D R A F T

FOR DISCUSSION ONLY

DIRECTED TRUST ACT

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DIRECTED TRUST ACT

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June 6October 7, 2016

DIRECTED TRUST ACT

The Committee appointed by and representing the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in preparing this Act consists of the following individuals:

- ROBERT H. SITKOFF, Harvard Law School, 1575 Massachusetts, Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138, *Chair*
- TURNEY P. BERRY, 500 W. Jefferson St., Suite 2800, Louisville, KY 40202, *Vice-Chair* JACK BURTON, 119 E. Marcy St., Suite 200, Santa Fe, NM 87501-2046
- DAVID M. ENGLISH, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, 203 Hulston Hall, Columbia, MO 65211
- MICHAEL B. GETTY, 430 Cove Tower Dr., #503, Naples, FL 34110
- HARRY J. HAYNSWORTH, IV, 108 Addingtons, Williamsburg, VA 23188-7430
- JOHN H. LANGBEIN, Yale Law School, P.O. Box 208215, New Haven, CT 06520-8215
- BRADLEY MYERS, University of North Dakota, 215 Centennial Dr., Stop 9003, Room 201, Grand Forks, ND 58202-9003
- RAYMOND P. PEPE, 17 N. 2nd St., 18th Floor, Harrisburg, PA 17101-1507
- DREW L. SNYDER, Office of the Governor, P.O. Box 139, Jackson, MS 39205
- SUSAN D. SNYDER, 50 S. LaSalle St., MB-09, Chicago, IL 60603
- MARTHA T. STARKEY, 11611 N. Meridian St., Suite 150, Carmel, IN 46032
- ROBERT A. STEIN, University of Minnesota Law School, 229 19th Ave. S., Minneapolis, MN 55455
- CHARLES A. TROST, Nashville City Center, 511 Union St., Suite 2700, Nashville, TN 37219-1760

SUZANNE B. WALSH, 185 Asylum St., CityPlace 1, 29th Floor, Hartford, CT 06103-3469 JOHN MORLEY, Yale Law School, P.O. Box 208215, New Haven, CT 06520, *Reporter*

EX OFFICIO

RICHARD T. CASSIDY, 100 Main St., P.O. Box 1124, Burlington, VT 05401, *President* PAMELA W. BERTANI, 728 Texas St., Suite 4, Fairfield, CA 94533, *Division Chair*

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ADVISORS

JAMES P. SPICA, 500 Woodward Ave., Suite 4000, Detroit, MI 48226-5403, *ABA Advisor* KAREN E. BOXX, University of Washington, William H. Gates Hall, P.O. Box 353020, Seattle, WA 98195-3020, *ABA Section Advisor*

AMY E. HELLER, 340 Madison Ave., <u>17th Floor</u>, New York, NY 10173-1922, <u>ABA Section</u> <u>Advisor</u>

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

LIZA KARSAI, 111 N. Wabash Ave., Suite 1010, Chicago, IL 60602, Executive Director

Copies of this act may be obtained from:

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 111 N. Wabash Ave., Suite 1010 Chicago, Illinois 60602 312/450-6600 www.uniformlaws.org



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PREFATORY NOTE

1

2 Introduction. This actBackground. The Directed Trust Act addresses an 3 increasingly common arrangement in contemporary estate planning and asset management 4 known as a directed trust. A directed trust usually involves the naming of a trustee to hold 5 custody of the trust property and another person who is not a trustee to perform one or more of 6 the investment, distribution, and administration functions that would otherwise have belonged to 7 the trustee. There is no consistent vocabulary for the nontrustee powerholder in a directed trust. 8 Several terms are common in practice, including "trust protector," "trust adviser," and "trust 9 director." There is much uncertainty about the fiduciary status of a nontrustee who has control or potential control over a function the administration of trusteeship a trust and about the fiduciary 10 responsibility of a trustee with regard to actions taken or directed by such a nontrustee. Existing 11 12 uniform trust rusts and estateestates statutes address the issue inadequately. Existing nonuniform 13 state laws are in disarray. 14 15 [Remainder to come.]

1	
2	The Directed Trust Act. Under this act, a nontrustee who holds a fiduciary power over the
3	administration of a trust is called a "trust director." A trustee that is subject to a power of a trust
4	director is called a "directed trustee." The core contribution of the act is to address the many
5	complications created by giving a power over the administration of a trust to a person who is not
6	a trustee. These complications include the fiduciary duty of a trust director (Section 7) and the
7	fiduciary duty of a directed trustee (Sections 8 and 10).
8	
9	Enabling Settlor Autonomy Subject to Fiduciary Minimums. By validating terms of a trust
10	that provide for a trust director with a power over the administration of a trust, this act supports
11	the settlor's freedom of disposition. At the same time, the act provides for certain mandatory
12	minimum fiduciary safeguards in accordance with the venerable principle that a trust is a
13	fiduciary relationship.
14	
15	Structure of the Act. The heart of the act appears in Sections 5 through 10, which address
16	the powers and duties of trust directors and directed trustees. Sections 5 through 7 address the
17	kinds of powers that the terms of a trust can grant to a trust director and the fiduciary duty of the
18	director. Sections 8 through 10 address the fiduciary duty of a directed trustee, prescribing the
19	ways in which the existence of a trust director changes the trustee's normal fiduciary duty.
20	Section 11 addresses the relationship between a directed trust and cotrusteeship. The remaining
21	sections address a variety of important technical issues in the administration of a directed trust
22	and in this act's relationship to existing law.
23	
24	<i>Key Policy Questions.</i> The key policy questions on which the drafting committee focused
25	are: (1) the scope of the powers that may be granted to a trust director (Sections 5 and 6); (2) the
26	fiduciary duties of a trust director (Section 7) and a directed trustee (Sections 8 and 10); and (3)
27	the extension of the fiduciary rules of a directed trust to cotrusteeship (Section 11). With respect
28	to the fiduciary duties of a directed trustee, as explained in the comment to Section 8, of the
29	viable options from among the existing directed trust statutes, the drafting committee preferred
30	the one that protects beneficiaries most strongly. [Further prefatory note to come/for
31	discussion—e.g., "willful misconduct" as a net increase in duty relative to nondirected
32	trust.] October 28-29, 2016 Committee Meeting
33	
34	DIRECTED TRUST ACT
35	SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This [act] may be cited as the Directed Trust Act.
36	Comment
37	This act governs a set of trust arrangements that are commonly known as "directed
38	trusts." In rough terms, a directed trust is a trust in which a person other than a trustee holds a
39	fiduciary power to direct some aspect of the trust's management or administration. Under this
40	act, <u>the person who holds</u> such a powerholderpower is called a "trust director," and a trustee that
40 41	is subject to <u>such a fiduciary power of a trust director</u> is called a "directed trustee" (see Section
42	2(2) and (6)). In addition to covering a trust director, this This act also covers a variety of similar
42	actors who may be called by different names any arrangement that exhibits the functional features
тЈ	actors who may be caned by unterent names any arrangement that exhibits the functional realtites

1 2 3	of a directed trust, even if the terms of the trust use other terminology, such as a <u>"</u> trust protector and <u>" or</u> a <u>"</u> trust advisor , both of which are treated as "trust directors" under this act. Section 6 schedules the kinds of fiduciary powers that may be given to a trust director. <u>"</u>
4 5 6 7 8	The title of this act uses the term "Trust," rather than "Trusteeship," because the purpose of this act is to address the complications created by giving a fiduciary power over a trust to a person who is not a trustee, and so a title focused exclusively on trusteeship would be inaccurate. The usage of the term "trust" is also consistent with other uniform trust laws, including the
9 10 11	Uniform Trust Code (2000) and the Uniform Trust Decanting Act (2015). SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS. In this [act]:
12	(1) "Breach of trust" includes a violation by a trust director or trustee of a duty imposed
13	by this [act] or the terms of a trust.
14	(2) "Directed trustee" means a trustee that is subject to a <u>trust director's</u> power of a trust
15	directordirection under Section 6.
16	(3) "Person" means an individual, business or nonprofit entity, public corporation,
17	government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or other legal entity.
18	(4(4) "Power of appointment" means a power given by the terms of a trust to a person
19	that enables the person in a nonfiduciary capacity to designate a recipient of an ownership
20	interest in or a power of appointment over the trust property.
21	(5) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
22	United States Virgin Islands, or any other territory or insular possession subject to the
23	jurisdiction of the United States.
24	(56) "Terms of a trust" means the manifestation of a settlor's intent regarding a trust's
25	provisions:
26	(A) as expressed in the trust instrument;
27	(B) as established by other evidence that would be admissible in a judicial
28	proceeding;

1	(C) as amended by a trustee or trust director in accord with the terms of the trust;
2	[or]
3	(D) as determined or amended by court order[; or]
4	f((E) as determined or amended by nonjudicial settlement agreement under
5	[Uniform Trust Code Section 111]].
6	(67) "Trust director" means a person, other than a trustee, that is given a power of
7	direction under Section 6 by the terms of a trust, whether or not the terms of the trust designate
8	the person as a trust director, trust protector, or trust adviser, and whether or not the person is a
9	beneficiary.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Legislative Note: A state that has adopted Uniform Trust Code § 102 [to come: guidance re "breach of trust" and Section 103(18) (2004) or Uniform Trust Decanting Act Section 2(28) (2015), defining "terms of a trust"]., " should consider updating those definitions to conform with paragraph (6) of this section. A state that has not adopted Uniform Trust Code §Section 111 (2000) should replace the bracketed language of subparagraph 6(E) with a cross reference to the state's law governing nonjudicial settlement. A state that has not authorized amendment by nonjudicial settlement agreement or should omit paragraph 5subparagraph 6(E) as indicated by if the brackets.state does not have such a law.
18	Comment
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30	(1) Breach of trust. The definition of "breach of trust" in paragraph (1) expands the comparable definition inclarifies that the term "includes" a breach by a trust director of a duty imposed by this act or the terms of a trust. Historically, the term has been used to reference a breach of duty by a trustee, as under Uniform Trust Code § 1001(a) (2000) to include a breach by a trust director.and Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 93 (2012). By including withinexpanding the meaning of the term a violation to include a breach of duty by a trust director of a duty imposed by this act or by the terms of a trust, this definitionparagraph resolves any doubt about whether such conduct is also a "breach of trust." Under traditional law, by contrast, the term "breach of trust" referred to "a failure by the trustee to comply with any duty that the trustee owes[] as trustee." Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 93 (2012).
31 32 33 34 35 36 37	(2) Directed trustee. The definition of "directed trustee" in paragraph (2) includes only a trustee that is subject to a <u>trust director's power of</u> direction by a trust director <u>under Section 6</u> . A cotrustee that is subject to direction by another cotrustee is not for that reason a directed trustee, becauseas paragraph (67) excludes a trustee from the definition of a "trust director." SinceBecause a cotrustee is not "subject to a power of a trust director" within the meaning of a directed trustee under this definitionparagraph. Section 11 addresses the relationship between

this act and cotrusteeship.

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(3) Person. The definition of "person" in paragraph (3) tracks the current Uniform Law Commission boilerplatedefinition for that term except that itparagraph (3) excludes an "estate" and a "trust." The intention is to exclude," which has the effect of excluding an "estate" and a "trust" from being named as a trust director.

(4) Power of appointment. The definition of "power of appointment" in paragraph (4) is based on the similar definition in Uniform Powers of Appointment Act § 102(13) (2013). The definition is consistent with what Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 17.1 cmt. g (2011), refers to as a "discretionary" power of appointment, that is, one in which "the donee may exercise the power arbitrarily as long as the exercise is within the scope of the power."

If a power to designate a recipient of an ownership interest in or a power of appointment over trust property is held in a fiduciary capacity, then it is not a "power of appointment" under this paragraph. Instead, it is what Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 17.1 cmt. g (2011), calls a "fiduciary distributive power." In the hands of a person other than a trustee, a fiduciary distributive power would ordinarily be a power of direction under Section 6.

Section 6(c)(2) prescribes a default rule of construction under which a power to designate a recipient of an ownership interest in or a power of appointment over trust property is a power of appointment (and so not held in a fiduciary capacity) unless the terms of the trust provide otherwise.

(5) *State*. The definition of state in paragraph (4) follows the standard Uniform Law Commission boilerplatedefinition.

30 (6) Terms of a trust. The definition of "terms of a trust" in paragraph (5) takes is based on Uniform Trust Decanting Act § 2(28) (2015) as its starting point, but makes several 31 improvements. The Uniform Trust Decanting Act), which updates the comparable definition in 32 33 Uniform Trust Code § 103(18) (amended 2004)), to take notice of court orders and nonjudicial 34 settlement agreements, both of which are of growing practical significance. Paragraph (5) further 35 expands improves on the Uniform Trust Decanting Act by further expanding the definition to include amendments (in addition to determinations) by court order and nonjudicial settlement 36 37 agreement and to include amendments by trustees and a trustee or trust directors. 38

39 director. The Restatement likewise recognizes the possibility that the terms of a trust may
40 later be varied from the settlor's initial expression, though it does not mention as many
41 mechanisms for variance as paragraph (56). See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 76 cmt. b(1)
42 (2007) ("References ... to the terms of the trust ... also refer to trust terms as reformed or
43 modified by court decree, and as modified by the settlor or others or by consent of all
44 beneficiaries.") (internal cross-references omitted).

- 45 46
- (7) Trust director. The definition of a <u>"trust director"</u> in paragraph ($\frac{67}{}$) includes any

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	person other than a trustee who is given a power of direction under Section 6. A person withgranted a power by the terms of a trust that is a power of direction under Section 6 is a trust director even if the terms of the trust or the parties call the person an "adviser" or "protector" or otherwise purport to disclaim trust director status- and even if the person is also a beneficiary. However, because the term excludes a trustee, a trustee is not a trust director even if the trustee that fallswould be a power of direction under Section 6. Such if held by a person other than a trustee. The power of such a trustee, and the cotrustee over which the trustee has athe power, are instead governed by the otherwise applicable law of cotrusteeship as modified by Section 11. If a person other than a trustee has a power over a trust that is not included ina power of direction under Section 6, that person is not a trust director with respect to that power, and the person's exercise or nonexercise of the power is not governed by this act.
16	(a) This [act] applies to a trust, whenever created before, on, or after [the effective date of
17	this [act]] which, that has its principal place of administration in this state, including asubject to
18	the following rules:
19	(1) If the trust whose principal place of administration has been changed to this
20	state. As to a trustwas created before or on [the effective date of this [act]], this [act] applies only
21	to conduct after that date.
22	(2) As to a trust whose principal place of administration is changed to this state on
23	or after [the effective date of this [act]], this [act] applies only to conduct after the change.
24	(b) Without precluding other means to establish a sufficient connection with the
25	designated jurisdiction, terms of a trust designating the principal place of administration of the
26	trust are valid and controlling if:
27	(1) a trustee's principal place of business is located in or a trustee is a resident of
28	the designated jurisdiction;
29	(2) a trust director's principal place of business is located in or a trust director is a
30	resident of the designated jurisdiction; or

(3) all or part of the administration occurs in the designated jurisdiction.

Legislative Note: A state that has adopted Uniform Trust Code <u>Section</u> 108(a) (2000) could
 omit subsection (b) and instead add subsection (b)(2) to Section 108 of the state's Uniform Trust
 Code.

5 Comment 6 7 Subsection (a) - This subsection prescribes). Subsection (a) addresses two rulesmatters. 8 First, because powers and duties in a directed trust are matters of trust administration, see 9 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 271 cmt. a (1971), this subsection follows the 10 prevailing conflict of laws rule by linking application of this act to the trust's principal place of 11 administration. As with other matters of administration, the parties are protected against 12 inconsistent court orders by the common law principle of "primary supervision." See id., § 267 13 cmt. e. 14 15 Second, this subsection applies this act to all trusts administered in an enacting state regardless of whether the trust was in existence on the effective date of this act, but. However, 16 17 under subsections (a)(1) and (2), this act applies only with respect to conduct occurring after the effective date or, if the trust's principal place of administration was changed to the enacting state 18 19 after the effective date, only with respect to conduct after that change. Because some of the 20 standards of conduct prescribed by this act depart from Uniform Trust Code § 808 (2000) and the 21 common law, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 75 (2007), the drafting committee reasoned 22 that the act should apply prospectively, following the model of Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 23 11 (1994). 24 25 Subsection (b) This subsection,). Subsection (b), which derives from Uniform Trust 26 Code § 108(a) (2000), establishes a safe harbor for a settlor's designation of a trust's principal 27 place of administration. Such a designation is valid if (1) a trustee is located in the designated 28 jurisdiction, (2) a trust director is located in the designated jurisdiction, or (3) at least some of the 29 trust administration occurs in the designated jurisdiction. Subsections (b)(1) and (b)(3) reproduce 30 without change the safe harbor prescribed by Uniform Trust Code § 108(a) (2000). Subsection 31 (b)(2) is an innovation in that it expands the safe harbor of Section 108(a) to include also the 32 location of a trust director, in addition to the location of a trustee, as a sufficient connection with 33 the designated jurisdiction. This expansion reflects this act's validation of a directed trust with a 34 trust director. Other than this expansion, the drafting committee followed the Uniform Trust 35 Code in "not attempt[ing] to further define principal place of administration." Uniform Trust Code § 108 cmt. 36 37 SECTION 4. LAW AND PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY. Unless displaced by a 38 provision of this [act], the law and principles of equity of this state supplement this [act]. 39 Comment 40 This section confirms that the law and principles of equity of an enacting state remain 41 applicable to a directed trust except to the extent modified or displaced by this act. For example,

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	other than the safe harbor under Section 3(b) for a term of a trust that designates the trust's principal place of administration, the law of an enacting state by which principal place of administration is determined would continue to apply to a directed trust. Provisions such as this one are familiar from other uniform acts. <i>See, e.g.</i> , Uniform Powers of Appointment Act § 104 (2013); Uniform Trust Code § 106 (2000). This section departs from other uniform acts, however, by referencing "the law" rather than the "common law." In making this change, the drafting committee intended to reference both common law and statute law, given <u>Given</u> that so much relevant background trust law has now-been codified by statutes such as the Uniform Trust Code (2000) as well as the), Uniform Trust Decanting Act (2015), Uniform Principal and Income Act (1997), and Uniform Prudent Investor Act (1994)-, the drafting committee intended for this section to reference both common law.
12	SECTION 5. EXCLUSIONS. This [act] does not apply to:
13	(1) a nonfiduciary power of appointment;
14	(2) a power to appoint or remove a trustee or trust director;
15	(3) a power of a settlor with respect to a revocable trust;
16	(34) a power of a beneficiary with respect to a trust to the extent the exercise or
17	nonexercise of the power affects only the interest of the beneficiary or another beneficiary
18	represented by the beneficiary under [Uniform Trust Code Sections 301- <u>through</u> 305]; or
19	(4 <u>Alternative A for Paragraph (5)</u>
20	(5) a power of a trust director to the extent the power must be held in a nonfiduciary
21	capacity to achieve the settlor's federal tax objectives.
22	<u>Alternative B for Paragraph (5)</u>
23	(5) a power to substitute in place of for trust property other property of equivalent value to
24	the extent the power must be held in a nonfiduciary capacity to achieve the settlor's federal tax
25	objectives ; .
26	(5) a power with respect to a trust other than a power under Section 6.
27 28 29 30	<i>Legislative Note:</i> A state that has not adopted Uniform Trust Code <u>\$\$Sections</u> 301-305 (2000) should replace the bracketed language with a cross reference to the state's law governing virtual representation.
31	Comment
	8

This section prescribes<u>excludes</u> five categories of <u>exclusions from powers that the</u>
 drafting committee concluded should not be covered by this act- for reasons of policy, coverage
 by other law, or both. A power that falls within one of these exclusions is governed by law other
 than this act.

6 Nonfiduciary power (1) Power of appointment. Paragraph (1) excludes a nonfiduciary 7 "power of appointment, that is, a discretionary," which is defined by Section 2(4) to mean "a 8 power given by the terms of a trust to a person other than a trustee that enables the person in a 9 nonfiduciary capacity to designate a recipient of an ownership interest in or a power of 10 appointment in which "the doneeover the trust property." A nonfiduciary power of appointment that may exercise the powerbe exercised arbitrarily as long as the exercise is within the scope of 11 12 the power." Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 17.1 cmt. g 13 (2011). A nonfiduciary or discretionary power of appointment is governed by other statutory 14 law, such as the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act (2013), and by extensive common law, such as under Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers §§17.1-23.1 15 16 (2011). By contrast, a fiduciary distributive power in a person other than a trustee is a power of direction under Section 6(b)(1), and the person holding the power is a trust director under 17 Section 2(6). Without the exclusion of this paragraph, Section 6(b)(1) could have been read to 18 19 transform all nonfiduciary or discretionary powers of appointment into fiduciary powers of a 20 trust director. 21 22 ————In consequence of this exclusion, the terms of a trust may grant to a person a 23 nonfiduciary power over distribution of the trust property—that is, a power of appointment— 24 without that person becoming a trust director subject to this act. Not every power of distribution 25 is excluded, however. If the terms of a trust indicate that a power of distribution is held in a fiduciary capacity, then the power is not a power of appointment within the exclusion in this 26 27 section. In the hands of a person other than a trustee, such a fiduciary distribution power would 28 be a power of direction under Section 6. 29 30 Section 6(c)(2) prescribes a default rule of construction under which a power to designate a recipient of an ownership interest in or a power of appointment over trust property is a power 31 of appointment (and so not held in a fiduciary capacity) unless the terms of the trust provide 32 33 otherwise.

35 (2) Power to appoint or remove. Paragraph (2) excludes "a power to appoint or remove a trustee or trust director." This exclusion is responsive to multiple suggestions to the drafting 36 committee that such a power, in particular a power to remove a trustee and appoint a successor 37 38 corporate trustee, is a normal and customary drafting practice that arose separately from the 39 phenomenon of directed trusts. Under prevailing law, the only limit on the exercise of such a 40 power is that it "must conform to any valid requirements or limitations imposed by the trust terms." Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. c (2003). If the terms of the trust do not impose 41 any requirements or limitations on the power to remove, then it may be exercised without cause. 42 43 See Austin Wakeman Scott, William Franklin Fratcher & Mark L. Ascher, Scott and Ascher on Trusts § 11.10.2 (5th ed. 2006) ("If the terms of the trust confer the power of removal without 44 any limitation, it is unnecessary for the holder to show cause."). 45 46

34

1 (3) Revocable trust. Paragraph (23) excludes a power of a settlor with respect to a 2 revocable trust. Because the settlor of a revocable trust may at any time revoke the trust and take 3 back the trust property, under modern law the trustee's duties run to the settlor rather than to the 4 beneficiaries, see Uniform Trust Code § 603(a) (2004), and the trustee must "comply with a 5 direction of the settlor even though the direction is contrary to the terms of the trust or the trustee's normal fiduciary duties." Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 74(1)(a)(i) (2007). Without 6 7 the exclusion of this paragraph, Section 6(b)(1) or (b)(3)(A) could have been read to transform 8 all powers retained by a settlor in a revocable trust into fiduciary powers of a trust director. A 9 nonfiduciary power in a person other than the settlor to withdraw the trust property is a power of 10 appointment that would fall within paragraph (1) of this section. 11 12 (4) Power of a beneficiary. Paragraph (34) excludes a power of a beneficiary to the extent 13 that the exercise or nonexercise of the power affects only the interest of the beneficiary (or the 14 interest of another beneficiary who is represented by the beneficiary under applicable virtual representation law). This exclusion follows traditional law, under which "[a] power that is for the 15 16 sole benefit of the person holding the power is not a fiduciary power." Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 75 cmt. d (2007). By contrast, if the exercise or nonexercise of a power held by a 17 beneficiary affects the interests of another beneficiary, and the power falls within the scope of 18

Section 6, then under this act the beneficiary is a trust director subject to the standards of conduct
 prescribed by this act to the extent thatof the effect on the other beneficiary's powers affect the
 other beneficiary. interests.

For example, a power in a beneficiary to release a trustee from a claim by the beneficiary is excluded from this act. But a power in a beneficiary to release the trustee from a claim by another beneficiary (other than by virtual representation) is a power of consent direction under Section $6_{\overline{1}}(b)$, and the beneficiary would be a trust director under Section $2(\underline{67})$ to the extent the beneficiary's power to release the trustee affects the claims of the other beneficiary.

Paragraph (4) excludes a power to substitute in place of trust property other property of
 equivalent value to the extent that the power must be held in a nonfiduciary capacity to achieve
 the settlor's tax objectives. This paragraph is meant to preserve the viability of [insert]. Without
 this exception, [insert]. [Relevant tax law is IRC 675(4)(C), Treas. Reg. 1.675(b)(4), and
 (5) Tax-related powers. [For discussion: (1) Choice of alternative A or B, and (2)

33 whether to include provisions guarding against powers with adverse tax consequences or
 34 affecting charitable status or special needs trusts, as discussed in the accompanying memo.]
 35

36 Rev. Rul. 2008-22.]

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38 Paragraph (5) excludes a power with respect to a trust other than a power under Section
39 6(b) (c). This exclusion confirms that the list of powers prescribed in Section 6(b) (c) is
40 exclusive. This act does not affect the ability of a settlor to give a person other than a trustee a
41 power affecting the management or administration of a trust other than those listed in Section
42 6(b) (c) to the extent that the power is permissible under otherwise applicable law.
43 _____SECTION 6. POWERS OF TRUST DIRECTOR.

44

(a) A trust director has only those powers granted <u>to the director</u> by the terms of <u>athe</u> trust

1	under this section.
2	(b) The terms of a trust may grant a trust director:
3	(1) a power of direction to invest, manage, or distributeunder which the director
4	may administer the trust property or to direct a trustee or another trust director in the trustee's or
5	director's administration of the trust, including in the investment, management, or distribution of
6	the <u>trust</u> property;
7	(2) a power of consent under which:
8	(A) a trustee or another trust director must obtain the permission of the
9	director before exercising a power of the trustee or other director; or
10	(B) the director may release a trustee or another trust director from
11	liability for an action proposed or previously taken by the trustee or other director;
12	(3) a power of protection to:
13	(A) amend or modify the terms of the trust or terminate the trust;
14	(B) change the principal place of administration, situs, or governing law of
15	the trust; or
16	(C) determine the capacity of the settlor or a trustee, trust director,
17	beneficiary, or other party.
18	(D) appoint or remove a trustee or another trust director, or a successor to
19	either; or
20	(E) prosecute, defend, or join an action, claim, or judicial proceeding
21	relating to the trust.
22	(c) Unless the terms of a trust provide otherwise:
23	(1) a trust director may exercise any further power appropriate to the exercise of

1	the director's express powers under subsection (b);
2	(2(2) a power to designate a recipient of an ownership interest in or
3	a power of appointment over trust property is a power of appointment and not a power of
4	direction under subsection (b);
5	(3) the powers of a trust director are not affected by the incapacity or death of the
6	settlor; and
7	(34) trust directors with joint powers must act by majority decision.
8 9 10 11 12	Legislative Note: A state that has adopted Uniform Probate Code § 2-907(c)(4) (1993) or Uniform Trust Code §§ 408(b) or 409(2) (2000) should revise those provisions to add a cross- reference to subsection (b)(3)(E) of this section.[For discussion: should an enforcer under those sections be a "trust director" under this act?]
12	Comment
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 22 23 24 25 26 27	<i>Validating a trust director.</i> This section validates a provision for a trust director in the terms of a trust. Although many states would allow a trust director without specific statutory authorization, <i>seethis section resolves any doubt. See, e.g., In re Eleanor Pierce (Marshall) Stevens Living Trust,</i> 159 So. 3d 1101 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (upholding the appointment of a trust protector without specific statutory authorization), this section resolves any doubt.). A specific trust director may be named by the terms of a trust, by the action of a trustee or another trust director acting in accordance with the terms of the trust, as in <i>Minassian v. Rachins,</i> 152 So. 3d 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014), or in accordance with Section 15(2).
28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38	<i>Exclusivity.</i> The list of powers that may be given to a trust director under this section is exclusive. A person who holds a power that does not fall within this section is not a trust director (see Section 2(6)). The validity, meaning, and effect of a power that does not fall within this section is therefore governed by law other than this act. For example, a power to arbitrate a dispute between or among trustees and beneficiaries is not included in this section. The holder of such a power is thus not a trust director and the power is valid only to the extent authorized by other law.

1 prescribes three categories of powers This act does not provide any default powers to a trust 2 director. Nor does the act specify the scope or parameters of any power that the terms of a trust 3 might grant to a director. For a trust director to have any powers, the scope and content of those 4 powers must be prescribed by the terms of a trust. 5 6 Subsection (b). By validating terms of a trust that authorize a trust director to "administer" the trust or direct a trustee in the "administration" of the trust, subsection (b) 7 8 enables a broad array of director powers, including powers that go beyond those customarily 9 held by a trustee. As used in this subsection, the term "administration" has a meaning at least as 10 broad as it has in the context of determining a trust's "principal place of administration," such as under Section 3(b). For the avoidance of doubt, the last clause of subsection (b) confirms that the 11 12 terms of a trust may grant to a trust director: (1) powers of direction, (2) powers of consent, and 13 (3) powers of protection. 14 15 Subsection (b)(1) - power of direction. A power of directionadministration includes any power to 16 "invest, manage, or distribute" trust property. The trio of the kinds of investment, management, and distribution, which is taken from powers that are customarily given to a trustee, such as 17 under Uniform Trust Code § 815(a)(2)(b) (2000), is meant to incorporate). The drafting 18 19 committee further intended the entire field of trustee term to include other powers. For example, 20 that might affect the administration of a trust, such as the power to modify a trust or to release a 21 trustee from liability. 22 23 *Capaciousness of subsection (b).* Without limiting the set of powers enabled by 24 subsection (b), the drafting committee specifically contemplated that the terms of a trust could create a power in a trust director to-: 25 26 27 • direct a trustee in the investments, including a power to 28 acquire, dispose of, exchange, or retain any investment of some or all of 29 the trust property would be a power of direction. A power to direct a 30 trustee in the distribution of trust property would likewise be a power of direction. So too would be a power to direct the trustee to; 31 32 make or take loans: to 33 vote proxies for securities held in trust; to 34 adopt a particular valuation of trust property; to or determine the frequency or methodology of valuation; to interpret the trust; to 35 adjust between principal and income or convert to a unitrust; or to decant 36 the trust. In sum, as regards a directed trustee, the "power of direction" 37 category encompasses any power in a trust director to direct the trustee in 38 39 the trustee's exercise of any of the trustee's powers. 40 manage a trust-owned business; or 41 select custodians for trust assets; • modify, reform, terminate, or decant a trust; 42 43 direct a trustee's or another director's delegation of the trustee's or other 44 director's powers; 45 change the principal place of administration, situs, or governing law of the trust; A power of direction can also take the form of a direct exercise of authority by a trust 46

director. The terms of a trust may, for example, give a trust director a power to sign subscription
 documents or to hold certain trust property. Such powers to act directly are powers of direction if
 they involve the investment, management, or distribution of trust property.

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31 32 Nonfiduciary power of appointment. Because Section 5(1) excludes a nonfiduciary power of appointment from this act, a settlor can give a nontrustee a nonfiduciary power over distribution of the trust property, which would be a power of appointment, without subjecting the power holder to this act. By contrast, if the settlor intends for the holder of the power to be subject to fiduciary duty, then the holder is a trust director and the power is a power of direction subject to this act.

Subsection (b)(2) - power of consent. A power of consent can include two related but distinct kinds of powers. One is a power to grant or withhold permission before a trustee or other trust director may act. For example, a trustee could be required to obtain the consent of a trust director before selling certain trust property or before making a distribution. Any power held by a trustee or another trust director can be subjected to this kind of power of consent. The core distinction between this kind of a power of consent and a power of direction is that a power of consent contemplates initiative on the part of the party subject to the power, whereas a "power of direction" contemplates initiative on the part of the party holding the power.

The other form of consent power is a power to release a trustee or other trust director from liability. Under this kind of power of consent, a trustee or trust director that is subject to the power may act without the director's permission, but if the trustee or trust director receives permission, the trustee or director will be exonerated from liability for acting consistently with the permission.

Both kinds of power of consent can be combined in the hands of a single trust director. For example, the terms of a trust may prohibit a trustee from acting without a director's consent and may also release the trustee from liability if the trustee receives that consent. The precise scope and effect of a power of consent, such as whether it may be exercised prospectively or retrospectively, is a question of construction of the terms of the trust.

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34	• ascertain the happening of an event that affects the administration of the trust;
35	• determine the capacity of a trustee, settlor, director, or beneficiary of the trust;
36	 determine the compensation to be paid to a trustee or trust director;
37	• prosecute, defend, or join an action, claim, or judicial proceeding relating to the
38	<u>trust;</u>
39	• grant permission before a trustee or another director may exercise a power of the
40	trustee or other director; or
41	• release a trustee or another trust director from liability for an action proposed or
42	previously taken by the trustee or other director.
43	Manner of direction. Subsection (b) provides that a trust director may either "administer"
44	a trust or "direct a trustee or another trust director in the administration of the trust." The terms
45	of a trust may thus allow a director to exercise its powers either independently or through
46	directions given to a trustee. For example, in connection with a power to direct investments, the

1 terms of a trust might enable a trust director to enter into an investment subscription agreement by signing that agreement itself or by directing the trustee to sign the agreement. Note, however, that this act does not specify by default the manner in which a director may act. Whether a director may act independently or only by directing a trustee's actions is governed by the terms of the trust. 6 7 Exclusions, Like the other provisions of this act, subsection (b) does not apply to matters

Exclusions. Like the other provisions of this act, subsection (b) does not apply to matters that are excluded by Section 5. Thus, because Section 5(2) excludes a power "to appoint or remove a trustee or trust director," subsection (b) does not include such a power as a power of direction within the meaning of this act. The validity and construction of such a power is governed by law other than this act.

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36 37 Subsection (b)(3) power of protection. A "power of protection" category includes five specific kinds of powers. [Placeholder pending further committee review of this list in light of questions about trustee removal and amendment/termination.]

16 The language in subsection (b)(3)(E), which validates a power in a trust director to "prosecute, defend, or join an action, claim, or judicial proceeding," is based on Uniform Trust 17 Code § 816(24). Paragraph (E) thus enables a settlor to give a trust director a power of protection 18 to litigate matters pertaining to the trust. Paragraph (E) would therefore reverse the result in 19 20 Schwartz v. Wellin, No. 2:13-CV-3595-DCN, 2014 WL 1572767 (D.S.C. Apr.-17, 2014). In that 21 case, the court held that a trust director (i.e., the "trust protector") lacked standing because Rule 22 17(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not include a trust director as a party who may bring litigation if not the "real party in interest." However, Rule 17(a)(1) does allow "a 23 24 party authorized by statute" to bring such litigation, and this subsection provides the requisite 25 statutory authorization.

Pet and other noncharitable purpose trusts. Most states have enacted statutes, often
 based on Uniform Probate Code § 2-907(c)(4) (1993) or Uniform Trust Code §§ 408(b) and
 409(2) (2000), that authorize a settlor or the court to name a person with standing to enforce a
 trust for a pet animal or other noncharitable purpose. Because the enforcement power of such a
 person falls under subsection (b)(3)(E), upon the effective date of this act the person would be a
 trust director subject to this act.

Subsection (c) This subsection prescribes three c). This subsection prescribes four default rules of construction that apply unless the terms of a trust provide otherwise. These rules concern (1) further appropriate powers, (2) settlor incapacity or death, and (3) joint powers.

38 Subsection (c)(1) further Further appropriate powers. Subsection (c)(1) prescribes a
39 default rule under which a trust director may exercise any "further" power that is "appropriate"
40 to the director's exercise of the director's express powers under the terms of the trust as
41 authorized by subsection (b). The term "appropriate" is drawn from Uniform Trust Code §
42 815(a)(2)(B) (2000). The drafting committee intended that appropriateness

42 would Appropriateness should be judged in relation to the purpose or function being carried out

44 by the director. Examples of further powers that might be appropriate include powersa power to:

45 (1) incur reasonable costs and direct indemnification for those costs; (2) make a report or

46 accounting to a beneficiary or other interested party; (3) direct a trustee to issue a certification of

- 1 trust under Uniform Trust Code § 1013 (2000); or (4) prosecute, defend, or join an action, claim, 2 or judicial proceeding relating to thea trust. In some circumstances, it might be appropriate 3 for a trust director to delegate the director's powers, much as it may sometimes it is prudent 4 for a trustee to do so.
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Subsection (c)(1) would reverse the result in Schwartz v. Wellin, No. 2:13-CV-3595-DCN, 2014 WL 1572767 (D.S.C. Apr.

The further powers granted to a trust director by subsection (c)(1) extend only as far as is appropriate to the exercise of the director's powers expressly granted by the terms of the trust under subsection (b). Thus, for example, a trust director who under the terms of a trust has a power to direct the trustee in the making of investments would also have a further power under subsection (c)(1) to bring an action against the trustee to remedy the trustee's failure to implement such a direction. But such a director would not normally have a power under subsection (c)(1) to sue the trustee for imprudence in the distribution of trust property. 15 17, 2014) if under the circumstances it would be "appropriate" for a trust director to

16 prosecute, defend, or join an action, claim, or judicial proceeding pertaining to the trust. In Wellin, the court held that a trust director (which the terms of the trust referred to as a "trust 17 protector") lacked standing because under Rule 17(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 19 it was neither a real party in interest nor a party who could pursue a claim if not a real party in 20 interest. However, Rule 17(a)(1) does allow "a party authorized by statute" to bring such 21 litigation, and subsection (c)(1) supplies the requisite statutory authorization if appropriate under 22 the circumstances in light of the terms of the trust. Subsection (b) would also provide the 23 requisite statutory authorization if the terms of the trust expressly confer a power of litigation on 24 the director. 25

Rule of construction for powers of appointment. Subsection (c)(2) prescribes a default rule of construction under which a power to designate a recipient of an ownership interest in or a power of appointment over trust property is a power of appointment unless the terms of the trust provide otherwise. Powers of appointment, the exercise of which are not subject to fiduciary duty but must be in accord with the terms of the power, are excluded from the scope of this act by Section 5(1).

Settlor

34 Subsection (c)(2) settlor incapacity or death. Subsection (c)($\frac{23}{23}$) specifies a default rule 35 that under which a trust director's powers survive the incapacity or death of the settlor. Following the directed trust statutes in several states, including Nevada and South Dakota, see Nev. Rev. 36 Nevada N.R.S.Stat. § 163.555, South Dakota SDCL (2015); S.D. Codified Laws § 55-1B-3, 37 38 (2016), the drafting committee included this section to confirm that the common law rule of 39 agency under which an agent's authority terminates on the incapacity or death of the principal 40 would not apply to a trust director. See Restatement (Third) of Agency §§ 3.07-3.08 (2006).

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42 *Majority decision.* Subsection (c)(2) *majority decision.* Subsection (c)(24) provides a default rule of majority action for multiple trust directors with "joint powers," such as in the case 43 44 of a three-person committee with a power of direction over investment or distribution. Majority ruleaction is the modern prevailing default for multiple trustees. See Uniform Trust Code § 703(a) 45 (2000); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 39 (2003). In the event of a deadlock among trust 46

1 2 3 4 5	directors with joint powers, by analogy to a deadlock among cotrustees, a court could "direct exercise of the [joint] power or take other action to break the deadlock." Id <u>. cmt.</u> , emt. e. The question of information sharing among trust directors with related but not "joint" powers, such as between a trust director with a power of direction over investment and a trust director with a power of direction 9. e.
6 7	SECTION 7. DUTY AND LIABILITY OF TRUST DIRECTOR.
8	(a) Subject to subsection (eb), with respect to a power of direction under Section $6(b)(1)$,
9	a power of consent under Section $6(b)(2)$, or a further power under Section $6(c)(1)$ appropriate
10	to the power of direction-or consent:
11	(1) the trust director is subject to the same fiduciary duty and liability as a trustee;
12	and
13	(2) the director's duty or liability may be varied by the terms of the trust to the
14	same extent that the terms of the trust could vary the duty or liability of a trustee.
15	(b) Subject to subsection (c), with respect to a power of protection under Section 6(b)(3)
16	or a further power under Section 6(c)(1) appropriate to the power of protection, the trust director:
17	(1) must act in accord with the terms and purposes of the trust; and
18	(2) is not liable for breach of trust unless the director's exercise or nonexercise of
19	the power was done in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the
20	interests of the beneficiaries.
21	(e(b) Unless the terms of a trust provide otherwise, if a trust director is a licensed medical
22	professional and, certified, or otherwise authorized or permitted by law to provide health care in
23	the ordinary course of the director's business or practice of a profession, and the director acts in
24	the director's such a capacity as such, the director is not subject to a duty or liability under this
25	[act].
26	(dc) The terms of a trust may impose a duty or liability on a trust director in addition to

1 the duties and liabilities under this [act].

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Comment

Subsection (a) powers of direction and consent. For powers of direction and consent, subsection]. Subsection (a) imposes the same system of fiduciary duties on a trust director that would ordinarily apply to a trustee. Under subsection (a)(1), for example, a <u>A trust</u> director with a power to make or direct investments-, for example, has the same duties to act in the sole interest of the beneficiary and to act prudently that a trustee would have in making investmentsto act prudently, in the sole interest of the beneficiaries, and impartially with due regard for the respective interests of the beneficiaries. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§ 77-7879, 90-92 (2007). The theory behind subsection (a) is that within the scope of if a trust director exercises a power of direction, the director is the most appropriate person to bear the duty associated with the exercise or consent, thenonexercise of that power. Put differently, in a directed trust, a trust director functions much like a trustee in a trust that is not directed.-non-directed trust, and thus should have the same duties as a trustee.

Accordingly, subsection (a)(1) sets the default duties of a trust director with respect to a power of direction or a power of consent by absorbing the default fiduciary lawduties that would ordinarily apply to a trustee, and subsection (a)(2) sets the mandatory minimum duties of such a director by absorbing the mandatory fiduciary rules-minimum duties that a settlor cannot waive for a trustee. In giving strong defaultaligning the fiduciary duties toof a trust director with those of a trustee, subsection (a) follows the great majority of the existing state directed trust statutes.

[Placeholder for discussion about trustee's general duties of loyalty and prudence, and how those general duties can be applied to a variety of circumstances.]

Absorption of existing trust fiduciary law. Subsection (a) operates by absorbing existing 26 27 state law rather than reinventing it for by inventing a new body of law. Incorporating existing 28 trust director. This absorption technique fiduciary law in this manner offers several advantages. 29 First, it avoids the need to spell out the entirety of trust fiduciary law. That is, it avoids the need 30 to replicate something like Article 8 of the Uniform Trust Code. Second, absorbing the trust fiduciary law of each enacting state accommodates diversity across the states in the particulars of 31 32 a trustee's default and mandatory fiduciary duties, such as the duties to diversify and to give 33 information to beneficiaries, both of which have become increasingly differentiated across the 34 states. Third, absorption allows for changes to the law of a trustee's fiduciary duties to be 35 absorbed automatically into the duties of a trust director without need for periodic conforming 36 revision revisions to this act. 37

- 38 Absorption and circumstances of trust directors. In applying the law of trustee fiduciary
 39 duties to a trust director, a court must make use of the flexibility built into trust fiduciary law.
 40 Courts have long applied the duties of loyalty and prudence across a wide array of
 41 circumstances, including many different kinds of trusts as well as other fiduciary relationships,
 42 such as corporations and agencies. Courts are thus capable of applying fiduciary duties in a
- 43 <u>manner that is sensitive to the wide variation that is possible across powers of direction. In</u>
- 44 assessing the actions of a director that holds a power to modify a trust, for example, a court

should apply the standards of loyalty and prudence in a manner that is appropriate to the
 particular context, including the trust's terms and purposes and the director's particular powers.

4 Springing powers without a duty to monitor. The drafting committee contemplated that a 5 settlor could construct a director's power to be springing and without an ongoing obligation to 6 monitor the administration of the trust. For example, a settlor could grant a trust director a power 7 to direct a distribution, but only if requested to do so by a beneficiary. A director holding such a 8 power would not be under a duty to act unless requested to do so by a beneficiary. Moreover, 9 because under subsection (a)(2) a settlor can vary the fiduciary duties of a trust director to the 10 same extent that the settlor could vary the fiduciary duties of a trustee, in the example just given under Uniform Trust Code § 105(b)(2) (amended 2004) the settlor could waive all of the 11 12 director's otherwise applicable duties other than the duty to act in good faith. In such a situation, 13 the director would be subject to the minimum duty to act in good faith in the director's response 14 to the beneficiary's request for a distribution.

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16 Extended discretion and exculpation or exoneration. Under the framework of subsection (a), the terms of a trust could give a trust director extended discretion, such as in the form of 17 "sole," "absolute," or "uncontrolled" discretion, with the same effect as those terms would have 18 on the discretion of a trustee. Under prevailing law, "words such as 'absolute' or 'unlimited' or 19 20 'sole and uncontrolled' are not interpreted literally. Even under the broadest grant of fiduciary 21 discretion, a trustee must act honestly and in a state of mind contemplated by the settlor. Thus, 22 the court will not permit the trustee to act in bad faith or for some purpose or motive other than 23 to accomplish the purposes of the discretionary power." Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 50 cmt. 24 c (2003); see also Uniform Trust Code § 814(a) (amended 2004). Likewise, Under subsection 25 (a)(2), the terms same rules would apply to a grant of a trust could give extended discretion to a 26 trust director. 27

A trust director is likewise subject to the protection of same rules as a trustee with regard
to an exculpation or exoneration clause, but only to the extent that a trustee could likewise be
exculpated or exonerated. Under prevailing law, such as under Uniform Trust Code § 1008
(2000) and Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 96 (2012), an exculpation or exoneration clause
cannot protect a trustee against liability for acting in bad faith or with reckless indifference.
Under subsection (a)(2), the same rules would apply to an exculpation or exoneration clause for a
trust director.

35 36 Subsection (b) <u>power of protection</u>. For a power of protection, subsection (b) distinguishes between a trust director's duty in paragraph (1) and the threshold for the trust 37 38 director's liability in paragraph (2). Subsection (b)(1) imposes a duty on a trust director to "act in 39 accord with the terms and purposes of the trust." [To come: discussion of the drafting committee's reasoning, and the problem of "latent" powers, subject to the drafting 40 41 committee's further deliberations at the next drafting session in light of questions in 42 particular about powers to amend or terminate the trust and to replace the trustee.] 43

44 Subsection (b)(2) prescribes a threshold for liability of "bad faith" or "reckless
45 indifference," which is consistent with the maximum exoneration allowed by Uniform Trust
46 Code § 1008(a)(1) (2000). See also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 96 cmt. c (2012) ("[A]n

$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix}$	exculpatory clause cannot excuse a trustee for a breach of trust committed in bad faith. Nor can the trustee be excused for a breach committed with indifference to the interests of the
2 3	beneficiaries or to the terms and purposes of the trust—that is, committed without reasonable
3 4	effort to understand and conform to applicable fiduciary duties.").
4 5	enone to understand and comorni to applicable nutchary duties.).
6	The distinction between a trust director's duty and its threshold for liability is
7	meaningful, because it preserves equitable remedies in a situation in which a trust director has
8	breached its duty but failed to cross the threshold for liability. If a trust director acts in a manner
9	that is inconsistent with the terms and purposes of the trust, but not in bad faith, injunctive relief
10	might be appropriate, even if damages are not available. Section 15(6) absorbs the law governing
11	trustee removal for removal of a trust director. And nothing in this section limits the inherent
12	power of the court to issue an order enjoining a trust fiduciary, such as a trust director, "to take
13	or refrain from taking certain action(s) or otherwise to avoid committing a breach of trust" or
14	other appropriate injunctive relief. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 95 cmt. c (2012); see also
15	Uniform Trust Code § 1001 (2000).
16	– <u>health-care</u>
17	Subsection (c) licensed medical professionals. Subsection (c) prescribes a default rule that
18	exemptsb) refers to a trust director who is a licensed medical professional "licensed, certified, or
19	otherwise authorized or permitted by law to provide health care in the ordinary course of the
20	director's business or practice of a profession." This phrasing is based on the definition of
21	"health-care provider" in Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act § 1(8) (1993). To the extent that a
22	trust director acts in the director's business or practice of a profession to provide health care, the
23	director is relieved from duty or liability under this act tounless the extentterms of the director
24	acts intrust provide otherwise.
25	The rule of this subsection, which applies unless the director's medical capacity. The
26	provision is responsive toterms of the trust provide otherwise, addresses the concern that a
27	medicalhealth-care professional might refuse to accept appointment as a trust director if doing
28	sosuch service would expose the professional provider to fiduciary duty under this act in addition
29	to the other regulations and professional rules ordinarily applicable to such a professional. For
30	example, a trust might call for a licensed medicalhealth-care professional to determine a
31	beneficiary's the capacity or sobriety or in a revocable trust to determine of a beneficiary or the
32	capacity of the settlor. In making such a determination, the medical under subsection (b) the
33	<u>health-care</u> professional would <u>not</u> be subject to the usual regulations applicable to the
34	professional, but not to duty or liability under this act. Furthermore, this section only excludes
35	the licensed medical professional from duty and liability. It does not exclude the licensed
36	medical professional from the other provisions of the act, such as the provisions in Section 15
37	that provide helpful clarity on mechanical issues such as acceptance, resignation, and vacancy.
38	instead the professional would be subject to the rules and regulations otherwise applicable to the
39	professional.
40	
41	Subsection ($\frac{dc}{dc}$)—no ceiling on duties. Subsection ($\frac{dc}{dc}$) confirms that the duties prescribed
42	by this section are defaults and minimums, not ceilings. The terms of a trust can impose further
43	duties in addition to those prescribed by this section.

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1	SECTION 8. DUTY AND LIABILITY OF DIRECTED TRUSTEE.
2	(a) With respectSubject to a matter for whichsubsection (b), a directed trustee is subject
3	to a power of direction under Section 6(b)(1) or a power of protection under Section 6(b)(3), the
4	following rules apply:
5	(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3), if the director exercises the
6	power, or a further power under Section 6(c)(1) appropriate to the exercise of the power, the
7	trustee must comply with the exercise, including by takingmust take reasonable action to
8	implement the exercise comply with the terms of a power of direction.
9	(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3), if the director does not exercise
10	the power and a term of the trust provides that the trustee may not act in the absence of an
11	exercise of the power, the(b) A directed trustee must not comply with that term.
12	(3) The trustee must not comply with an exercise the terms of a power of direction
13	or protection, or a term of the trust providing that the trustee may not act in absence of an
14	exercise of such a power, to the extent that by complying with the exercise or the term the trustee
15	would engage in willful misconduct.
16	(b) With respect to a matter for which a directed trustee is subject to a power of consent
17	under Section 6(b)(2), the following rules apply:
18	(1(c) If under the terms of the trust the trustee may not act without the permission
19	of the director, and the trustee acts reasonably in proposing an action but the director does not
20	grant permission, the trustee is liable only for the trustee's own willful misconduct.
21	(2) If under the terms of the trust the directora trust director may release thea
22	trustee or another trust director from liability for breach of trust and the director grants such a
23	release, the trustee or other director is not liable to the extent of the release unless:

1	(A(1) the breach involved the trustee's own willful misconduct;
2	(B)or the other director's own willful misconduct;
3	(2) the release was induced by improper conduct of the trustee or other director;
4	or
5	(C(3)) at the time of the release, the director did not know of the material
6	facts relating to the breach.
7	(ed) A directed trustee that has reasonable doubt about its duty under this section may
8	satisfy that duty by timely petitioning the court for instructions or presenting the issue in a
9	pending proceeding.
10	(de) The terms of a trust may impose a duty or liability on a directed trustee in addition to
11	the duties and liabilities underprescribed by this [act].
11	
12 13 14	Legislative Note: A state that has adopted Uniform Trust Code <u>§Section</u> 808 [to come: guidance re pointer to this act and changes to For discussion: what recommendation should we make about revision or repeal of UTC Section 808.].?].
12 13	re pointer to this act and changes to For discussion: what recommendation should we make
12 13 14	re pointer to this act and changes to For discussion: what recommendation should we make about revision or repeal of UTC Section 808.J.?].

Traditional law. **[To come: Discussion of traditional law, including Uniform Trust** Code § 808 (2000) and Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 75 (2007).] [See the accompanying 2016 Annual Meeting memo.]

The specialized modern legislation. [To come: Discussion of the two kinds of specialized legislation, and the policy arguments for each.]

This act willful misconduct. **[To come: Discussion of the decision of the drafting committee to follow the states that preserve some fiduciary duty, employing the common** *"willful misconduct" standard to that end.*]

Subsection (a) compliance with direction or protection. Paragraph (1) of this subsection imposes on a directed trustee a duty to comply with a trust director's exercise of a power of direction or protection. For example, a directed trustee must take steps reasonably necessary to implement the director's exercise of the director's power. Paragraph (2) imposes a similar duty not to act in the absence of the director's exercise of the director's power if the terms of the trust so require. The duties of compliance prescribed by paragraphs (1) and (2) are qualified by paragraph (3), which imposes a duty on a directed trustee not to comply with a trust director's exercise<u>The terms</u> of a power of direction or protection, or a term of the trust that provides that the trustee may not act in the absence of the director's exercise of such a power, to the extent that by complying the trustee would engage in willful misconduct.

-. The reference in to "the first clause terms of this subsection to "a matter for which a directed trustee is subject to a power of direction under Section 6(b)(1) or a power of protection under Section 6(b)(3)"" limits a directed trustee's duty to comply to circumstances in which a direction that is within the trust director's power of direction. It follows, therefore, that a. A trustee should not comply with an action of a direction by a trust director that is outside of the director's power of direction-or protection. To do so would violate the trustee's duty to comply with the terms of the power of direction and the trustee's broader background 30 duty of a trustee to act in accordance with the terms of thea trust. See, e.g., Uniform Trust Code § 105(b)(2) (amended 2005) (making mandatory "the duty of a trustee to act ... in accordance with 31 terms ... of the trust"); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 76 (2007) ("The trustee has a duty to 32 33 administer the trust ... in accordance with the terms of the trust."). For example, a direction 34 rendered in a form contrary to that required by the terms of the trust, such as an oral direction if 35 the terms of the trust require a writing, is not within the trust director's power of direction.

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37 Duty to take "reasonable action." Subsection (a) requires that a trustee take "reasonable 38 action" in complying with the terms of a power of direction. If a trust director with a power to 39 direct investments directs the trustee to purchase a particular security, for example, the trustee 40 must take reasonable care and must refrain from self-dealing and conflicts of interest in selecting a broker or executing the trade. The duty to act reasonably in complying with the terms of a 41 power of direction does not, however, impose a duty to ensure that the substance of a direction is 42 43 reasonable. Although a trustee must take reasonable care in executing a direction to purchase a 44 security, for example, the trustee is not required to assess whether the purchase of that security would be prudent in relation to the trust's investment portfolio. 45 Subsection (b) <u>effect of power of consent. Paragraph (1) of this willful misconduct.</u> 46

Subsection (b) provides an exception to the duty of obedience prescribed by subsection addresses
 a power of consent(a). Under subsection (b), a trustee must not comply with the terms of a power
 of direction to the extent that by complying the trustee would engage in "willful misconduct."
 The drafting committee settled upon the term willful misconduct after a review of the existing
 specialized directed trust statutes.

6 7 Roughly speaking, the existing directed trust statutes fall into two groups. In one group, 8 which constitutes a majority, are the statutes that fully relieve a directed trustee from duty or 9 liability for complying with an action of a trust director. This group includes the statutes in 10 Alaska, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Dakota. The policy rationale for these statutes is that duty should follow power. A director who possesses a power of direction should be the 11 exclusive bearer of fiduciary duty in the exercise or nonexercise of that power. Moreover, the 12 13 settlor of a directed trust could have made the trust director the sole trustee instead. Thus, on 14 greater-includes-the-lesser reasoning, the settlor should also be able to eliminate a directed trustee's duty and liability for complying with an action of a trust director. Under these statutes, a 15 16 beneficiary's only recourse for misconduct by the trust director is an action against the director for breach of the director's fiduciary duty to the beneficiary. 17 In the other group, which includes Delaware, Illinois, Colorado, North Carolina, and 18 19 Virginia, are the statutes under which the directed trustee is not permitted to act without the 20 permission of the trust director. Paragraph (1) provides that a directed trustee is not liable for complying with a direction of a trust director, unless by so doing the directed trustee would 21 22 personally engage in "willful" or "intentional" misconduct. The policy rationale for these statutes 23 is that, because a trustee stands at the center of a trust, the trustee must bear at least some duty 24 even if the trustee is directed. Although the settlor could have made the trust director the sole 25 trustee, the settlor did not actually do so—and under traditional understandings of trust law, a trustee must always be accountable to a beneficiary in some way. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) 26 27 of Trusts § 96 cmt. c (2012) ("Notwithstanding the breadth of language in a trust provision relieving a trustee from liability for breach of trust, for reasons of policy trust fiduciary law 28 29 imposes limitations on the types and degree of misconduct for which the trustee can be excused 30 from liability."). 31

32 The states in the second group also recognize, however, that to facilitate the settlor's intent that the trust director rather than the directed trustee be the primary decisionmaker, it is 33 34 appropriate to reduce the trustee's duty and liability below the usual level with respect to a 35 matter subject to a power of direction. Accordingly, under these statutes a beneficiary's main recourse for misconduct by the trust director is an action against the director for breach of the 36 director's fiduciary duty to the beneficiary. The beneficiary also has recourse against the trustee, 37 38 but only if the trustee's compliance with the terms of the power of direction amounted to "willful 39 misconduct" by the trustee. Relative to a non-directed trust, this second approach has the effect 40 of increasing the total fiduciary duties owed to a beneficiary. All of the usual duties of 41 trusteeship are preserved in the trust director, and in addition the directed trustee also has a duty to avoid willful misconduct. 42 43 44 After extensive deliberation and debate, the drafting committee opted to follow the

44 <u>After extensive deliberation and debate, the drafting committee opted to follow the</u>
 45 <u>second group of statutes, which includes the prominent Delaware act, on the grounds that this</u>
 46 <u>model does more to protect a beneficiary and is more consistent with traditional fiduciary policy,</u>

- even while remaining viable and popular, as evidenced by the large number of directed trusts in
 Delaware. To put the point otherwise, the popularity of directed trusts in Delaware establishes
 that a directed trust regime that preserves a "willful misconduct" safeguard is workable and that
 a total elimination of duty in a directed trustee is unnecessary.
- 6 The willful misconduct standard prescribed by this subsection changes the policy of 7 Uniform Trust Code § 808 (2000), which provides the current uniform law treatment of directed 8 trusts and is similar in substance to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 75 (2007). Section 808(b) 9 provides: "If the terms of a trust confer upon a person other than the settlor of a revocable trust 10 power to direct certain actions of the trustee, the trustee shall act in accordance with an exercise of the power unless the attempted exercise is manifestly contrary to the terms of the trust or the 11 12 trustee knows the attempted exercise would constitute a serious breach of a fiduciary duty that 13 the person holding the power owes to the beneficiaries of the trust." In deciding to change this 14 standard, the drafting committee was deeply influenced by the fact that a growing number of states that had previously adopted Section 808 have since abandoned it or modified it to follow 15 16 one of the two other models discussed above. The drafting committee was also strongly influenced by the fact that a review of every existing specialized state statute on directed trusts 17 showed that no state that has legislated specifically on the issue of directed trustee fiduciary 18 19 duties has chosen to follow Section 808. 20 The willful misconduct standard in subsection (b) is to be distinguished from the duty to 21 take reasonable action in subsection (a). The reasonability standard of subsection (a) applies to 22 the manner in which a trustee complies with a power of direction. The willful misconduct 23 standard of subsection (b) applies to the decision of whether to comply with a power of direction. 24 25 Subsection (c)—release by trust director. Subsection (c) provides additional substantive and procedural safeguards for a release by a trust director of a trustee from liability. Under 26 27 Section 6, the terms of a trust may empower a trust director to release a trustee or another trust director from liability for breach of trust. If the director grants such a release, the trustee or other 28 29 director is not liable to the extent of the release. The terms of a trust may enable such a release to 30 be given at any time, whether before or after the trustee or other director acts-reasonably in proposing an action but the director does not grant permission, the trustee is liable only for. 31 32 33 This subsection imposes certain substantive and procedural limitations on a release by a 34 trust director. First, consistent with the policy of subsection (b) as described above, a trustee 35 cannot be released for a breach that involves the trustee's own willful misconduct. In undertaking to obtain the director's permission, however, the trustee is subject to the normal 36 duties of trusteeship applicable under the terms of the trust and the enacting state's law. Second, 37 38 consistent with prevailing law governing a release of a trustee by a beneficiary, see, e.g., 39 Uniform Trust Code § 1009 (amended 2001); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 97 (2012), a
- 40 release by a trust director is not enforceable if it was induced by improper conduct of the trustee
 41 or if at the time of the release the director did not know of the material facts relating to the
- 42 breach.
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 44 Paragraph (2) provides that a trustee is not liable for breach of trust if in accordance with
 45 the terms of the trust a trust director approved or ratified the conduct constituting the breach.
 46 Such an approval or ratification is only permissible, however, if the conduct constituting the
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- breach does not involve willful misconduct (paragraph (2)(A)), and if the director's release was
 not induced by improper conduct of the trustee and the director knew of the material facts
 relating to the breach (paragraph(2)(B) (C)). These limits on release are drawn from Uniform
 Trust Code § 1009 (2000) and are similar in substance to those stated in Restatement (Third) of
 Trusts § 97 (2012).
- 7 [To discuss: (1) release can also be of another trust director but with the same 8 "willful misconduct" substantive safeguard; (2) the interaction of this section with the 9 exclusion in Section 5(4) as regards a release by a beneficiary that affects the interest of 10 another beneficiary. Per the comment to Section 5(4), a power in a beneficiary to release a trustee from a claim by the beneficiary is excluded from this act. But a power in a 11 beneficiary to release the trustee from a claim by another beneficiary (other than by virtual 12 representation) is a power of direction under Section 6(b), and the beneficiary would be a 13 14 trust director under Section 2(7), subject to fiduciary duty under this Section 8, to the extent the beneficiary's power to release the trustee affects the claims of the other 15 beneficiary. This act would therefore reverse the result in Vena v. Vena, 899 N.E.2d 522 (III. 16 App. 2008), which we should discuss.] 17
- 19 Subsection (ed)—petition for instructions. Subsection (ed) provides that a directed trustee 20 may satisfy its duty under this section by petitioning for instructions. The specific language of this subsection parallels Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 71 (2007) ("A trustee or beneficiary 21 22 may apply to an appropriate court for instructions regarding the administration or distribution of the trust if there is reasonable doubt about the powers or duties of the trusteeship or about the 23 24 proper interpretation of the trust provisions."). The safe harbor of this subsection is bounded by 25 two limits. First,: a trustee must have "reasonable doubt" about its duty-under this section. Second, a, and the trustee's petition for instructions must be "timely." 26

The safe harbor of this subsection is permissive, rather than mandatory. This subsection confirms that a<u>A</u> trustee may satisfy its duties by petitioning for instructions. It-But this subsection does not, by itself, require a trustee to bring such a petition.

[To discuss: Question from the floor about affiliates.]

Subsection (d)—no ceiling on duties. Subsection (d) confirms that the duties prescribed by this section are merely defaults and minimums, not ceilings. The terms of a trust can impose further duties in addition to those prescribed by this section.

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SECTION 9. DUTY TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO TRUSTEE OR TRUST

39 **DIRECTOR.**

40 (a) A directed trustee shall provide information to a trust director to the extent the

41 information is reasonably related to the powers or duties of the trustee and the powers or duties

42 of the director.

- 1 (b) A trust director shall provide information to a trustee or another trust director to the 2 extent the information is reasonably related to the powers or duties of the director and the powers 3 or duties of the trustee or other director. 4 Comment 5 6 Duty to provide information. This section imposes a duty on a directed trusteestrustee and 7 trust directors director to provide information to each other. Subsection (a) imposes this duty on a 8 directed trustee, and subsection (b) imposes this duty on a trust director. 9 10 *Reasonableness.* This section relies heavily on the concept of reasonableness. 11 Information must be disclosed only if it is reasonably related both to the powers or duties of the person making the disclosure and to the powers or duties of the person receiving the disclosure. 12 13 The information must be reasonably related to the powers or duties of the person making the disclosure, because otherwise that person cannot be expected to have access to and control 14 overpossess the information. The information must also be reasonably related to the powers or 15 duties of the person receiving the disclosure, because otherwise thethat person would not need 16 the information. Examples of matters that might require disclosure under this section include 17 18 modifications to the terms of a trust, changes to investment policy or strategy of the trust, 19 distributions of trust property, changes in accounting procedure or valuations, and removal or 20 appointment of trustees orand trust directors. 21 22 An affirmative and a responsive duty to inform. This section imposes both an affirmative 23 duty to provide information even in the absence of a request for that information and a 24 responsive duty to inform. In other words, it imposes a duty both to provide information 25 independently and to reply to requests for information. For example, if a trust director exercises a 26 power of protection to amendmodify the terms of thea trust, the director would have an 27 affirmative duty to inform the trustees and other trust directors whose powers or duties are 28 reasonably related to the amendment, whether or not the trustees or other trust directors inquired 29 about the amendmentit. Similarly, the director would have a responsive duty to provide 30 information about the amendment upon a request by a trustee or another trust director whose 31 powers or duties were reasonably related to the amendment. 32 33 Shelton v. Tamposi. In Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741 (N.H. 2013), the terms of the 34 trust left distribution in the hands of the trustee, but shifted power over investment to a trust 35 director (i.e., the "investment director"). In consequence, the trustee could not raise the cash necessary to fund a distribution to one of the beneficiaries. Under the terms of this section, the 36 37 trust director would have been under a duty to give the trustee information about the liquidity
- 38 effects of the director's investment program <u>on the trust's cash position</u>, and the trustee would
- 39 have been under a duty to give the director information about the <u>liquidity needscash</u>
- 40 <u>requirements</u> of the trustee's distribution program. Moreover, in making and implementing the
- 41 investment program, under Section 7(a) the trust director would be subject to the same duties as
- 42 a similarly situated trustee, in parallel to the trustee's duties in making and implementing the43 distribution program.
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Interaction with Section 10. Section 10 provides that a directed trustee does not have a duty to monitor, inform, or advise other parties about the actions of a trust director. Section 10 does not, however, eliminate the trustee's duty to provide information related to itsthe trustee's own powers and duties. This section, which requires a directed trustee to provide information "reasonably related to the powers or duties of the trustee" is therefore not inconsistent with Section 10.

9 Interaction with Section 11. Section 11 authorizes a settlor to subject cotrustees to the 10 more narrow disclosure rules of this section, conditioning each cotrustee's access to information on a reasonable relation to the cotrustee's powers or duties, instead of the broader information 11 rights under the common law, as under Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 81-emt.-b (2007) 12 13 ("Furthermore, absent clear provision in the trust to the contrary, even in the absence of any duty 14 to intervene or grounds for suspicion, a trustee is entitled to request and receive reasonable 15 information regarding an aspect of trust administration in which the trustee is not required to 16 participate.").

Disclosure to beneficiaries. This section governs disclosure of information to trustees and trust directors, rather than to beneficiaries. The duty of a trust director to disclose information to a beneficiary is governed by Section 7, which prescribes the fiduciary duties of a trust director. The duty of a directed trustee to disclose information to a beneficiary is governed by the background law of an enacting state by way of Section 4 under Section 4, and by Section 10, which limits a directed trustee's duty to inform a beneficiary about the actions of a trust director.

Mandatory floor, not a-ceiling. This section imposes a mandatory floor on a directed
 trustee's and a trust director's duty to share information, rather than a ceiling. The terms of a
 trust canmay specify more extensive duties of information sharing among directed trustees and
 trust directors.

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____SECTION 10. NO LIABILITY FOR FAILUREDUTY TO MONITOR, INFORM,

31 **OR ADVISE.** Unless the terms of a trust provide otherwise, a directed trustee:

(1) isdoes not liable forhave a failureduty to monitor a trust director or inform or give

33 advice to a settlor, beneficiary, trustee, or trust director about the director's exercise or

- 34 nonexercise of the director's powers; and
- 35 (2) does not become liable for a failure assume the duty described in paragraph (1)
- 36 because the directed trustee on another occasion monitors a trust director or informs or gives
- 37 advice to a settlor, beneficiary, trustee, or trust director about a trust director's exercise or
- 38 nonexercise of the director's powers.

Comment

Following the weight of existing statute law. This section provides that a directed trustee
isdoes not liable for failinghave a duty to monitor a trust director or for failing to inform or give advice to a settlor, beneficiary, trustee, or trust director about a trust director's actions. Many existing state statutes have provisions to similar effect, though the language in this section is more direct and simpler than those provisions.

8 The <u>existing</u> provisions in the existing state statutes on which this section is based were 9 meant to reverse the result in *Rollins v. Branch Banking & Trust Company of Virginia*, 56 Va. 10 Cir. 147 (2002), in which the court considered the liability of a trustee that was subject to 11 direction in investment. The court declined to hold the trustee <u>directly</u> liable for the investment 12 director's failure to direct the diversification of the trust's investments, but the court nevertheless 13 held the trustee liable for failing to advise the beneficiaries about the risks of the investment 14 director's actions.

16 Survival of trustee's general duty of disclosure. Although this section confirms that a directed trustee is not liable for failinghas no duty to monitor, inform, or advise regarding a trust 17 18 director's exercise or nonexercise of its powers, this section does not relieve a trustee of its 19 ordinary duties to disclose and report under otherwise applicable law such as under Uniform 20 Trust Code § 813 (amended 2004) or Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 82 (2007). For example, 21 although a directed trustee would not be liable for failing have a duty to advise a beneficiary 22 about the risks of a portfolio concentration, the trustee would remain under a duty to make 23 periodic reports or accountings to the beneficiary and to answer reasonable inquiries by the 24 beneficiary about the administration of the trust to the extent required by otherwise applicable 25 state law.

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This section does not relieve a trustee of the duty under Section 9 to provide a trust
director with information reasonably related to the director's powers or duties.

30 The trust director's specific dutiesduty of disclosure. Under Section 7(a), a trust director 31 holding a power of direction or consent is subject to the same disclosure duties as a trustee would 32 be in the exercise or nonexercise of the same power under the same circumstances. For. Thus, for 33 example, if a trust director intended to direct a nonroutine transaction, to change "investment 34 strategies," or to take "significant actions ... involving hard-to-value assets or special sensitivity to beneficiaries," the director might be under a duty of affirmative advance disclosure. See 35 36 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 82 cmt. d (2007); see also Allard v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 663 P.2d 37 104, 110 (Wash, 1983) ("The trustee must inform beneficiaries, however, of all material facts in 38 connection with a nonroutine transaction which significantly affects the trust estate and the 39 interests of the beneficiaries prior to the transaction taking place.").

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41 Administrative classification. No assumption of duty. In addition to waiving a directed
42 trustee's dutiesduty to monitor, inform, or advise as under paragraph (1) of this section, many
43 state statutes also go further and sayalso provide that if a trustee for some reason chooses to do
44 so, those monitoring, informing, or advising activities will be deemed to be "administrative
45 actions." The purpose of these provisions is to ensure that if a directed trustee chooses for some

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	reason to inform, monitor, or advise, the trustee does not assume a continuing obligation to do so nor concede a prior duty to have done so. This section dispenses with the opacity of an administrative classification and achieves the intended result more directly in paragraph (2), which provides) by providing that if a trustee monitors, informs, or advises about the actions of a trust director on one occasion, the trustee does not thereby become liable for a prior or subsequent failureassume a duty to monitor, inform, or advise on another occasion.
8	SECTION 11. APPLICATION TO COTRUSTEE. The terms of a trust may provide
9	that a cotrustee is subject only to the duty and liability of a directed trustee under Sections $8, 9$,
10	and 10 with respect to: through 10 with respect to another trustee's power to administer the trust
11	or direct the cotrustee in the administration of the trust, including in the investment,
12	management, or distribution of the trust property.
13	(1) another trustee's power of direction to invest, manage, or distribute the trust property
14	or to direct the cotrustee in the cotrustee's or trust director's investment, management, or
15	distribution of the property; or
16	(2) another trustee's power of consent under which:
17	(A) the cotrustee must obtain the permission of the other trustee before exercising
18	a power of the cotrustee; or
19	(B) the other trustee may release the cotrustee from liability for an action
20	proposed or previously taken by the cotrustee.
21	(3) another trustee's power of protection to:
22	(A) amend or modify the terms of the trust or terminate the trust;
23	(B) change the principal place of administration, situs, or governing law of the
24	t rust;
25	(C) determine the capacity of the settlor, a trustee, a trust director, a beneficiary,
26	or other party;
27	(D) appoint or remove a trustee or another trust director, or a successor to either;

1	OF
2	(E) prosecute, defend, or join an action, claim, or judicial proceeding relating to
3	the trust.
4 5	Legislative Note: A state that has adopted Uniform Trust Code § 703(c), (f), and (g) should revise those sections by [to discussfor discussion at next committee meeting].
6	Comment
7 8 9 10 11 12	<u>Cotrusteeship and directed trusteeship compared</u> . Cotrusteeship and directed trusteeship are similar in many ways. The principal difference is that in a cotrusteeship, every person named as a cotrustee holds title to the trust property. In a directed trust, by contrast, title to trust property belongs only to the trustee, and not to the trust director. The placement of title can have important consequences for dealings with third parties and for tax, property, and other bodies of law outside of trust law.
13 14 15 16 17	<i>Cotrusteeship by default.</i> Under this section the default rule is that, if a settlor names cotrustees, the traditional law of cotrusteeship applies. The fiduciary duties of directed trusteeship will only apply if the terms of the trust so provide.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	<i>Settlor autonomy.</i> Under traditional law governing cotrustees, each cotrustee "has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee from committing a breach of trust and, if a breach of trust occurs, to obtain redress." Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 81(2) (2007). This rule applies even if the settlor limits the role or function of one of the cotrustees. "Even in matters for which a trustee is relieved of responsibility, … if the trustee knows that a co-trustee is committing or attempting to commit a breach of trust, the trustee has a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the fiduciary misconduct." <i>Id.</i> cmt. b. This rule <u>for a cotrustee</u> contrasts with <u>the rules for a directed trustee under</u> . Sections 8 and 10 of this act, which impose a less demanding fiduciary standard-on a directed trustee.
27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36	This section allows a settlor to choose either fiduciary regime for a cotrusteeship—the traditional rules of cotrusteeship or the more permissive rules of a directed trusteeship. Given that a settlor could have opted into the permissive rules of this act by naming a trust director and a directed trustee instead of naming cotrustees, there There seems little reason to prevent the settlor from directing applying the application of the fiduciary rules of this act to an arrangement that uses the labeling of cotrustees, rather than trust directors.cotrusteeship because a settlor could choose the more permissive rules for a directed trusteeship by labeling one of the cotrustees as a trust director and another as a directed trustee.
36 37 38 39 40 41 42	<i>Mechanics of choosing directed trustee duties.</i> Whether this section applies to a given trust is a question of <u>construing construction of</u> the terms of that trust. This section does not impose a requirement of express reference to this section or to this act. Under Section 3(a), this section <u>may applyapplies</u> to a trust created before the effective date of this act, but only as to conduct occurring after that date.

1 *Cotrustees as directed trustees and trust directors.* The terms of a trust can place a 2 cotrustee in a position of actingeither giving direction, like a trust director, or taking direction, 3 like a directed trustee. This section only applies to a cotrustee who acts like a directed trustee. 4 takes direction. This section does not address the duties of a cotrustee who acts like a that gives 5 direction because under Section 7, the duties of a trust director, because the duties of a cotrustee 6 under traditional law are by definition comparable to the ordinary duties of a trust director under 7 Section 7. [Placeholder: For further discussion, what about a power of protection in a 8 cotrustee?]trustee. 9 10 *No third-party effects.* Nothing in this This section changes does not change the rights of third parties who deal with a cotrustee in the cotrustee's capacity as such. Although this section 11 12 changes the degree to which the terms of a trust may reduce a cotrustee's duties to a beneficiary, 13 it does not alter the rules that affect the rights of third parties who contract with or otherwise 14 interact with a cotrustee. 15 16 SECTION 12. LIMITATION OF ACTION AGAINST TRUST DIRECTOR. 17 (a) An action against a trust director for breach of trust must be commenced within the 18 same limitations period as an action against a trustee for breach of trust- [as prescribed by 19 Uniform Trust Code Section 1005]. 20 (b) A report or accounting to a person of the conduct of a trust director has the same 21 effect on the limitations period for an action by the person against the director that the report or 22 accounting would have if the director were a trustee. [as prescribed by Uniform Trust Code 23 Section 1005]. 24 Legislative Note: A state that has adopted Uniform Trust Code Section 1005 should update the bracketed language to reference that enactment. A state that has adopted a statute other than 25 Uniform Trust Code Section 1005 to govern limitation of an action against a trustee should 26 27 replace the bracketed language with a cross reference to that statute. A state that has not adopted a statutory limitation should delete the bracketed language. 28 29 Comment 30 Subsection (a) extends to a trust director the same limits on liability that a trustee enjoys 31 under the law of an enacting state by way of a statutory limitations period, such as under 32 Uniform Trust Code § 1005(c) (2000). The limitations period absorbed by subsection (a) applies 33 to all claims against a trust director for breach of trust, whether by a beneficiary, a trustee, 34 another trust director, or some other party. 35 36 Subsection (b) extends to a trust director the same limits on liability that a trustee enjoys 37 under the law of an enacting state arising from the making of a report or accounting, such as

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	under Uniform Trust Code § 1005(a)-(b) (2000), except that the rule of subsection (b) applies regardless of whether the report or accounting was made by the trust director. A trust director may therefore be protected by a report or accounting made by a trustee or another trust director even though the director isdid not responsible for the content of make the report or accounting, so long as the report or accounting fairly discloses the director's actions. Laches, which strictly speaking is an equitable defense rather than a limitations period, is addressed made applicable to an action against a trust director by Section 13(1). SECTION 13. DEFENSES IN ACTION AGAINST TRUST DIRECTOR. In an
11	action against a trust director for breach of trust, the director may assert the same defenses a
12	trustee could assert in an action against the trustee for breach of trust, including:.
13	(1) laches or estoppel;
14	(2) consent, release, or ratification;
15	(3) reasonable reliance on the terms of the trust; and
16	(4) reasonable care to ascertain the happening of a conditional event.
17	Comment
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18 10	Absorption. This section applies to an action for breach of trust against a trust director the
19	<i>Absorption.</i> This section applies to an action for breach of trust against a trust director the law of an enacting state governing defenses available to a trustee in a comparable action. This
19 20	law of an enacting state governing defenses available to a trustee in a comparable action. This
19 20 21	law of an enacting state governing defenses available to a trustee in a comparable action. This approach is consistent with the more general absorption of the law of fiduciary duties under
19 20 21 22	law of an enacting state governing defenses available to a trustee in a comparable action. This approach is consistent with the more general absorption of the law of fiduciary duties under Section 7, and it offers the same advantages of allowing variation across the states and avoiding
19 20 21 22 23	law of an enacting state governing defenses available to a trustee in a comparable action. This approach is consistent with the more general absorption of the law of fiduciary duties under Section 7, and it offers the same advantages of allowing variation across the states and avoiding conflicts with the Uniform Trust Code or other applicable state law. The defenses listed in
19 20 21 22	law of an enacting state governing defenses available to a trustee in a comparable action. This approach is consistent with the more general absorption of the law of fiduciary duties under Section 7, and it offers the same advantages of allowing variation across the states and avoiding conflicts with the Uniform Trust Code or other applicable state law. The defenses listed in paragraphs (1)-(4) of this section are not exclusive. A trust director can assert any defense that
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19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37	law of an enacting state governing defenses available to a trustee in a comparable action. This approach is consistent with the more general absorption of the law of fiduciary duties under Section 7, and it offers the same advantages of allowing variation across the states and avoiding conflicts with the Uniform Trust Code or other applicable state law. The defenses listed in paragraphs (1)-(4) of this section are not exclusive. A trust director can assert any defense that would be available to a trustee in an action for breach of trust, including a defense not listed in this section. under existing state law, including: [For discussion: Should we move these examples into the blackletter, with bracketed UTC cross-references, and indicate that they are not exhaustive? We moved these examples to the comment in response to suggestions by several Commissioners at the Annual Meeting in July.] <i>Paragraph (1) - laches or estoppel.</i> This paragraph addresses laches and estoppel. It is important for this act to absorb and apply these doctrines for trust directors, because the common law and principles of equity have not yet developed such an application. <i>Paragraph (2) - laches or estoppel (see</i> Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 98 (2012)); <i></i>
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1	for a trustee to a claim of breach of trust if the consent, release, or ratification was
2	informed and not improperly obtained.));
3	
4	• Paragraph (3) reasonable reliance on the terms of a trust. The law in many statutes,
5	such as provided by (see Uniform Trust Code § 1006 (2000) and); Uniform Prudent
6	Investor Act § 1(b) (1994), recognizes a defense for a trustee of reasonable reliance on
7	the terms of the trust as expressed in the trust instrument. This paragraph absorbs that law
8	for application to a trust director.); and
9	
10	• Paragraph (4) event reasonable care in ascertaining the happening of an event
11	affecting administration or distribution. Prevailing law, such as provided by (see
12	Uniform Trust Code § 1007 (2000) and); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 76 cmt. f
13	(2007), recognizes a defense for a trustee of reasonable care in ascertaining the happening
14	of an event that affects the administration of a trust. This paragraph absorbs that law for
15	application to a trust director.)).
16	apprication to a trast director.
17	<i>Exculpation or exoneration</i> . The discussion notescomments to Section 7 address the
18	effect of an exculpation or exoneration clause for on the duty and liability of a trust director.
19	effect of an exemption of exonormion charge for <u>on the daty and monity of</u> a flust director.
20	Attorney's fees and indemnification. Attorney's fees and indemnification for a trust
20	director are governed by Section $6(c)(1)$, which establishes a default rule that allows a trust
22	director to exercise "any further power appropriate to the exercise of the director's express
23	power" under Section 6(b). By default, therefore, a trust director has the power to incur
24	attorney's fees and other expenses and to direct indemnification for them so long as they are <u>if</u>
25	"appropriate" to the exercise of the director's express powers.
26	
27	SECTION 14. JURISDICTION OVER TRUST DIRECTOR.
_,	
28	(a) By accepting appointment as trust director of a trust subject to this [act], the director
29	submits personally to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state regarding any matter related to a
30	power or duty of the director.
31	(b) This section does not preclude other methods of obtaining jurisdiction over a trust
32	director.
33	Comment
34	
35	Under subsection (a), by accepting appointment as trust director of a trust subject to this
36	act, the director submits to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of the state. This rule is
37	mandatory. The terms of a trust or an agreement among the trust director and other parties cannot
38	eliminatenegate a court's personal jurisdiction over a trust director under this section. However,
39	this section does not preclude a court from declining to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of
40	forum non conveniens.
i	

1 2 3 4 5	Subsection (b) confirms that subsection (a) does not prescribe the exclusive method of obtaining jurisdiction over a trust director. SECTION 15. OFFICE OF TRUST DIRECTOR. The TRUST DIRECTORSHIP.
6	Unless the terms of a trust provide otherwise, the rules applicable to a trusteeship regarding the
7	following matters apply to a trust directorship:
8	(1) acceptance; [as prescribed by Uniform Trust Code Section 701];
9	(2) appointment; [as prescribed by Uniform Trust Code Section 704];
10	(3) giving of bond to secure performance; [as prescribed by Uniform Trust Code Section
11	<u>702];</u>
12	(4) compensation; [as prescribed by Uniform Trust Code Section 708];
13	(5) resignation; [as prescribed by Uniform Trust Code Section 705];
14	(6) removal; [as prescribed by Uniform Trust Code Section 706]; and
15	(7) vacancy [as prescribed by Uniform Trust Code Section 704].
16 17 18 19 20 21	Legislative Note: A state that has adopted the Uniform Trust Code sections referenced in this section should update the bracketed language to reference the appropriate portions of that enactment. A state that has adopted relevant statutory provisions other than the sections of the Uniform Trust Code referenced in this section should replace the bracketed language with cross references to those provisions. A state that has not adopted relevant statutory provisions should delete the bracketed language accordingly.
22	Comments
23 24 25 26 27 28	This section applies to a trust directorship absorbs the state law of an enacting state applicable to a trusteeship for a trust directorship with regard to seven subjects. The default or mandatory character of that he law as applied to a trusteeship governs whether the law is default or mandatory as applied to a trust directorship turns on the default or mandatory character as applied to a trusteeship.
29 30 31 32	<i>Paragraph (1)—acceptance.</i> This paragraph absorbs an enacting state's law governing acceptance of a trusteeship, such as under Uniform Trust Code § 701(a)–(b) (2000) or Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 35 (2003), for application to acceptance of a trust directorship.
33 34	<i>Paragraph</i> (2)— <i>appointment</i> . This paragraph absorbs an enacting state's law governing trustee appointment, such as under Uniform Trust Code § 704(c) and (e) (amended 2004) and
	35

- 1 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 34 (2003), for application to appointment of a trust director. 2 3 *Paragraph* (3)—bond. This paragraph absorbs an enacting state's law governing bond to 4 secure performance by a trustee, such as under Uniform Trust Code § 702(a)–(b) (2000) and 5 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 34(3) (2003), for application to bond by a trust director. 6 7 *Paragraph* (4)—*compensation*. This paragraph absorbs an enacting state's law governing 8 compensation of a trustee, such as under Uniform Trust Code § 708 (2000) and Restatement 9 (Third) of Trusts § 38 cmt. i (2003), for application to compensation of a trust director. Just The drafting committee contemplated that, just as in total "the reasonable fees for multiple trustees 10 may be higher than for a single trustee," Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38 cmt. i (2003), id., so 11 too the total reasonable fees infor a trust with multiple trustees directed trustee and a trust 12 13 directors director may be higher than for a single trustee. 14 15 On the other hand, the reasonable compensation of a directed trustee that is subject to a 16 trust director's power of direction or power of consent is likely to be less than that for a similarly situated trustee that is not subject to such a power directed. An apt analogy is to a trustee who that 17 hires others to "render services expected or normally to be performed by the trustee." 18 19 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38 cmt. c(1) (2003); see also Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 9 20 cmt. (1994) ("If, for example, the trustee's regular compensation schedule presupposes that the 21 trustee will conduct the investment management function, it should ordinarily follow that the 22 trustee will lower its fee when delegating the investment function to an outside manager."). 23 24 Paragraph (5)—resignation. This paragraph absorbs an enacting state's law governing 25 resignation by a trustee, such as under Uniform Trust Code § 705 (amended 2001) and 26 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 36 (2003), for application to resignation by a trust director. 27 28 Paragraph (6)—removal. This subsection absorbs an enacting state's law governing 29 removal of a trustee, such as under Uniform Trust Code § 706 (2000) and Restatement (Third) of 30 Trusts § 37 cmt. e (2003), for application to removal of a trust director. 31 32 *Paragraph* (7)—*vacancy*. This section absorbs an enacting state's law applicable to a 33 vacancy in a trusteeship, such as under Uniform Trust Code § 704 (amended 2004), for 34 application to a vacancy in a trust directorship. 35 36 *Costs and indemnification.* The power of a trust director to incur reasonable costs and 37 direct indemnification for expenses would in most cases be covered by Section 6(c)(1). 38 39 SECTION 16. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION. In 40 applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote 41 uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it. 42 SECTION 17. RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND
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1	NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT. This [act] modifies, limits, or supersedes the Electronic
2	Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq., but does not
3	modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of that act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001(c), or authorize
4	electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103(b) of that act, 15 U.S.C.
5	Section 7003(b).
6	SECTION 18. REPEALS; CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
7	(a)
8	(b)
9	(c)
10	SECTION 19. EFFECTIVE DATE. This [act] takes effect