards of prudent investing applies to all charitable institutions. The
33 Committee believed that the greater precision of the prudence norms of the Restatement and
34 UPIA, as compared with UMIFA (1972), could helpfully inform managers of charitable
35 institutions.

36
37 UPIA applies to trusts and not to nonprofit corporations, but the Prefatory Note to UPIA
38 explains that “the standards of the Act can be expected to inform the investment responsibilities
39 of directors and officers of charitable corporations.” Further, comment b to Restatement (Third)
40 of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 379, at 190-91 states that “absent a contrary statute or other
41 provision, prudent investor rule applies to investment of funds held for charitable corporations.”
42 Section 3 clarifies that the investment rules that apply to charitable trusts through UPIA apply to
43 charitable corporations as well.

1 Other than the duty of loyalty, the duty to minimize costs and the duty to act in good faith,
2 the provisions of Section 3 are default rules. A gift instrument or the governing instruments of
3 an institution can modify these duties, but the charitable purpose doctrine limits the extent to
4 which an institution or a donor can modify these duties.
5

6 **Subsection (a). Duty of Loyalty.** This subsection applies the duty of loyalty to
7 performance of investment duties. Under existing laws the duty of loyalty requires a fiduciary
8 acting on behalf of the institution to make decisions in the interests of the institution and not in
9 the interests of the fiduciary or a third party. Trust law requires a fiduciary to act solely in the
10 interests of the beneficiary, while nonprofit law uses a “best interests” standard. To the extent
11 that trust law imposes a higher standard, trust law will continue to govern trustees who are
12 subject to UMIFA (200-).
13

14 **Subsection (b). Duty to Minimize Costs.** Subsection (b) tracks the language of UPIA §
15 7 and requires an institution to minimize costs. An institution may prudently incur costs by
16 hiring an investment advisor, but the costs incurred should be appropriate under the
17 circumstances. *See* UPIA § 7 cmt.; Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227,
18 cmt. M, at 58 (1992); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 188 (1959).
19

20 **Subsection (c). Duty to Act in Good Faith.** The language in subsection (c) comes from
21 Section 8.30 of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act. The duty to act in good faith
22 involves considering the factors set forth in subsection (e).
23

24 **Subsection (e). Prudent Decision Making.** Subsection (e) takes much of its language
25 from UPIA § 2(a) and § 2(c). In making decisions about whether to acquire or retain an asset, the
26 institution should consider the institution’s mission, its current programs, and the desire to
27 cultivate additional donations from a donor, in addition to factors related more directly to the
28 asset’s potential as an investment. The direction in subsection (e)(1) to consider the terms of the
29 gift instrument means that the institution must consider the donor’s intent in making decisions
30 under Section 3 but does not mean that the donor can or should control the management of the
31 institution.
32

33 Subsection (e)(5) reflects the fact that some organizations will invest in taxable
34 investments that may generate unrelated business taxable income for income tax purposes.
35

36 Subsections (e)(2), (e)(3), and (e)(10) indicate that a prudent decision maker can take into
37 consideration the relationship between an investment and the purposes of the institution and of
38 the institutional fund in making an investment that may have a program-related purpose. For an
39 investment that is not a program-related asset but serves program-related purposes, due weight
40 should be given to the programmatic purposes in determining the suitability of the investment.
41

42 [The Comment will delete the following 2 paragraphs and replace them with an
43 explanation of the decision to remove program-related assets from UMIFA.] The Drafting

1 Committee considered making UMIFA (200-) inapplicable to assets used in carrying out an
2 institution’s charitable purposes but decided against that approach because some assets serve
3 both a program-related purpose and an investment purpose. Some members of the Committee
4 expressed concern that assets that were only partially programmatic should not fall outside the
5 scope of the prudence standard. If UMIFA (200-) excluded programmatic assets, an institution
6 might attempt to justify an imprudent investment decision by arguing that the asset was related to
7 the institution’s charitable purposes. Further, a line based on whether assets were “primarily”
8 programmatic in nature would be difficult to enforce. The Drafting Committee concluded that
9 the best approach was to make the programmatic element one factor in the decision-making
10 process.
11

12 The degree to which an institution uses an asset to accomplish a charitable purpose will
13 affect the weight given that factor in a decision to acquire or retain the asset. Thus, if a
14 university acquires residential property near the edge of campus to hold for future development,
15 the purpose of the property is one component of the decision to acquire the property but the
16 institution must also consider other more directly investment-related factors. A decision to
17 acquire land on which to build the university’s new science center will not be viewed as an
18 investment for the production of a financial return but rather should be considered as an
19 investment to accomplish a charitable purpose of the university. Assets held entirely for
20 programmatic purposes should not be considered part of the institution’s investment portfolio for
21 purposes of risk-return analysis and for benchmarking of investment returns. To do otherwise
22 would adversely affect investment decision-making.]
23

24 **Subsection (f). Portfolio Approach.** This subsection, taken from UPIA § 2(b), reflects
25 the spread of portfolio theory in modern investment practice. UPIA and UMIFA (200-) both
26 follow the articulation of the prudent investor standard in Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent
27 Investor Rule § 227(a) (1992).
28

29 **Subsection (g). Duty to Investigate.** This subsection incorporates the traditional
30 fiduciary duty to investigate, stated in UPIA § 2(d). The subsection requires persons who
31 exercise authority to make investment and management decisions to investigate the accuracy of
32 the information used in making decisions.
33

34 **Subsection (h). Broad Investment Authority.** This subsection uses language derived
35 from UPIA §§ 1(b). Consistent with the portfolio theory of investment, the subsection “clarifies
36 that no particular kind of property or type of investment is inherently imprudent.” UPIA § 2,
37 cmt. The reference to investments “authorized by law other than this [act]” includes state
38 statutes creating legal lists for investments. This provision does not contravene any other state
39 statute that authorizes specific investments and is designed to permit investments in a broad
40 range of investments.
41

42 [Legislative Note: A state may want to delete the clause “in addition to an investment
43 authorized by law other than this [act]” as unnecessary or may want to add a specific reference to

1 other law. Legislative counsel should review existing law to determine whether the legislature
2 should repeal existing rules on investments or should add a specific reference to those rules
3 here.]
4

5 Subsection (h) also provides that terms of a gift instrument or other law applicable to
6 institutions may limit the authority under this subsection. For example, the gift instrument for a
7 particular institutional fund might preclude the institution from investing the assets of the fund in
8 companies that produce tobacco products.
9

10 **Subsection (i). Duty to Diversify.** This subsection derives from UPIA § 3, see also
11 Restatement (Third): Prudent Investor Rule § 227 (1992). The subsection assumes that prudence
12 requires diversification but permits an institution to determine that nondiversification is
13 appropriate under the circumstances applicable to a fund. *See* UPIA § 3 cmt. (discussing the
14 rationale for diversification).
15

16 **Subsection (j). Disposing of Unsuitable Assets.** This subsection imposes a duty on an
17 institution to make a decision about retaining or disposing of property within a reasonable time
18 after the institution receives the property. The language comes from UPIA § 4, which restates
19 Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 229 (1992), which itself took language
20 from Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 231 (1959). *See* UPIA § 4 cmt.
21

22 **Subsection (k). Special Skills or Expertise.** Subsection (k) states the rule provided in
23 UPIA § 2(f) requiring a trustee to use the trustee’s own skills and expertise in carrying out the
24 trustee’s fiduciary duties. The comment to RMNCA 8.30 describes the existence of a similar
25 rule under the law of nonprofit corporations. [MORE]
26

27 UMIFA (1972) contained two provisions that authorized investments in pooled or
28 common investment funds. UMIFA (1972) §§ 4(3), 4(4). The Drafting Committee concluded
29 that Section 3(h) of UMIFA (200-) authorizes these investments. The decision not to include the
30 two provisions in UMIFA (200-) does not mean that UMIFA (200-) implies no disapproval of
31 such investments.
32
33

34 **SECTION 4. EXPENDITURE OF ENDOWMENT FUNDS; RULE OF**
35 **CONSTRUCTION.**

36 (a) Subject to the terms of the gift instrument, an institution may expend or accumulate so
37 much of an endowment fund as the institution determines to be prudent for the uses, benefits, and
38 purposes for which the endowment fund is established. In making its determinations on

1 expenditures and accumulations, the institution shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution,
2 and shall consider:

- 3 (1) the purposes of the institution and the endowment fund;
- 4 (2) general economic conditions;
- 5 (3) the possible effect of inflation or deflation;
- 6 (4) the expected total return from income and the appreciation of investments;
- 7 (5) other resources of the institution;
- 8 (6) preservation of the purchasing power of the endowment fund;
- 9 (7) the investment policy of the institution;
- 10 (8) the duration of the endowment fund; and
- 11 (9) any other relevant circumstances.

12 (b) The following rules of construction apply to gift instruments executed or in effect
13 before or after the effective date of this [act]:

14 (1) To limit the authority to expend or accumulate funds under subsection (a), a
15 gift instrument must specifically state the limitation.

16 (2) A designation of a gift as an endowment, or a direction or authorization in the
17 gift instrument to use only “income”, “interest”, “dividends”, or “rents, issues, or profits”, or “to
18 preserve the principal intact” or words of similar import, creates an endowment of indefinite
19 duration but does not limit the authority to make expenditures or to accumulate under subsection
20 (a).

21
22 **Comment**

1
2 **Purpose and Scope of Revisions.** This section revises the provision in UMIFA (1972)
3 that permitted the expenditure of appreciation of an endowment fund to the extent the fund had
4 appreciated in value above the fund’s historic dollar value. UMIFA (1972) defined historic
5 dollar value to mean the value of all contributions to the fund. The new approach abandons the
6 use of historic dollar value as a floor for expenditures and provides more flexibility to the
7 institution in making decisions about whether to expend any part of an endowment fund. As
8 under UMIFA (1972), a prudence standard applies to the process of making decisions about
9 expenditures from an endowment fund.

10
11 Section 4 permits expenditures from an endowment fund to the extent the institution
12 determines that the expenditures are prudent after considering the factors listed in subsection (a).
13 These factors emphasize the importance of keeping the purposes of the institution and of the
14 endowment fund in mind while also considering economic conditions. As under UMIFA (1972),
15 expenditures do not depend on the characterization of assets as income or principal and are not
16 limited to the amount of income and unrealized appreciation.

17
18 Institutions have operated effectively under UMIFA (1972) and have operated more
19 conservatively than historic dollar value would have permitted. Institutions have no incentive to
20 spend everything the law permits them to spend, and good practice has been to provide for
21 modest expenditures while maintaining the purchasing power of a fund. Institutions have
22 followed this approach even though UMIFA (1972) does not require an institution to maintain a
23 fund’s purchasing power and allows an institution to spend any amounts in a fund above historic
24 dollar value. The Drafting Committee concluded that eliminating historic dollar value and
25 providing institutions with more discretion would not lead to depletion of endowment funds.
26 Instead, UMIFA (200-) should encourage institutions to establish a spending approach that will
27 be responsive to short-term fluctuations in the value of the fund. Section 4 allows an institution
28 to maintain appropriate levels of expenditures in times of economic downturn or economic
29 strength. In some years, accumulation rather than spending will be prudent, and in other years an
30 institution may appropriately make expenditures even if a fund has generated no investment
31 return that year.

32
33 Several levels of safeguards exist to prevent institutions from depleting endowment funds
34 or diverting funds from the purposes for which they were created. Donors can restrict gifts and
35 can provide specific instructions to donee institutions as to appropriate uses for assets
36 contributed. Within institutions, fiduciary duties govern the persons making decisions on
37 expenditures. Those persons must operate with the best interests of the institution in mind and in
38 keeping with the intent of donors. If an institution diverts an institutional fund from the
39 charitable purposes of the institution, the state attorney general can enforce the charitable
40 interests of the public. By relying on these safeguards while providing institutions with adequate
41 discretion to make decisions on appropriate expenditures, the Act creates a standard that takes
42 into consideration the diversity of the charitable sector. The committee expects that industry
43 standards will continue to evolve and inform institutions as the institutions apply this standard.

1 Section 4 provides guidance on factors to consider in exercising discretion but does not
2 take away discretion by providing a cap or floor for distribution. The Drafting Committee
3 discussed whether to provide a safe harbor for spending within a range based on percentages of
4 the assets of the fund. The Committee concluded that specifying a range for appropriate
5 distributions was unwise because a fixed range could not take into account the factors listed in
6 subsection (a) or changes in market conditions. A fixed range might be appropriate under current
7 conditions but would be unlikely to remain appropriate over time. Institutions have done a good
8 job of developing spending policies under UMIFA (1972) and should be able to continue to
9 develop spending policies that take into consideration the specific needs of a particular fund.
10 Prudent decision making after considering all the factors is the standard under UMIFA (200-). A
11 safe-harbor would simply create a new standard that could not take into account the needs of
12 individual institutions and funds.

13
14 The Drafting Committee also considered creating a presumption of imprudence if
15 expenditures in one year exceeded seven percent of the value of the endowment fund, averaged
16 over three years. [The Comment will include an explanation of why the presumption of
17 imprudence was not included and will include examples of ways in which donors can use a
18 spending rule to limit the authority under subsection (a).]
19

20 For a discussion of spending approaches, see Joel C. Dobris, *New Forms of Private*
21 *Trusts for the Twenty-First Century—Principal and Income*, 31 Real. Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 1
22 (1996). For example, Dobris suggests spending 5% or 4% of a five-year moving average of
23 market values might be appropriate. *Id.*, at 39.
24

25 Donor’s intent must be respected in the process of making decisions to expend
26 endowment funds. Section 4 does not allow an institution to convert an endowment fund into a
27 non-endowment fund nor does the section allow the institution to ignore a donor’s intent that a
28 fund be maintained as an endowment. Rather, subsection (b) provides rules of construction to
29 assist institutions in interpreting donor’s intent. Subsection (b) assumes that if a donor wants an
30 institution to spend “only the income” from a fund, the donor intends the fund to continue in
31 perpetuity and expects the institution to expend amounts that represent a reasonable return on
32 investments. The donor is unlikely to be concerned about designation of returns as “income” or
33 “principal” under accounting principles. Rather the donor likely assumes that the institution will
34 use modern investing strategies like total-return investing to generate enough funds to distribute
35 while maintaining the long-term viability of the fund. Subsection (b) provides default rules to
36 construe donor’s intent.
37

38 If a donor indicates that the rules on investing or expenditures under Section 4 do not
39 apply to a particular fund, then as a practical matter the institution will probably invest the fund
40 separately. Thus, a decision by a donor to require specific expenditure rules will likely also have
41 consequences in the way the institution invests the fund.
42

1 Endowment funds include funds that may last in perpetuity but also funds that should
2 continue for a fixed term of years or until the institution achieves a specified objective. Section 4
3 requires the institution to consider the intended duration of the fund in making determinations
4 about spending. For example, if a donor directs that a fund be spent over 20 years, Section 4 will
5 guide the institution in making distribution decisions. The institution would amortize the fund
6 over 20 year rather than try to maintain the fund in perpetuity.

7
8 As a rule of construction, subsection (b) applies retroactively. Retroactive application is
9 appropriate because subsection (b) does not alter the substance of an existing contract, but rather
10 serves as a default rule that implements donor’s intent. The Colorado Supreme Court recently
11 considered the question of retroactive application of a default statute involving the donative
12 aspect of an insurance contract. *See In re Estate of DeWitt*, 54 P. 3d 849 (Colo. 2002). In
13 holding that the statute did not violate the Contracts Clause, the court cited approvingly from a
14 statement prepared by the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trusts and Estates Acts (the “JEB”).
15 JEB Statement Regarding the Constitutionality of Changes in Default Rules as Applied to Pre-
16 Existing Documents, 17 Am. Coll. Tr. & Est. Couns. Notes 184 app. II (1991). The JEB
17 Statement explains why retroactive application of default statutes is appropriate and is not
18 unconstitutional and states, “The JEB is aware of no authority for the application of the Contracts
19 Clause to state legislation applying altered rules of construction or other default rules to pre-
20 existing documents in any field of law, and especially not in the field of estates, trusts, and
21 donative transfers.” *Id.* at 4 (citing J. Nowak & R. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 11.8, at 394 et
22 seq. (4th ed. 1991)).
23
24

25 SECTION 5. DELEGATION OF MANAGEMENT AND INVESTMENT

26 FUNCTIONS.

27 (a) Subject to any specific limitations set forth in a gift instrument or in law other than
28 this [act], an institution may delegate to external agents the management and investment
29 functions with respect to institutional funds that an institution could prudently delegate under the
30 circumstances. An institution shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in:

31 (1) selecting an agent;

32 (2) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the
33 purposes of the institution and the institutional fund; and

1 (3) periodically reviewing the agent’s actions in order to monitor the agent’s
2 performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation.

3 (b) In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the institution to exercise
4 reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation.

5 (c) An institution that complies with the requirements of subsection (a) is not liable for
6 the decisions or actions of an agent to which the function was delegated.

7 (d) By accepting delegation of a management or investment function from an institution
8 that is subject to the laws of this state, an agent submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
9 state in all proceedings arising from the delegation.

10 **Comment**

11
12 This section incorporates into UMIFA (200-) the delegation rule found in UPIA § 9,
13 updating the delegation rules in UMIFA (1972) § 5. Section 5 permits the decision makers in an
14 institution to delegate management and investment functions to external agents if the decision
15 makers exercise reasonable skill, care, and caution in selecting the agent, defining the scope of
16 the delegation and reviewing the performance of the agent. Decision makers cannot delegate the
17 authority to make decisions concerning expenditures and can only delegate management and
18 investment functions. Subsection (c) protects decision makers who comply with the requirement
19 for proper delegation from liability for actions or decisions of the agents.

20
21 Section 5 does not address issues of internal delegation and potential liability for internal
22 delegation, and subsection (c) does not affect laws that govern personal liability of directors or
23 trustees for matters outside the scope of Section 5. Directors will look to nonprofit corporation
24 laws for these rules, while trustees will look to trust law. *See, e.g.,* RMNCA, Section 8.30(b)
25 (permitting directors to rely on information prepared by an officer or employee of the institution
26 if the director reasonably believes the officer or employee to be reliable and competent in the
27 matters presented).

28
29 The language of subsection (c) is similar to that of UPIA § 9(c) and RMNCA § 8.30(d).
30 The decision not to include the terms “beneficiaries” or “members” in subsection (c) does not
31 indicate a decision that this section does not create immunity from claims brought by
32 beneficiaries or members. Instead, a decision maker who complies with section 5 will be
33 protected from any liability resulting from actions or decisions made by an external agent.
34

1 Subsection (d) creates personal jurisdiction over the agent. This subsection is not a
2 choice of law rule.
3
4

5 **SECTION 6. RELEASE OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON USE OR**
6 **INVESTMENT.**

7 (a) For purposes of this section, the term institutional fund includes a fund that is one of
8 two or more institutional funds collectively managed.

9 (b) With the consent of the donor, in a record, an institution may release, in whole or in
10 part, a restriction imposed by a gift instrument on the use or investment of an institutional fund.
11 A release under this subsection may not allow a fund to be used for a purpose other than a
12 charitable purpose of the institution affected.

13 (c) An institution may apply to the [appropriate court] for release or modification of a
14 restriction imposed by a gift instrument on the use or investment of an institutional fund. The
15 institution shall notify the [Attorney General], who must be given an opportunity to be heard. If
16 the court finds that the restriction is unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful,
17 the court may release or modify the restriction, in whole or in part, in a manner consistent with
18 the charitable purposes expressed in the gift instrument.

19 (d) If an institution concludes that a restriction imposed by a gift instrument on the use or
20 investment of an institutional fund is unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful,
21 the institution, after notification to the [Attorney General], may release or modify, in whole or
22 part, the restriction if:

1 (1) the institutional fund subject to the restriction has a total value of less than
2 [\$25,000]; and

3 (2) more than [20] years have elapsed since the inception of the fund.

4 (e) If a restriction is released or modified, in whole or part, under subsection (d), the
5 institution must use the property in a manner the institution determines, in good faith, to be
6 consistent with the charitable purposes expressed in the gift instrument.

7 **Comment**

8
9 Section 6 expands the rules on releasing or modifying restrictions that are found in
10 Section 7 of UMIFA (1972). Subsection (a) restates the rule from UMIFA (1972) allowing the
11 release of a restriction with donor consent. Subsection (b) describes the application of court-
12 ordered cy pres but does not require notice to the donor as was required in UMIFA (1972).
13 Subsection (c), a new provision, permits an institution to apply cy-pres for small funds that have
14 existed for a substantial period of time, after giving notice to the state attorney general.
15

16 Subsection (a) permits the release of a restriction if the donor consents. A release with
17 donor consent cannot change the charitable beneficiary of the fund. Although the donor has the
18 power to consent to a release of a restriction, this section does not create a power in the donor
19 that will cause a federal tax problem for the donor. The gift to the institution is a completed gift
20 for tax purposes, the property cannot be diverted from the charitable beneficiary, and the donor
21 has no retained interest in the fund.
22

23 Subsection (b) applies the doctrine of cy pres to institutions governed by UMIFA. The
24 circumstances for the application of cy pres under UMIFA (200-) are the same as those in UTC §
25 413; cy pres may be applied if the restriction is unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or
26 wasteful. A restriction that may have made sense when a donor made a gift, may no longer be
27 appropriate due to unanticipated changes. Subsection (b) allows the institution to apply for
28 modification of the restriction, in keeping with the original intent of the donor. The institution
29 must give notice to the state attorney general, who represents the interests of the public in
30 ensuring that the donor's charitable wishes as expressed in the gift instrument are followed. In
31 determining the appropriate modification, the court will consider what the donor would have
32 preferred if the donor had been aware of the unanticipated circumstances.
33

34 The Drafting Committee considered requiring notification of the donor in a cy pres
35 application but concluded that such a requirement would make cy pres impracticable in situations
36 involving multiple donors. Good practice dictates notifying known donors of any change
37 considered by the institution. The Drafting Committee concluded that an institution's concern

1 for donor relations would serve as sufficient incentive for following that practice. The interest of
2 donors who cannot be contacted will be protected by the attorney general, the court, and the
3 standard itself. An institution will be able to use cy pres only if there is a significant problem
4 with complying with the restriction and only with the supervision of the attorney general and the
5 court.
6

7 Subsection (c) permits an institution to release or modify a restriction using a cy pres
8 approach but without donor consent or court approval if the amount of the institutional fund
9 involved is small and if the institutional fund has been in existence for more than 20 years. The
10 Drafting Committee determined that under some circumstances a restriction may no longer make
11 sense but the cost of a judicial cy pres proceeding will be too great to warrant a change in the
12 restriction. The Committee discussed at length the parameters for allowing an institution to
13 apply cy pres itself, without court supervision. The Committee drafted subsection (c) to balance
14 the needs of an institution to operate efficiently for its charitable purposes and the need to protect
15 donors' wishes. The subsection assumes that an institutional fund with a value of \$25,000 or less
16 is sufficiently small that the cost of a judicial proceeding will be out of proportion with the need
17 to change the restriction. The Committee included a requirement that the institutional fund be in
18 existence at least 20 years because it seemed reasonable to require additional safeguards for
19 donors' intent for some period of time after the creation of the institutional fund. The 20 year
20 period begins to run from the date of inception of the fund and not from the date of each gift to
21 the fund. The amount and the number of years have been placed in brackets to signal to enacting
22 jurisdictions that they may wish to designate a higher or lower figure.
23

24 Subsection (d) provides that, as under judicial cy pres, an institution acting under
25 subsection (c) must change the restriction in a manner that is in keeping with the intent of the
26 donor and the purpose of the fund. For example, if the value of a fund is too small to justify the
27 cost of administration of the fund as a separate fund, the term "wasteful" would allow the
28 institution to combine the fund with another fund with similar purposes. If a fund had been
29 created for nursing scholarships and the institution closed its nursing school, the institution might
30 appropriately decide to use the fund for other scholarships at the institution. In using the
31 authority granted under subsection (c), the institution must make a good faith determination of
32 which alternative use for the fund reasonably approximates the original intent of the donor. The
33 institution cannot divert the fund to an entirely different use. For example, the fund for nursing
34 scholarships could not be used to build a football stadium.
35

36 Although UMIFA (200-) does not create standing in donors seeking to enforce
37 restrictions on their gifts, a donor making a significant gift to an institution may include in the
38 gift instrument a right to notice of any modification or a right to standing to enforce a gift. In
39 addition, some states do provide for donor standing to enforce terms of a gift under certain
40 circumstances. *See* [citation].
41
42

1 **SECTION 7. REVIEWING COMPLIANCE.** Compliance with this [act] is determined
2 in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time a decision is made or action is taken,
3 and not by hindsight.

4
5 **SECTION 8. APPLICATION TO EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS.** This
6 [act] applies to institutional funds existing on and created after its effective date. As applied to
7 institutional funds existing on its effective date, this [act] governs only decisions or actions
8 occurring after that date.

9
10 **SECTION 9. RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND**
11 **NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT.** This [act] modifies, limits, and supersedes the federal
12 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq.) but
13 does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101 of that act (15 U.S.C. Section 7001(a)) or
14 authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103 of that act (15 U.S.C.
15 Section 7003(b)).

16
17 **SECTION 10. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION.** In
18 applying and construing this Uniform Act, consideration must be given to the need to promote
19 uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

20
21 **SECTION 11. EFFECTIVE DATE.** This [act] takes effect
22

1 **SECTION 12. REPEAL.**

2 The following acts and parts of acts are repealed:

3