

DRAFT
FOR DISCUSSION ONLY

**REVISED UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT**

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS

WITH PREFATORY NOTE AND PRELIMINARY COMMENTS

Copyright ©2005
By
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS

The ideas and conclusions set forth in this draft, including the proposed statutory language and any comments or reporter's notes, have not been passed upon by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws or the Drafting Committee. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Conference and its Commissioners and the Drafting Committee and its Members and Reporters. Proposed statutory language may not be used to ascertain the intent or meaning of any promulgated final statutory proposal.

October 25, 2005

**DRAFTING COMMITTEE TO REVISE UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT**

The Committee appointed by and representing the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in revising this Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act consists of the following individuals:

BARRY C. HAWKINS, 300 Atlantic St., Stamford, CT 06901, *Chair*

JOHN P. BURTON, P.O. Box 1357, 315 Paseo de Peralta, Santa Fe, NM 87501, *Enactment Plan
Coordinator*

MARY JO HOWARD DIVELY, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Ave., Pittsburgh, PA
15213

L.S. JERRY KURTZ, JR., 1050 Beech Ln., Anchorage, AK 99501

SHELDON F. KURTZ, University of Iowa, College of Law, 446 BLB, Iowa City, IA 52242

JOHN H. LANGBEIN, Yale Law School, P.O. Box 208215, New Haven, CT 06520

JOHN C. MCAVOY, 3110 Brandywine St. NW, Washington, DC 20008

MATTHEW S. RAE, JR., 520 S. Grand Ave., 7th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071-2645

GLEE SMITH, P.O. Box 667, Lawrence, KS 66044

SUSAN N. GARY, University of Oregon, School of Law, 1515 Agate St., Eugene, OR 97403,
Reporter

EX OFFICIO

HOWARD J. SWIBEL, 120 S. Riverside Plaza, Suite 1200, Chicago, IL 60606, *President*

TOM BOLT, Corporate Place, 5600 Royal Dane Mall, St. Thomas, VI 00802-6410,
Division Chair

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ADVISORS

CAROL G. KROCH, RR 1 E College Rd. E, P.O. Box 2316, Princeton, NJ 08543-2316,
American Bar Association Advisor

JOHN K. NOTZ, JR., 191 N. Wacker Dr., Chicago, IL 60606-1698, *American Bar Association
Section Advisor*

CYNTHIA ROWLAND, One Ferry Building, Suite 200, San Francisco, CA 94111, *American
Bar Association Section Advisor*

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

WILLIAM H. HENNING, University of Alabama School of Law, Box 870382, Tuscaloosa, AL
35487-0382, *Executive Director*

Copies of this Act may be obtained from:
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
211 E. Ontario Street, Suite 1300
Chicago, Illinois 60611
312/915-0195
www.nccusl.org

REVISED UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFATORY NOTE.....1
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE3
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS.....3
SECTION 3. STANDARD OF CONDUCT IN MANAGING AND INVESTING
INSTITUTIONAL FUND8
SECTION 4. EXPENDITURE OF ENDOWMENT FUND; RULES OF CONSTRUCTION ..16
[SECTION 5. DELEGATION OF MANAGEMENT AND INVESTMENT FUNCTIONS25
SECTION 6. RELEASE OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON MANAGEMENT,
INVESTMENT, OR PURPOSE.....27
SECTION 7. REVIEWING COMPLIANCE30
SECTION 8. APPLICATION TO EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS30
SECTION 9. RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL
COMMERCE ACT.....31
SECTION 10. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION.....31
SECTION 11. EFFECTIVE DATE.....31
SECTION 12. REPEAL.....31

REVISED UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT

PREFATORY NOTE

In 1972 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act [hereafter referred to as UMIFA (1972)]. At that time uncertainty existed as to the standards that governed directors of charitable corporations in managing and investing the funds of the charitable organizations. Directors of a charity organized as a nonprofit corporation had been held to the investment standards that applied to trustees of private trusts. *See Lynch v. John M. Redfield Foundation*, 9 Cal. App. 3d 293 (1970) (stating that directors of a charitable corporation are essentially trustees and as such are held to an investment duty similar to that of a trustee of a private trust). *See also* Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 389 (1959). For directors of large institutions, the then-current restrictions on trust investing made the use of modern investment strategies problematic.

UMIFA (1972) provided guidance and authority to the governing boards of those charitable organizations within its scope on several issues. The statute gave a governing board broad investment authority and indicated that a governing board was not restricted to investments authorized for trustees. The statute permitted a board to delegate authority to independent financial advisors. With respect to endowment funds, the statute authorized a governing board to expend unrealized appreciation, even if the endowment fund provided only for the distribution of “income.” This provision enabled fund managers to use modern investment techniques such as total-return investing and unitrust-style spending. UMIFA (1972) also permitted the governing board to release restrictions on the use or investment of institutional funds if the donor consented and to release restrictions that had become “obsolete, inappropriate, or impracticable” if a court approved.

The investment standards adopted by UMIFA (1972) foreshadowed changes to trust investment law in the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (1994) [hereafter referred to as UPIA]. UPIA applies modern portfolio theory to trusts, including charitable trusts. The Uniform Principal and Income Act (1997) furthered the principles of UPIA, providing tools for the use of investment techniques authorized under UPIA. The Uniform Trust Code (2000) [hereafter referred to as the UTC] expanded the application of the doctrine of *cy pres*. These Uniform Acts have informed the work of the Drafting Committee of the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (200-) [hereafter UMIFA (200-)].

Objectives of the Act. UMIFA (200-) uses language from UPIA and the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act [hereafter referred to as the RMNCA], reflecting the fact that standards for investing and managing institutional funds are and should be the same regardless of whether a charitable organization is organized as a trust, as a nonprofit corporation or in some other manner. The rules governing expenditures from endowment funds have been modified to give a governing board more flexibility in making expenditure decisions, so that the board can cope with fluctuations in the value of the endowment. As under UMIFA (1972), these rules are available to decision makers of charities organized as charitable trusts, as nonprofit corporations, or in some other manner, but the rules do not apply to a fund managed by a trustee that is not a

charity. The Act does not apply to trusts managed by corporate or individual trustees, but the Act does apply to a trust managed by a charity. The provisions governing the release and modification of restrictions have been changed to permit more efficient management of institutional funds.

Other Legal Rules. UMIFA (200-) addresses investment issues and issues relating to endowment funds but is not a comprehensive statute addressing all legal issues that apply to charitable organizations. For matters not governed by UMIFA (200-), a charitable organization will continue to be governed by rules applicable to charitable trusts, if it is organized as a trust, or rules applicable to nonprofit corporations, if it is organized as a nonprofit corporation.

1 **REVISED UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT**

2
3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.** This [act] may be cited as the Uniform Management of
4 Institutional Funds Act.

5 **SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS.** In this [act]:

6 (1) “Charitable purpose” means the relief of poverty, the advancement of
7 education or religion, the promotion of health, the promotion of governmental purposes, or
8 another purpose the achievement of which is beneficial to the community.

9 (2) “Endowment fund” means an institutional fund, or any part thereof, not
10 wholly expendable by the institution on a current basis under the terms of a gift instrument. ~~The~~
11 ~~term includes two or more endowment funds collectively managed.~~ The term does not include
12 assets of an institution designated by the institution as an endowment fund for its own use.

13 (3) “Gift instrument” means a record or records under which property is granted
14 to, transferred to, or held by an institution as an institutional fund. The term includes an
15 institutional solicitation in the form of a record from which ~~a gift to the institution an institutional~~
16 ~~fund~~ results if the solicitation indicates the intent of the institution that the solicitation constitute
17 a gift instrument and another record does not supersede the solicitation.

18 (4) “Institution” means:

19 (A) a person, other than an individual, organized and operated exclusively
20 for charitable purposes;

21 (B) a government, or governmental subdivision, agency, or
22 instrumentality to the extent that it holds funds exclusively for a charitable purpose;

1 (C) a trust that ~~has~~ had both charitable and noncharitable interests, after
2 all noncharitable interests have terminated.

3 (5) “Institutional fund” means a fund held by an institution exclusively for
4 charitable purposes. ~~The term includes two or more institutional funds collectively managed.~~ The
5 term does not include:

6 (A) program-related assets;

7 (B) a fund held for an institution by a trustee that is not an institution; or

8 (C) a fund in which a beneficiary that is not an institution has an interest,
9 other than an interest that could arise upon violation or failure of the purposes of the fund.

10 (6) “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust,
11 partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, public corporation,
12 government, or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or
13 commercial entity.

14 (7) “Program-related asset” means an asset held by an institution primarily to
15 accomplish a charitable purpose of the institution and not primarily for appreciation or producing
16 income.

17 (8) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is
18 stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

19 Preliminary Comment

20
21
22 **Subsection (1). Charitable Purpose.** The definition of charitable purpose uses the same
23 formulation as that in UTC § 405 and Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 (2003). The definition
24 is the standard legal definition of charitable purposes, developed from the definition of charity
25 set forth in the English Statute of Charitable Uses, enacted in 1601. Some 17 states have created
26 statutory definitions of charitable purpose for other purposes. *See, e.g.*, 10 PA. CONS. STAT. §
27 162.3 (2005) (setting forth a definition of charitable purpose within the Solicitation of Funds for

1 Charitable Purposes Act. The definition includes the words “humane,” “patriotic,” social
2 welfare and advocacy,” and “civic.”) The definition in subsection (1) applies for purposes of this
3 Act and does not affect other definitions of charitable purpose.
4

5 **Subsection (2). Endowment Fund.** An endowment fund is an institutional fund or a part
6 of an institutional fund that is not wholly expendable by the institution on a current basis. A
7 restriction that makes a fund an endowment fund arises from the terms of a gift instrument. If an
8 institution has more than one endowment fund, under Section 3 the institution can manage and
9 invest some or all endowment funds together. Section 4 and Section 6 must be applied to
10 individual funds and cannot be applied to a group of funds that may be managed collectively for
11 investment purposes.
12

13 Board-designated funds are institutional funds but not endowment funds. The rules on
14 expenditures and modification of restrictions in this Act do not apply to restrictions placed by an
15 institution on an otherwise unrestricted fund held by the institution for its own benefit. The
16 institution may be able to change these restrictions itself, subject to internal rules and to the
17 fiduciary duties that apply to those that manage an institution.
18

19 If an institution transfers assets to another institution, subject to the restriction that the
20 other institution hold the assets as an endowment, then the second institution will hold the assets
21 as an endowment fund.
22

23 **Subsection (3). Gift Instrument.** The term gift instrument refers to the records that
24 establish the terms of a gift and may consist of more than one document. As used in this
25 definition, “record” is an expansive concept and means a writing in any form, including
26 electronic. The term includes a will, deed, grant, conveyance, agreement, or memorandum, and
27 also includes writings that do not have a donative purpose. For example, under some
28 circumstances the bylaws of the institution, minutes of the board of directors, or canceled checks
29 could be a gift instrument or be one of several records constituting a gift instrument.
30

31 Solicitation materials may constitute a gift instrument. For example, a solicitation that
32 suggests in writing that any gifts received pursuant to the solicitation will be held as an
33 endowment may be integrated with other writings and may be considered part of the gift
34 instrument. Whether the terms of the solicitation become part of the gift instrument will depend
35 upon the circumstances of the gift and whether a subsequent writing superseded the terms of the
36 solicitation. Each gift received in response to a solicitation will be subject to any restrictions
37 indicated in the gift instrument that applies to that gift. For example, if an initial gift establishes
38 an endowment fund, and then the charity solicits additional gifts “to be held as part of the
39 Charity X Endowment Fund,” those additional gifts will each be subject to the restriction that the
40 gifts be held as part of the endowment fund.
41

42 The term gift instrument includes matching funds provided by an employer or some other
43 person. Whether matching funds are treated as part of the endowment fund or otherwise will
44 depend on the terms of the matching gift.

1 The term gift instrument also includes an appropriation by a legislature or other public or
2 governmental body for the benefit of an institution.

3
4 **Subsection (4). Institution.** The Act applies generally to institutions organized and
5 operated exclusively for charitable purposes. By defining institution as a person, the term
6 includes charitable organizations created as nonprofit corporations, trusts, unincorporated
7 associations, governmental subdivisions or agencies, or any form of entity, however organized,
8 that is organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes. The term includes a trust
9 organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, but only if a charity acts as trustee.
10 This approach leaves unchanged the coverage of UMIFA (1972). The exclusion of “individual”
11 from the definition of institution is not intended to exclude a corporation sole.

12
13 In many respects, changes in trust law have caught up with the provisions in UMIFA, so
14 the exclusion of certain trusts from UMIFA (200-) does not mean that many of the rules of
15 UMIFA (200-) will not apply to those trusts. Prudent investor standards apply to trustees of
16 charitable trusts in states that have adopted UPIA, trustees can use the doctrines of cy pres and
17 deviation to modify trust provisions, and the Uniform Principal and Income Act, where enacted,
18 permits allocation between principal and income to facilitate total-return investing. Charitable
19 trusts not included in UMIFA (200-), primarily those managed by corporate trustees, will lose
20 the benefits of UMIFA’s endowment spending rule and the provision permitting a charity to
21 apply cy pres, without court supervision, for modifications to a small, old fund. Enacting
22 jurisdictions may choose to incorporate these rules into existing trust statutes to provide the
23 benefits to charitable funds managed by corporate trustees.

24
25 The definition of institution includes governmental organizations that hold funds
26 exclusively for the purposes listed in the definition. Some organizations created by state
27 government may fall outside the definition due to the way in which the state created the
28 organizations. Because state arrangements are so varied, creating a definition that encompasses
29 all charitable entities created by states is not feasible. States should consider the core principles
30 of UMIFA (200-) for application to governmental institutions. For example, the control over a
31 state university may be held by a State Board of Regents. In that situation, the state may have
32 created a governing structure by statute or in the state constitution so that the university is, in
33 effect, privately chartered. The Drafting Committee does not intend to exclude these universities
34 from the definition of institution, but additional state legislation may be necessary to address
35 particular situations.

36
37 **Subsection (5). Institutional Fund.** The term institutional fund includes any fund held
38 by an institution for charitable purposes, whether expendable currently or subject to restrictions.
39 The term does not include a fund held by a trustee that is not an institution.

40
41 Some institutions combine assets from multiple funds for investment purposes, and some
42 institutions combine funds from different institutions to invest in a common fund. Typically
43 each fund is assigned units representing the value of the individual fund. The assets can then be
44 invested collectively, permitting more efficient investment and improved diversity of the overall
45 portfolio. The collective fund makes annual distributions to the individual funds based on the

1 units held by each fund. For purposes of Section 3 [and Section 5], the collective fund is
2 considered one institutional fund. Section 4 and Section 6 apply to each fund individually and
3 not to the collective fund.
4

5 Assets held by an institution primarily for program-related purposes are not subject to
6 UMIFA (200-). Assets used to carry out a charity's program should not be subject to the same
7 investment standards that apply to assets held primarily for investment purposes. For example, a
8 university may purchase land adjacent to its campus for future development. The purchase
9 might not meet prudent investor standards, but the purchase may be appropriate because the
10 university needs to build a new dormitory. The classroom buildings, administration buildings,
11 and dormitories held by the university all have value as property, but the university does not hold
12 those buildings for investment purposes. The Act excludes from the prudent investor norms
13 those assets that a charity uses to conduct its charitable activities, but does not exclude assets that
14 have a tangential tie to the charitable purpose of the institution but are held primarily for
15 investment purposes.
16

17 A fund held by an institution is not an institutional fund if any beneficiary of the fund is
18 not an institution. For example, a charitable remainder trust held by a charity as trustee for the
19 benefit of the donor during the donor's lifetime, with the remainder interest held by the charity,
20 is not an institutional fund. However, this subsection treats as an institution a charitable
21 remainder trust that continues to operate for charitable purposes after the termination of the
22 noncharitable interests. The Act will have only a limited effect on a charitable remainder trust
23 during the period required to complete the distribution of the trust's property after the
24 noncharitable interest ends. The prudence norm will apply to the actions of the trustee, but the
25 trustee will make decisions about investment and management of funds knowing that the trust
26 will distribute its assets and not continue indefinitely.
27

28 **Subsection (6). Person.** The Act uses as the definition of person the definition approved
29 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The definition of
30 institution uses the term person, but to be an institution a person must be organized and operated
31 exclusively for charitable purposes. A person with a commercial purpose cannot be an
32 institution. Thus, although the definition of person includes "business trust" and "any other . . .
33 commercial entity," the Act does not apply to an entity organized for business purposes and not
34 exclusively for charitable purposes. Further, the definition of person includes trusts, but only
35 trusts managed by charities can be institutional funds. UMIFA (200-) does not apply to trusts
36 managed by corporate trustees or by individual trustees.
37

38 If a governing instrument provides that a fund will revert to the donor if, and only if, the
39 institution ceases to exist or the purposes of the fund fail, then the fund will be considered an
40 institutional fund until such contingency occurs.
41

42 **Subsection (7). Program-Related Asset.** Although UMIFA (200-) does not apply to
43 program-related assets, if program-related assets serve, in part, as investments for an institution,
44 then the institution should identify categories for reporting those investments and should
45 establish investment criteria for the investments that are reasonably related to achieving the

1 institution’s charitable purposes. For example, a program providing below-market loans to
2 inner-city businesses may be “primarily to accomplish a charitable purpose of the institution” but
3 also can be considered, in part, an investment. The institution should create reasonable credit
4 standards and other guidelines for the program to increase the likelihood that the loans would be
5 repaid.

6
7 **Subsection (8). Record.** This definition was added to clarify that the definition of
8 instrument includes electronic records as defined in Section 2(8) of the Uniform Electronic
9 Transactions Act (1999).

10
11 **SECTION 3. STANDARD OF CONDUCT IN MANAGING AND INVESTING**
12 **INSTITUTIONAL FUND.**

13 (a) Subject to the intent of a donor expressed in a gift instrument, an institution,
14 in managing and investing an institutional fund, shall consider the charitable purposes of the
15 institution and the purposes of the institutional fund.

16 (b) In addition to complying with the duty of loyalty imposed by law other than
17 this [act], each person responsible for managing and investing an institutional fund shall manage
18 and invest the fund in good faith and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
19 would exercise under similar circumstances.

20 (c) In managing and investing an institutional fund, an institution:

21 (1) may incur only costs that are appropriate and reasonable in relation to
22 the assets, the purposes of the institution, and the skills available to the institution; and

23 (2) shall make a reasonable effort to verify facts relevant to the
24 management and investment of the fund.

25 (d) An institution may pool two or more institutional funds for purposes of
26 management and investment.

1 ~~(d)~~ (e) Except as otherwise provided by a gift instrument, the following rules

2 apply:

3 (1) In managing and investing an institutional fund, the following factors,
4 if relevant, must be considered:

5 (A) general economic conditions;

6 (B) the possible effect of inflation or deflation;

7 (C) the expected tax consequences, if any, of investment decisions
8 or strategies;

9 (D) the role that each investment or course of action plays within
10 the overall investment portfolio of the fund;

11 (E) the expected total return from income and the appreciation of
12 investments;

13 (F) other resources of the institution;

14 (G) the needs of the institution and the fund to make distributions
15 and to preserve capital; and

16 (H) an asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the
17 charitable purposes of the institution.

18 (2) Management and investment decisions about an individual asset must
19 be made not in isolation but rather in the context of the institutional fund's portfolio of
20 investments as a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy having risk and return
21 objectives reasonably suited to the fund and to the institution.

1 (3) An institution, subject to law other than this act, may invest in any
2 kind of property or type of investment consistent with the standards of this section.

3 (4) An institution shall diversify the investments of an institutional fund
4 unless the institution reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes
5 of the fund are better served without diversifying.

6 (5) Within a reasonable time after receiving property, an institution shall
7 make and implement decisions concerning the retention or disposition of the property or to
8 rebalance a portfolio, in order to bring the institutional fund into compliance with the purposes,
9 terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the institution and the requirements
10 of this [act].

11 (6) An individual who has special skills or expertise, or is named in
12 reliance upon the individual's representation that the individual has special skills or expertise,
13 has a duty to use those special skills or that expertise in managing and investing institutional
14 funds.

15 **Preliminary Comment**

16
17
18 **Purpose and Scope of Revisions.** This section adopts the prudence standard for
19 investment decision making. The section directs directors or others responsible for managing and
20 investing the funds of an institution to act as a prudent investor would, using a portfolio approach
21 in making investments and considering the risk and return objectives of the fund. The section
22 lists the factors that commonly bear on decisions in fiduciary investing and incorporates the duty
23 to diversify investments absent a conclusion that special circumstances make a decision not to
24 diversify reasonable. Thus, the section follows modern portfolio theory for investment decision
25 making. Section 3 applies to all funds held by an institution, regardless of whether the institution
26 obtained the funds by gift or otherwise and regardless of whether the funds are restricted.

27
28 The Drafting Committee discussed at great length the standard that should govern
29 nonprofit managers. UMIFA (1972) states the standard as "ordinary business care and prudence
30 under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of the action or decision." Since the
31 decision in *Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses*, 381 F. Supp.

1 1003 (1974), the trend has been to hold directors of nonprofit corporations to a standard similar
2 to the corporate standard but with the recognition that the facts and circumstances considered
3 include the fact that the entity is a charity and not a business corporation.
4

5 The language of the prudence standard adopted in UMIFA (200-) is derived from the
6 RMNCA and from the prudent investor rule of UPIA. The standard is consistent with the
7 business judgment standard under corporate law, *as applied to charitable institutions*. That is, a
8 manager operating a charitable organization under the business judgment rule would look to the
9 same factors as those identified by the prudent investor rule. The standard for prudent investment
10 set forth in Section 3 first states the duty of care as articulated in the RMNCA. The standard
11 then provides more specific guidance for those managing and investing institutional funds by
12 incorporating language from UPIA. The factors and rules derived from UPIA are consistent with
13 good practice under current law applicable to nonprofit corporations.
14

15 Trust law norms already inform managers of nonprofit corporations. The Preamble to
16 UPIA explains: “Although the Uniform Prudent Investor Act by its terms applies to trusts and
17 not to charitable corporations, the standards of the Act can be expected to inform the investment
18 responsibilities of directors and officers of charitable corporations.” *See also*, Restatement
19 (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 379, Comment b, at 190 (1992) (stating “absent a
20 contrary statute or other provision, the prudent investor rule applies to investment of funds held
21 for charitable corporations.”). Trust precedents have always been helpful but not binding
22 authority in corporate cases.
23

24 The Drafting Committee decided that by adopting language from both the RMNCA and
25 UPIA, UMIFA (200-) could clarify that the same standards of prudent investing apply to all
26 charitable institutions. Although principal trust authorities, UPIA § (2)(a), Restatement (Third)
27 of Trusts §337, UTC § 804, and Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 (prudent administration)
28 use the phrase “care, skill and caution,” the Drafting Committee decided to use the more familiar
29 corporate formulation as found in RMNCA. The standard also appears in Sections 3, 4 and 5 of
30 UMIFA (200-). The Drafting Committee does not intend any substantive change to the UPIA
31 standard and believes that “reasonable care, skill, and caution” are implicit in the term “care” as
32 used in the RMNCA. The Drafting Committee included the detailed provisions from UPIA,
33 because the Committee believed that the greater precision of the prudence norms of the
34 Restatement and UPIA, as compared with UMIFA (1972), could helpfully inform managers of
35 charitable institutions. For an explanation of the Prudent Investor Act, see John H. Langbein,
36 *The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing*, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 641
37 (1996).
38

39 Section 3 has incorporated the provisions of UPIA with only a few exceptions. UPIA
40 applies to private trusts and thus is entirely default law. A settlor of a private trust has complete
41 control over trust provisions. Because UMIFA (200-) applies to charitable organizations,
42 UMIFA (200-) makes the duty of care, the duty to minimize costs, and the duty to investigate
43 mandatory. The duty of loyalty is mandatory under other law. Other than these duties, the
44 provisions of Section 3 are default rules. A gift instrument or the governing instruments of an
45 institution can modify these duties, but the charitable purpose doctrine limits the extent to which

1 an institution or a donor can restrict these duties. In addition, subsection (a) of Section 3 reminds
2 the decision maker that the intent of a donor expressed in a gift instrument will control decision
3 making. Further, the decision maker must consider the charitable purposes of the institution and
4 the purposes of the institutional fund for which decisions are being made. These factors are
5 specific to charitable organizations, but UPIA § 2(a) states the duty to consider similar factors in
6 the private trust context.

7
8 UMIFA (200-) does not include the duty of impartiality, stated in UPIA § 6, because the
9 duty under UPIA did not make sense when applied to charities created as nonprofit corporations.
10 Under UPIA, a trustee must treat the current beneficiaries and the remainder beneficiaries
11 impartially, subject to alternative direction from the trust document. A nonprofit corporation
12 typically creates one charity. The institution may serve multiple beneficiaries, but those
13 beneficiaries do not have enforceable rights in the institution in the same way that beneficiaries
14 of a private trust do. Of course, if a charitable trust is created to benefit more than one charity,
15 rather than being created to carry out a charitable purpose, then UPIA will apply the duty of
16 impartiality to that trust.

17
18 In other respects, the Drafting Committee made changes to language from UPIA only
19 where necessary to make the language appropriate for charitable institutions. No material
20 differences are intended. Subsection (d)(1)(D) of Section 3 does not include a clause that
21 appears at the end of UPIA § 2(c)(4) (“which may include financial assets, interest in closely
22 held enterprises, tangible and intangible personal property, and real property.”). The Drafting
23 Committee deemed this clause unnecessary for charitable institutions. The language of
24 subsection (d)(1)(G) reflects a modification of the language of UPIA § (2)(c)(7). Other minor
25 modifications to the UPIA provisions make the language more appropriate for charitable
26 institutions.

27
28 The duties imposed by this section apply to those who govern an institution, including
29 directors and trustees, and to those to whom the directors or managers delegate responsibility for
30 investment and management of institutional funds. The standard applies to officers and
31 employees of an institution and to agents who invest and manage institutional funds. Volunteers
32 who work with an institution will be subject to the duties imposed here, but state and federal
33 statutes may provide reduced monetary liability for persons who act without compensation.
34 UMIFA does not affect the application of those monetary liability shield statutes.

35
36 **Subsection (a). Donor Intent and Charitable Purposes.** Subsection (a) states the
37 overarching direction provided by the donor’s intent as expressed in the terms of the gift
38 instrument and the duty to consider the charitable purposes of the institution and of the
39 institutional fund. A charity must comply with restrictions imposed on a gift by a donor, but the
40 emphasis in the Act on giving effect to donor intent does not mean that the donor can or should
41 control the management of the institution. The UPIA counterpart of subsection (a) is UPIA §
42 2(a).

43
44 **Subsection (b). Duty of Loyalty.** Subsection (b) reminds those managing and investing
45 institutional funds that the duty of loyalty will apply to their actions, but Section 3 does not state

1 the loyalty standard that applies. The Drafting Committee was concerned that different standards
2 of loyalty may apply to directors of nonprofit corporations and trustees of charitable trusts. The
3 RMNCA provides that under the duty of loyalty a director of a nonprofit corporation should act
4 “in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”
5 RMNCA § 8.30. The trust law articulation of the loyalty standard uses “sole interests” rather
6 than “best interests.” As the Restatement of Trusts explains, “[t]he trustee is under a duty to the
7 beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.” Restatement
8 (Second) of Trusts § 170 (1). Although the standards for loyalty, like the standard of care, are
9 merging, *see* Evelyn Brody, *Charitable Governance: What’s Trust Law Got to do With It?* Chi.-
10 Kent L. Rev. (2005); John H. Langbein, *Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole*
11 *Interest or Best Interest*, 114 Yale L.J. 929 (2005), the Drafting Committee concluded that
12 incorporating the duty of loyalty into UMIFA (200-) was unnecessary. Thus the duty of loyalty
13 under nonprofit corporation law will apply to charities organized as nonprofit corporations, and
14 the duty of loyalty under trust law will apply to charitable trusts.

15
16 **Subsection (b). Duty of Care.** Subsection (b) also applies the duty of care to
17 performance of investment duties. The language derives from § 8.30 of the RMNCA. This
18 subsection states the duty to act in good faith, “with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a
19 like position would exercise under similar circumstances.” Although the language in the
20 RMNCA and in UMIFA (200-) is similar to that of § 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation
21 Act (3d ed. 2002), the standard as applied to persons making decisions for charities is informed
22 by the fact that the institution is a charity and not a business corporation. Thus, in UMIFA (200-
23) the references to “like position” and “similar circumstances” mean that the charitable nature of
24 the institution affects the decision making of a prudent person acting under the standard set forth
25 in subsection (b). The duty of care involves considering the factors set forth in subsection (d)(1).

26
27 **Subsection (c)(1). Duty to Minimize Costs.** Subsection (c)(1) tracks the language of
28 UPIA § 7 and requires an institution to minimize costs. An institution may prudently incur costs
29 by hiring an investment advisor, but the costs incurred should be appropriate under the
30 circumstances. *See* UPIA § 7 cmt.; Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227,
31 cmt. M, at 58 (1992); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 188 (1959). The duty is consistent with
32 the duty to act prudently under § 8.30 of the RMNCA.

33
34 **Subsection (c)(2). Duty to Investigate.** This subsection incorporates the traditional
35 fiduciary duty to investigate, using language from UPIA § 2(d). The subsection requires persons
36 who make investment and management decisions to investigate the accuracy of the information
37 used in making decisions.

38
39 **Subsection (d)(1). Prudent Decision Making.** Subsection (d)(1) takes much of its
40 language from UPIA § 2(c). In making decisions about whether to acquire or retain an asset, the
41 institution should consider the institution’s mission, its current programs, and the desire to
42 cultivate additional donations from a donor, in addition to factors related more directly to the
43 asset’s potential as an investment.

1 Subsection (d)(1)(C) reflects the fact that some organizations will invest in taxable
2 investments that may generate unrelated business taxable income for income tax purposes.
3

4 Assets held primarily for program-related purposes are not subject to UMIFA (200-). The
5 management of those assets will continue to be governed by other laws applicable to the
6 institution. Other assets may not be held primarily for program-related purposes but may have
7 both investment purposes and program-related purposes. Subsections (a) and (d)(1)(H) indicate
8 that a prudent decision maker can take into consideration the relationship between an investment
9 and the purposes of the institution and of the institutional fund in making an investment that may
10 have a program-related purpose but not be primarily program-related. The degree to which an
11 institution uses an asset to accomplish a charitable purpose will affect the weight given that
12 factor in a decision to acquire or retain the asset.
13

14 **Subsection (d)(2). Portfolio Approach.** This subsection reflects the spread of portfolio
15 theory in modern investment practice. The language comes from UPIA § 2(b), which follows the
16 articulation of the prudent investor standard in Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor
17 Rule § 227(a) (1992).
18

19 **Subsection (d)(3). Broad Investment Authority.** Consistent with the portfolio theory of
20 investment, this subsection permits a broad range of investments. The language derives from
21 UPIA § 2(e).
22

23 Section 4 of UMIFA (1972) indicated that an institution could invest “without restriction
24 to investments a fiduciary may make.” The committee removed this language from subsection
25 (d)(3) as unnecessary because states no longer have legal lists restricting fiduciary investing to
26 the specific types of investments identified in statutory lists.
27

28 Subsection (d)(3) also provides that other law may limit the authority under this
29 subsection. In addition, all of subsection (d) is subject to contrary provisions in a gift instrument,
30 and a gift instrument may restrict the ability to invest in particular assets. For example, the gift
31 instrument for a particular institutional fund might preclude the institution from investing the
32 assets of the fund in companies that produce tobacco products.
33

34 **Subsection (d)(4). Duty to Diversify.** This subsection assumes that prudence requires
35 diversification but permits an institution to determine that nondiversification is appropriate under
36 the circumstances applicable to a fund. A decision to retain property due to “special
37 circumstances” must be made based on the needs of the charity and not solely for the benefit of a
38 donor. A decision to retain property in the hope of obtaining additional contributions from the
39 same donor may be considered made for the benefit of the charity, but the appropriateness of that
40 decision will depend on the circumstances. This subsection derives its language from UPIA § 3.
41 See UPIA § 3 cmt. (discussing the rationale for diversification); Restatement (Third) of Trusts:
42 Prudent Investor Rule § 227 (1992).
43

44 **Subsection (d)(5). Disposing of Unsuitable Assets.** This subsection imposes a duty on
45 an institution to review the suitability of retaining property contributed to the institution within a

1 reasonable period of time after the institution receives the property. Subsection (d)(5) requires
2 the institution to make a decision but does not require a particular outcome. The institution may
3 consider a variety of factors in making its decision, and a decision to retain the property either
4 for a period of time or indefinitely may be a prudent decision.

5
6 Section 4(2) of UMIFA (1972) specifically authorized an institution to retain property
7 contributed by a donor. The comment explained that an institution might retain property in the
8 hope of obtaining additional contributions from the donor. This concept continues under
9 UMIFA (200-), because the potential for developing additional contributions by retaining
10 property contributed to the institution is one of the “other circumstances” the institution may
11 consider in deciding whether to retain or dispose of the property. The institution must weigh the
12 potential for obtaining additional contributions with all other factors that affect the suitability of
13 retaining the property in the investment portfolio.

14
15 The language of subsection (d)(5) comes from UPIA § 4, which restates Restatement
16 (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 229 (1992), which itself took language from
17 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 231 (1959). *See* UPIA § 4 cmt.

18
19 **Subsection (d)(6). Special Skills or Expertise.** Subsection (d)(6) states the rule provided
20 in UPIA § 2(f) requiring a trustee to use the trustee’s own skills and expertise in carrying out the
21 trustee’s fiduciary duties. The comment to RMNCA § 8.30 describes the existence of a similar
22 rule under the law of nonprofit corporations. Section 8.30(a)(2) provides that in discharging
23 duties a director must act “with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
24 exercise under similar circumstances. . . .” The comment explains that “[t]he concept of ‘under
25 similar circumstances’ relates not only to the circumstances of the corporation but to the special
26 background, qualifications, and management experience of the individual director and the role
27 the director plays in the corporation.” After describing directors chosen for their ability to raise
28 money, the comment notes that “[n]o special skill or expertise should be expected from such
29 directors unless their background or knowledge evidences some special ability.”

30
31 The intent of subsection (d)(6) is that a person managing or investing institutional funds
32 must use the person’s own judgment and experience, including any particular skills or expertise,
33 in carrying out the management or investment duties. For example, if a charity names a person
34 as a director in part because the person is a lawyer, the lawyer’s background may allow the
35 lawyer to recognize legal issues in connection with funds held by the charity. The lawyer should
36 identify the issues for the board, but the lawyer is not expected to provide legal advice. *See* ALI
37 Principles of Corporate Governance, Council Draft No. 2 (Nov. 18, 2004) § 315 (Duty of Care),
38 cmt. b.

39
40 UMIFA (1972) contained two provisions that authorized investments in pooled or
41 common investment funds. UMIFA (1972) §§ 4(3), 4(4). The Drafting Committee concluded
42 that Section 3(d)(3) of UMIFA (200-) authorizes these investments. The decision not to include
43 the two provisions in UMIFA (200-) implies no disapproval of such investments.

1 **SECTION 4. EXPENDITURE OF ENDOWMENT FUND; RULES OF**
2 **CONSTRUCTION.**

3 (a) Subject to the intent of a donor expressed in a gift instrument and to
4 subsection (d), an institution may expend or accumulate so much of an endowment fund as the
5 institution determines to be prudent for the uses, benefits, purposes, and duration for which the
6 endowment fund is established. In making its determinations on expenditures and accumulations,
7 the institution shall act in good faith, with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like
8 position would exercise under similar circumstances, and shall consider, if relevant, the
9 following factors:

- 10 (1) the duration and preservation of the endowment fund;
11 (2) the purposes of the institution and the endowment fund;
12 (3) general economic conditions;
13 (4) the possible effect of inflation or deflation;
14 (5) the expected total return from income and the appreciation of
15 investments;
16 (6) other resources of the institution; and
17 (7) the investment policy of the institution.

18 (b) To limit the authority to expend or accumulate funds under subsection (a), a
19 gift instrument must specifically state the limitation.

20 (c) Terms in a gift instrument designating a gift as an endowment, or a direction
21 or authorization in the gift instrument to use only “income”, “interest”, “dividends”, or “rents,
22 issues, or profits”, or “to preserve the principal intact”, or similar words:

1 (1), create an endowment fund of ~~long-term-permanent~~ duration ~~but~~
2 unless other language in the gift instrument limits the duration or purpose of the fund: and

3 (2) do not otherwise limit the authority to expend or accumulate under
4 subsection (a).

5 (d) The expenditure in any one year of an amount greater than seven percent of
6 the fair market value of the endowment fund, calculated on the basis of market values
7 determined at least quarterly and averaged over the three-year period immediately preceding the
8 year in which the expenditure was made, creates a rebuttable presumption of imprudence. This
9 subsection does not limit the authority to make expenditures as permitted under law other than
10 this [act] or the gift instrument. This subsection does not create a presumption of prudence for
11 expenditure of an amount less than or equal to seven percent of the fair market value of the
12 endowment fund.

13 Preliminary Comment

14
15 **Purpose and Scope of Revisions.** This section revises the provision in UMIFA (1972)
16 that permitted the expenditure of appreciation of an endowment fund to the extent the fund had
17 appreciated in value above the fund's historic dollar value. UMIFA (1972) defined historic dollar
18 value to mean the value of all contributions to the fund. The new approach abandons the use of
19 historic dollar value. As under UMIFA (1972), the act applies a prudence standard to the process
20 of making decisions about expenditures from an endowment fund. The expenditure rule of
21 Section 4 applies only to the extent that a donor and an institution have not reached some other
22 agreement about spending from an endowment. If a gift instrument sets forth specific
23 requirements for spending, then the charity must comply with those requirements. However, if
24 the gift instrument uses more general language, for example directing the charity to "hold the
25 fund as an endowment" or "retain principal and spend income," then Section 4 provides a rule of
26 construction to guide the charity.

27
28 One of the difficulties addressed by UMIFA (1972) and UMIFA (200-) is that the
29 definition of "income" has changed over time. Prior to the promulgation of UMIFA (1972),
30 "income" for trust accounting purposes meant interest and stock dividends but not capital gains,
31 even realized capital gains. UMIFA (1972) addressed this problem by including a construction
32 provision, construing "income" in gift instruments to include a prudent amount of capital gains,

1 both realized and unrealized. This rule of construction, applied to the term “income” and to
2 other similar expressions in a gift instrument, likely carried out the intent of the donor who used
3 the term, while permitting the charity to invest in a manner that could generate better returns for
4 the fund.

5
6 UMIFA (200-) also applies a rule of construction to terms like “income” or
7 “endowment.” The assumption in the Act is that a donor who uses one of these terms intends to
8 create a fund that will generate sufficient gains to be able to make ongoing distributions from the
9 fund while at the same time preserving the purchasing power of the fund. Because historic dollar
10 value under UMIFA (1972) was a number fixed in time, the use of that approach may not have
11 adequately captured the intent of a donor who wanted the endowment fund to continue to
12 maintain its value in current dollars.

13
14 UMIFA (200-) requires the persons making spending decisions for an endowment fund to
15 focus on the purposes of the endowment fund and not the purposes of the institution more
16 generally, as was the case under UMIFA (1972). When the institution considers the purposes
17 and duration of the fund, the institution will give priority to the donor’s general intent that the
18 fund be maintained indefinitely. Although the Act does not require that a specific amount be set
19 aside as “principal,” the Act assumes that the charity will act to preserve “principal” (i.e., to
20 maintain the purchasing power of the fund) while spending “income” (i.e. making a distribution
21 each year that represents a reasonable spending rate, given investment performance and general
22 economic conditions).

23
24 **Subsection (a). Expenditure of Endowment Funds.** Subsection (a) uses the RMNCA
25 articulation of the standard of care for decision making under Section 4. The change in language
26 does not reflect a substantive change. The comment to Section 3 more fully describes this
27 standard of care.

28
29 Section 4 permits expenditures from an endowment fund to the extent the institution
30 determines that the expenditures are prudent after considering the factors listed in subsection (a).
31 These factors emphasize the importance of keeping in mind the intent of the donor and the
32 purposes of the institution and of the endowment fund, while also considering economic
33 conditions as well as present and reasonably anticipated resources of the institution. As under
34 UMIFA (1972), determinations under Section 4 do not depend on the characterization of assets
35 as income or principal and are not limited to the amount of income and unrealized appreciation.
36 The rule in Section 4 is permissive, however, and an institution may continue to make spending
37 decisions under trust accounting principles if it prefers.

38
39 Institutions have operated effectively under UMIFA (1972) and have operated more
40 conservatively than the historic dollar value rule would have permitted. Institutions have no
41 incentive to spend everything the law may permit them to spend, and good practice has been to
42 provide for modest expenditures while maintaining the purchasing power of a fund. Institutions
43 have followed this approach even though UMIFA (1972) does not require an institution to
44 maintain a fund’s purchasing power and allows an institution to spend any amounts in a fund
45 above historic dollar value, subject to the prudence standard. The Drafting Committee concluded

1 that eliminating historic dollar value and providing institutions with more discretion would not
2 lead to depletion of endowment funds. Instead, UMIFA (200-) should encourage institutions to
3 establish a spending approach that will be responsive to short-term fluctuations in the value of
4 the fund. Section 4 allows an institution to maintain appropriate levels of expenditures in times
5 of economic downturn or economic strength. In some years, accumulation rather than spending
6 will be prudent, and in other years an institution may appropriately make expenditures even if a
7 fund has generated no investment return that year.

8
9 Several levels of safeguards exist to prevent institutions from depleting endowment funds
10 or diverting funds from the purposes for which they were created. In comparison with UMIFA
11 (1972), UMIFA (200-) provides greater direction to the institution with respect to making a
12 prudent determination about spending from an endowment. UMIFA (1972) told the decision
13 maker to consider “long and short term needs of the institution in carrying out its educational,
14 religious, charitable, or other eleemosynary purposes, its present and anticipated financial
15 requirements, expected total return on its investments, price level trends, and general economic
16 conditions.” UMIFA (200-) clarifies that in making spending decisions the institution should
17 focus on the fact that the fund is an endowment and should attempt to ensure that the value of the
18 fund endures while still providing that some amounts be spent for the purposes of the
19 endowment fund. In UMIFA (200-) prudent decision making emphasizes the endowment aspect
20 of the fund, rather than the overall purposes or needs of the institution.

21
22 In addition to the guidance provided by Section 4, other safeguards exist. Donors can
23 restrict gifts and can provide specific instructions to donee institutions as to appropriate uses for
24 assets contributed. Within institutions, fiduciary duties govern the persons making decisions on
25 expenditures. Those persons must operate both with the best interests of the institution in mind
26 and in keeping with the intent of donors. If an institution diverts an institutional fund from the
27 charitable purposes of the institution, the state attorney general can enforce the charitable
28 interests of the public. By relying on these safeguards while providing institutions with adequate
29 discretion to make decisions on appropriate expenditures, the Act creates a standard that takes
30 into consideration the diversity of the charitable sector. The committee expects that industry
31 standards will continue to evolve and inform institutions as the institutions apply this standard.

32
33 Section 4 provides factors to consider in exercising discretion but does not take away
34 discretion by providing a safe harbor for spending within a range based on percentages of the
35 assets of the fund. The Committee concluded that specifying a range for appropriate distributions
36 was unwise because a fixed range could not take into account the factors listed in subsection (a)
37 or changes in market conditions. A fixed range that might be appropriate for some charities
38 under current economic conditions would be unlikely to remain appropriate over time. Most
39 institutions have done a good job of developing spending policies under UMIFA (1972) and
40 should be able to continue to develop spending policies that take into consideration the specific
41 needs of a particular fund. [cite] Prudent decision making after considering all the factors is the
42 standard under UMIFA (200-). A safe-harbor would simply create a new standard that could not
43 take into account the needs of individual institutions and funds.

1 The changes from UMIFA (1972), and in particular the deletion of historic dollar value,
2 are not intended to make any portion of an endowment fund unrestricted assets from a legal
3 standpoint. An endowment fund is restricted because of the donor’s intent that it not be spent in
4 the current year and the intent that the fund continue to maintain its value for a long time.
5 Spending decisions are subject to that general restriction as well as to the restriction that any
6 decision to spend must be prudent, made after considering the factors set forth in Section 4(a).
7 Regardless of the treatment of endowment fund from an accounting standpoint, legally an
8 endowment fund should not be considered unrestricted.

9
10 The term “endowment fund” includes funds that may last in perpetuity but also funds that
11 are created to last for a fixed term of years or until the institution achieves a specified objective.
12 Section 4 requires the institution to consider the intended duration of the fund in making
13 determinations about spending. For example, if a donor directs that a fund be spent over 20
14 years, Section 4 will guide the institution in making distribution decisions. The institution would
15 amortize the fund over 20 years rather than try to maintain the fund in perpetuity. For an
16 endowment fund of limited duration, spending at a rate higher than rates typically used for
17 endowment spending will be both necessary and prudent.

18
19 **Subsection (c). Rule of Construction.** Donor’s intent must be respected in the process
20 of making decisions to expend endowment funds. Section 4 does not allow an institution to
21 convert an endowment fund into a non-endowment fund nor does the section allow the institution
22 to ignore a donor’s intent that a fund be maintained as an endowment. Rather, subsection (c)
23 provides rules of construction to assist institutions in interpreting donor’s intent. Subsection (c)
24 assumes that if a donor wants an institution to spend “only the income” from a fund, the donor
25 intends that the fund both support current expenditures and be preserved indefinitely. The donor
26 is unlikely to be concerned about designation of returns as “income” or “principal” under
27 accounting principles. Rather the donor likely assumes that the institution will use modern
28 investing strategies like total-return investing to generate enough funds to distribute while
29 maintaining the long-term viability of the fund. Subsection (c) is an intent effectuating provision
30 that provides default rules to construe donor’s intent.

31
32 As subsection (b) explains, a donor who wants to specify spending guidelines can do so,
33 but must do so specifically. For example, a donor might require that a charity spend between
34 three and five percent of an endowed gift each year, regardless of investment performance or
35 other factors. If the charity agrees to the restriction in accepting the gift, the restriction will
36 govern spending decisions by the charity. Another donor might want to limit expenditures from
37 an endowment gift to accounting income and not want the institution to be able to expend
38 appreciation. An instruction to “pay only the income” will not be specific enough, but an
39 instruction to “pay only interest and dividend income earned by the fund and not to make other
40 distributions of the kind authorized by Section 4 of UMIFA” should be sufficient. If a donor
41 indicates that the rules on investing or expenditures under Section 4 do not apply to a particular
42 fund, then as a practical matter the institution will probably invest the fund separately. Thus, a
43 decision by a donor to require specific expenditure rules will likely also have consequences in
44 the way the institution invests the fund.

1 A default rule resolves an ambiguity. Statutes use default rules to fill gaps when the
2 actors involved have not clearly stated their intents. In UMIFA (200-), the rule of construction in
3 subsection (c) aids institutions in construing the intent of donors who use words like endowment
4 or income without specific directions as to the intended meaning. Changing a default rule does
5 not change the underlying intent. Instead, a change in the rule of construction changes the way
6 an ambiguity is resolved, in an attempt to increase the likelihood of giving effect to the intent of
7 most donors.

8
9 This issue, the retroactive application of a rule of construction, was considered in
10 connection with UMIFA (1972). [New Hampshire case]. More recently the Colorado Supreme
11 Court considered the retroactive application of another default statute, one that treats the
12 designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy as revoked when the spouses
13 dissolve their marriage. As a rule of construction, subsection (c) applies retroactively. Retroactive
14 application is appropriate because subsection (c) does not alter the substance of an existing
15 contract, but rather serves as a default rule that implements donor's intent. The Colorado
16 Supreme Court recently considered the question of retroactive application of a default statute
17 involving the donative aspect of an insurance contract. See In re Estate of DeWitt, 54 P. 3d 849
18 (Colo. 2002). In holding that retroactive application of the statute did not violate the Contracts
19 Clause, the court cited approvingly from a statement prepared by the Joint Editorial Board for
20 Uniform Trusts and Estates Acts (the "JEB"). JEB Statement Regarding the Constitutionality of
21 Changes in Default Rules as Applied to PreExisting Documents, 17 Am. Coll. Tr. & Est. Couns.
22 Notes 184 app. II (1991). The JEB Statement explains why retroactive application of default
23 statutes is appropriate and is not unconstitutional and states, "The JEB is aware of no authority
24 for the application of the Contracts Clause to state legislation applying altered rules of
25 construction or other default rules to pre-existing documents in any field of law, and especially
26 not in the field of estates, trusts, and donative transfers." *Id.* at 4 (citing J. Nowak & R. Rotunda,
27 Constitutional Law § 11.8, at 394 et seq. (4th ed. 1991)).

28
29 ~~—The Drafting Committee considered concerns that retroactive application of the~~
30 ~~construction provision might alter the intent of a donor who contributed money to an endowment~~
31 ~~fund with the understanding that the institution could never spend the actual amount contributed~~
32 ~~(the historic dollar value). Although the Committee agreed that in some cases a donor might~~
33 ~~have specifically considered the concept of historic dollar value, the Committee concluded that~~
34 ~~the construction provision in UMIFA (200-) would effectively carry out the intent of most~~
35 ~~donors.~~

36
37 The Drafting Committee was also concerned that retaining the historic dollar value
38 concept for endowment funds in existence before the enactment of UMIFA (200-) would require
39 institutions to manage endowment funds separately. For example, an institution with an
40 endowment fund for scholarships would have to create a new fund for post-enactment
41 contributions. Managing two funds would result in economic inefficiencies and greater
42 administration costs for the institution. Further, an institution with a fund created under UMIFA
43 (1972) with a value below historic dollar value might choose to invest in assets that produce trust
44 accounting income rather than appreciation. Choosing investments based on the characterization

1 of the income could reduce the long-term yield of the fund and, by doing so, contravene the
2 intent of the donors who contributed to the fund.

3
4 The Drafting Committee debated at length whether to include a presumption of
5 imprudence for spending above a fixed percentage of the value of the fund. The Drafting
6 Committee decided to include a presumption in the Act, but wanted these Comments to include a
7 discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of including a presumption in the Act.

8
9 Some who commented on the Act viewed the presumption as linked to the retroactive
10 application of the rule of construction of subsection (c). Donors who contributed to endowment
11 funds under UMIFA (1972) may have assumed that the historic dollar value of their gifts would
12 be subject to a no-spending rule under the statute. UMIFA (200-) deletes the concept of historic
13 dollar value, and the presumption of imprudence may serve to assure donors that spending from
14 an endowment fund will be limited.

15
16 ~~Decision to Include a Presumption of Imprudence.~~ Those in favor of the presumption of
17 imprudence argued that the presumption will curb the temptation a charity might have to spend
18 endowment assets too rapidly. Although the presumption would be rebuttable, and spending
19 above the identified percentage might, in some years and for some charities, be prudent,
20 institutions will likely be reluctant to authorize spending above seven percent. In addition, the
21 presumption will give the attorney general guidance in enforcing the prudence standard.

22
23 The Drafting Committee also heard arguments against including a presumption of
24 imprudence in the statute. A fixed percentage in the statute might be perceived as a safe harbor
25 and could lead institutions to spend more than is prudent. Although the provision should not
26 imply that spending below seven percent will be considered prudent, some charities might
27 interpret the statute in that way. Decision makers might be pressured to spend more than is
28 prudent, or might be willing to make spending decisions without adequate analysis.

29
30 Perhaps the biggest problem with including a presumption in the statute is the difficulty
31 of picking a number that will be appropriate given the range of institutions and charitable
32 purposes and the fact that economic conditions will change over time. Under current economic
33 conditions, a spending rate of seven percent is too high for most funds, but in a period of high
34 inflation, seven percent might be too low. In making a prudent decision as to how much to spend
35 from an endowment fund, each institution must consider a variety of factors, including the
36 particular purposes of the fund, the wishes of the donors, changing economic factors, and
37 whether the fund will receive future donations.

38
39 Each enacting state should make its own determination as to whether to include the
40 presumption when the state enacts UMIFA (200-). And whether or not a statute includes the
41 presumption, governing boards must remember that prudence controls decision making. Each
42 governing board must make decisions on expenditures based on the circumstances of the
43 particular charity.

1 **Rebuttable Presumption of Imprudence.** Although prudence will dictate the amount
2 an institution should spend, subsection (d) creates a rebuttable presumption of imprudence if
3 expenditures in one year exceed seven percent of the assets of an endowment fund. The
4 subsection applies a three-year rolling average in determining the value of the fund for purposes
5 of calculating the seven-percent amount. Endowment spending will rarely exceed seven percent,
6 but an institution can rebut the presumption of imprudence if circumstances in a particular year
7 make expenditures above that amount prudent. The concept and the language for the
8 presumption of imprudence comes from Mass. Gen. L. ch. 180A, § 2 (2004). Massachusetts
9 enacted this rule in 1975 as part of its UMIFA statute. New Mexico adopted the same
10 presumption in 1978. N.M.S.A. § 46-9-2 (C) (2004). The language has been modified slightly to
11 clarify that the three-year period consists of the three years immediately preceding the year of the
12 expenditure.
13

14 If sufficient evidence establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary
15 to raise the presumption of imprudence, then the institution will have a burden of production of
16 going forward with evidence to meet or rebut the presumption. The existence of the presumption
17 does not shift the burden of persuasion to the charity. [\[more needed here\]](#)
18

19 The Drafting Committee discussed the fact that expenditures from an endowment fund
20 may include distributions for charitable purposes, amounts used for management of the fund, and
21 the costs of fundraising for the fund. Amounts used to pay fund expenses will be deducted from
22 the fund before the institution computes seven percent of the fund's value. Thus the seven
23 percent will be applied to the net value of the fund and administrative expenses will not be
24 included in computing the expenditures from the fund. However, the costs of administration and
25 fundraising are factors that prudent decision makers consider. Thus, high costs or fees could be
26 considered imprudent, regardless of whether total spending exceeds seven percent of the fund's
27 value.
28

29 The presumption of imprudence does not create an automatic safe harbor. Expenditures at
30 six percent might well be imprudently high. [\[add discussion of James P. Garland, *The Fecundity*](#)
31 [of Endowments and Long-Duration Trusts, *The Journal of Portfolio Management* \(2005\).\]](#)
32 Indeed, evidence discussed by the Drafting Committee suggests that few funds can sustain
33 spending at a rate above five percent. *See* Roger G. Ibbotson & Rex A. Sinquefeld, *Stocks,*
34 *Bonds, Bills, and Inflation: Historical Returns (1926-1987)* (Research Foundation of the Institute
35 of Chartered Financial Analysts, 1989). Further, spending at a lower rate, particularly in the
36 early years of an endowment, may result in greater distributions over time. *See* DeMarche
37 Associates, Inc, *Spending Policies and Investment Planning for Foundations: A Structure for*
38 *Determining a Foundation's Asset Mix* (Council on Foundations: 3d ed. 1999). A presumption
39 of imprudence can serve as a reminder that spending at too high a rate will jeopardize the long-
40 term nature of an endowment fund. If an endowment fund is intended to continue indefinitely,
41 the institution should take special care to limit annual spending to a level that protects the
42 purchasing power of the fund.
43

44 For a discussion of spending approaches, see Joel C. Dobris, *New Forms of Private*
45 *Trusts for the Twenty-First Century—Principal and Income*, 31 *Real. Prop., Prob. & Tr. J.* 1

1 (1996). For example, Dobris suggests that spending 5% or 4% of a five-year moving average of
2 11 market values might be appropriate. *Id.*, at 39. [\[change cite to more recent Dobris article\]](#)
3

4 The presumption of imprudence indicates that the terms of the gift instrument can
5 provide additional spending authority. For example, if a gift instrument directs that an institution
6 expend a fund over a ten-year period, exhausting the fund after ten years, spending at a rate
7 higher than seven percent will be necessary. The section does not require an institution to spend
8 a minimum amount each year because the prudence standard and the needs of the institution will
9 be sufficient guidance as to whether accumulation rather than spending might be appropriate in a
10 particular year.

11
12 Spending above seven percent in any one year will not necessarily be imprudent. For
13 some endowment funds fluctuating spending rates may be appropriate. Although the Act does
14 not apply the percentage for the presumption on a rolling basis (e.g., 21 percent over three years),
15 some endowment funds may prudently spend little or nothing in some years and more than seven
16 percent in other years.

17
18 For example, a charity planning a construction project might decide to spend nothing
19 from an endowment for three years and then in the fourth year might spend 20 percent of the
20 value of the fund for construction costs. The decision to accumulate in years one through three
21 and then to spend 20 percent in year four might be prudent for the charity, depending on the
22 other factors. The charity should maintain adequate records during the accumulation period and
23 should document the decision-making process in year four to be able to meet the burden of
24 production associated with the presumption.

25
26 Another charity might establish a “capital replacement fund” designed to provide funds to
27 the institution for repair or replacement of major items of equipment. Disbursements from this
28 kind of fund will likely fluctuate, with limited expenditures in some years and then big
29 expenditures when the charity needs new equipment. The fund would not operate under a
30 relatively uniform spending rate. Indeed, an advantage of a capital replacement fund will be its
31 ability to absorb a significant capital expenditure in a single year without a negative impact on
32 the operating budget of the institution. Disbursements might average five percent per year but
33 would vary, with spending in some years more and in some years less. Even if this fund is an
34 endowment fund subject to Section 4, spending above seven percent in a particular year could
35 well be prudent. Subsection (d) does not preclude spending above seven percent.

36
37 A charity creating a capital replacement fund or a building fund might chose to adopt
38 spending rules for the fund that would not be subject to UMIFA (200-). Specific donor intent
39 can supersede the rules of UMIFA. If the charity creates a gift instrument that establishes
40 appropriate rules on spending for the fund, and if donors agree to those restrictions, then the
41 UMIFA rules on spending, including the presumption, will not apply.
42

1 **[SECTION 5. DELEGATION OF MANAGEMENT AND INVESTMENT**

2 **FUNCTIONS.**

3 (a) Subject to any specific limitation set forth in a gift instrument or in law other
4 than this [act], an institution may delegate to an external agent the management and investment
5 of an institutional fund to the extent that an institution could prudently delegate under the
6 circumstances. An institution shall act in good faith, with the care that an ordinarily prudent
7 person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, in:

8 (1) selecting an agent;

9 (2) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the
10 purposes of the institution and the institutional fund; and

11 (3) periodically reviewing the agent's actions in order to monitor the
12 agent's performance and compliance with the scope and terms of the delegation.

13 (b) In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the institution to
14 exercise reasonable care to comply with the scope and terms of the delegation.

15 (c) An institution that complies with subsection (a) is not liable for the decisions
16 or actions of an agent to which the function was delegated.

17 (d) By accepting delegation of a management or investment function from an
18 institution that is subject to the laws of this state, an agent submits to the jurisdiction of the
19 courts of this state in all proceedings arising from the delegation.

20 (e) An institution may delegate to committees, officers, or employees of the
21 institution as authorized by law other than this [act].]

22 **Preliminary Comment**

1 The prudent investor standard in Section 4 depends on the power to delegate. For many
2 investment forms, prudence dictates diversification and diversification may best be accomplished
3 through pooling investment vehicles which require delegation. The Drafting Committee decided
4 to put Section 5 in brackets because many states may already provide delegation authority
5 through other statutes. If other delegation authority exists, then an enacting state should enact
6 UMIFA (200-) without Section 5. Enacting delegation rules that duplicate existing rules could
7 be confusing and could potentially create conflicts. For charitable trusts, UPIA provides the
8 same delegation rules as those in Section 5. For nonprofit corporations, nonprofit corporation
9 statutes may provide these rules. A state enacting UMIFA (200-) must be certain that its laws
10 authorize delegation, either through other statutes or by enacting Section 5.
11

12 Section 5 incorporates the delegation rule found in UPIA § 9, updating the delegation
13 rules in UMIFA (1972) § 5. Section 5 permits the decision makers in an institution to delegate
14 management and investment functions to external agents if the decision makers exercise
15 reasonable skill, care, and caution in selecting the agent, defining the scope of the delegation and
16 reviewing the performance of the agent. Decision makers cannot delegate the authority to make
17 decisions concerning expenditures and can only delegate management and investment functions.
18 Subsection (c) protects decision makers who comply with the requirement for proper delegation
19 from liability for actions or decisions of the agents.
20

21 Section 5 does not address issues of internal delegation and potential liability for internal
22 delegation, and subsection (c) does not affect laws that govern personal liability of directors or
23 trustees for matters outside the scope of Section 5. Directors will look to nonprofit corporation
24 laws for these rules, while trustees will look to trust law. *See, e.g.*, RMNCA, § 8.30(b)
25 (permitting directors to rely on information prepared by an officer or employee of the institution
26 if the director reasonably believes the officer or employee to be reliable and competent in the
27 matters presented).
28

29 The language of subsection (c) is similar to that of UPIA § 9(c) and RMNCA § 8.30(d).
30 The decision not to include the terms “beneficiaries” or “members” in subsection (c) does not
31 indicate a decision that this section does not create immunity from claims brought by
32 beneficiaries or members. Instead, a decision maker who complies with section 5 will be
33 protected from any liability resulting from actions or decisions made by an external agent.
34

35 Subsection (d) creates personal jurisdiction over the agent. This subsection is not a choice
36 of law rule.
37

38 Subsection (e) notes that law other than this Act governs internal delegation. Section 5 of
39 UMIFA (1972) included internal delegation as well as external delegation, due to a concern at
40 that time that trust law concepts might govern internal delegation in nonprofit corporations. With
41 the widespread adoption of nonprofit corporation statutes, that concern no longer exists. The
42 decision not to address internal delegation in UMIFA (200-) does not suggest that a governing
43 board of a nonprofit corporation cannot delegate to committees, officers, or employees. Rather,
44 a nonprofit corporation must look to other law, typically a nonprofit corporation statute, for the
45 rules governing internal delegation.

1 **SECTION 6. RELEASE OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON**
2 **MANAGEMENT, INVESTMENT, OR PURPOSE.**

3 (a) In this section, “institutional fund” includes each fund of two or more
4 institutional funds collectively managed.

5 (b) With the donor’s consent in a record, an institution may release, in whole or
6 in part, a restriction contained in a gift instrument on the management, investment, or purpose of
7 an institutional fund. A release may not allow a fund to be used for a purpose other than a
8 charitable purpose of the institution.

9 (c) If, because of circumstances not anticipated by the donor, a modification will
10 further the purposes of the institutional fund, or a restriction becomes impracticable or wasteful
11 and impairs the management or investment of the fund, the court, upon application of an
12 institution, may modify a restriction contained in a gift instrument on the management or
13 investment of an institutional fund. The institution shall notify the [Attorney General], who must
14 be given an opportunity to be heard. To the extent practicable, any modification must be made
15 in accordance with the donor’s probable intention.

16 (d) If a particular charitable purpose or a restriction contained in a gift instrument
17 on the use of an institutional fund becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or
18 wasteful, the court, upon application of an institution, may ~~apply ex pres to~~ modify the purpose
19 of the fund or the restriction on the use of the fund in a manner consistent with the charitable
20 purposes expressed in the gift instrument. The institution shall notify the [Attorney General],
21 who must be given an opportunity to be heard.

1 (e) If an institution determines that a restriction contained in a gift instrument on
2 the management, investment, or purpose of an institutional fund is unlawful, impracticable,
3 impossible to achieve, or wasteful, the institution, [60 days] after notification to the [Attorney
4 General], may release or modify the restriction, in whole or part, if:

5 (1) the institutional fund subject to the restriction has a total value of less
6 than [\$25,000];

7 (2) more than [20] years have elapsed since the fund was established; and

8 (3) the institution uses the property in a manner the institution determines,
9 in good faith, to be consistent with the charitable purposes expressed in the gift instrument.

10 **Preliminary Comment**

11
12
13 Section 6 expands the rules on releasing or modifying restrictions that are found in
14 Section 7 of UMIFA (1972). Subsection (b) restates the rule from UMIFA (1972) allowing the
15 release of a restriction with donor consent. Subsections (c) and (d) make clear that an institution
16 can always ask a court to apply equitable deviation or cy pres to modify or release a restriction,
17 under certain circumstances. Subsection (e), a new provision, permits an institution to apply cy
18 pres on its own for small funds that have existed for a substantial period of time, after giving
19 notice to the state attorney general.

20
21 **Subsection (a). Individual Funds.** The rules on modification require that the
22 institution, or a court applying a court-ordered doctrine, review each institutional fund
23 separately. Although the term institutional fund can mean more than one fund for other purposes
24 of the Act, for purposes of this Section, each fund must be considered individually.

25
26 **Subsection (b). Donor Release.** Subsection (b) permits the release of a restriction if the
27 donor consents. A release with donor consent cannot change the charitable beneficiary of the
28 fund. Although the donor has the power to consent to a release of a restriction, this section does
29 not create a power in the donor that will cause a federal tax problem for the donor. The gift to the
30 institution is a completed gift for tax purposes, the property cannot be diverted from the
31 charitable beneficiary, and the donor cannot redirect the property to another use by the charity.
32 The donor has no retained interest in the fund.

33
34 **Subsection (c). Equitable Deviation.** Subsection (c) applies the rule of equitable
35 deviation, modifying the language from UTC § 412 for application in this section. *See also*
36 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 66 (2003). Under deviation, a court modifies restrictions on the

1 way an institution manages or administers a fund, doing so in a manner that furthers the purposes
2 of the fund. Deviation implements the donor’s intent. A donor may have a predominate purpose
3 for a gift and, secondarily, an intent that the purpose be carried out in a particular manner.
4 Deviation does not alter the purpose but rather modifies the means of carrying out the purpose.
5

6 Sometimes deviation is needed due to circumstances unanticipated when the donor
7 created a restriction on a gift. In other situations a restriction may impair the management or
8 investment of the fund. Modification of the restriction may permit the institution to carry out the
9 donor’s purposes in a more effective manner. A court applying deviation should attempt to
10 follow the donor’s probable intention in deciding how to modify the restriction. Consistent with
11 the doctrine of equitable deviation, subsection (c) does not require an institution to notify donors
12 of the proposed modification. Good practice dictates notifying any donors who are alive and can
13 be located with a reasonable expenditure of time and money.
14

15 **Subsection (d). Cy Pres.** A court can modify the purpose of an institutional fund using
16 the doctrine of cy pres. Under subsection (d) the focus is on the purpose of the fund rather than
17 on the means of carrying out the purpose. The term “modify” encompasses the release of a
18 restriction as well as an alteration of a restriction and also permits a court to order that the fund
19 be paid to another institution. A court can apply the doctrine of cy pres only if the restriction in
20 question has become unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful. This standard,
21 which comes from UTC § 413, updates the circumstances under which cy pres may be applied
22 by adding “wasteful” to the usual common law articulation of the doctrine. Any change must be
23 made in a manner consistent with the charitable purposes expressed in the gift instrument. *See*
24 *also* Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 (2003).
25

26 Subsection (d) is intended make the case law under cy pres applicable to institutions
27 covered by UMIFA (200-) and does not limit the doctrine of cy pres. In addition to requesting
28 that a court apply cy pres to modify a restriction, an institution may seek court assistance
29 otherwise, for example by requesting the dissolution of the institution. Consistent with the
30 doctrine of cy pres, subsection (d) does not require an institution seeking cy pres to notify
31 donors. Good practice will be to notify donors when possible.
32

33 **Subsection (e). Modification of Small, Old Funds.** Subsection (e) permits an
34 institution to release or modify a restriction using a cy pres approach but without court approval
35 if the amount of the institutional fund involved is small and if the institutional fund has been in
36 existence for more than 20 years. The Drafting Committee determined that under some
37 circumstances a restriction may no longer make sense but the cost of a judicial cy pres
38 proceeding will be too great to warrant a change in the restriction. The Committee discussed at
39 length the parameters for allowing an institution to apply cy pres itself, without court
40 supervision. The Committee drafted subsection (e) to balance the needs of an institution to
41 operate efficiently for its charitable purposes and the need to protect donors’ wishes. The
42 subsection assumes that an institutional fund with a value of \$25,000 or less is sufficiently small
43 that the cost of a judicial proceeding will be out of proportion with the need to change the
44 restriction. The Committee included a requirement that the institutional fund be in existence at
45 least 20 years because it seemed reasonable to require additional safeguards for donors’ intent for

1 some period of time after the creation of the institutional fund. The 20-year period begins to run
2 from the date of inception of the fund and not from the date of each gift to the fund. The amount
3 and the number of years have been placed in brackets to signal to enacting jurisdictions that they
4 may wish to designate a higher or lower figure.

5
6 As under judicial cy pres, an institution acting under subsection (e) must change the
7 restriction in a manner that is in keeping with the intent of the donor and the purpose of the fund.
8 For example, if the value of a fund is too small to justify the cost of administration of the fund as
9 a separate fund, the term “wasteful” would allow the institution to combine the fund with another
10 fund with similar purposes. If a fund had been created for nursing scholarships and the institution
11 closed its nursing school, the institution might appropriately decide to use the fund for other
12 scholarships at the institution. In using the authority granted under subsection (e), the institution
13 must make a good faith determination of which alternative use for the fund reasonably
14 approximates the original intent of the donor. The institution cannot divert the fund to an entirely
15 different use. For example, the fund for nursing scholarships could not be used to build a football
16 stadium.

17
18 **Notice to Donors.** The Drafting Committee decided not to require an institution acting
19 under subsection (e) to give notice to the donors who had contributed to the fund. Subsection (e)
20 can only be used for an old and small fund. For such a fund, locating a donor who contributed to
21 the fund more than 20 years earlier may be difficult and expensive. Locating multiple donors,
22 each of whom gave a small amount to create a fund 20 years earlier, may be even more
23 expensive. For any old fund, multiple donors may be prohibitively expensive, and notice by
24 publication is not likely to be effective in providing actual notice to the donors. Good practice
25 dictates notifying known donors of any change considered by the institution. The Drafting
26 Committee concluded that an institution’s concern for donor relations would serve as a sufficient
27 incentive for following that practice when donors can be located. In other circumstances, the
28 attorney general can protect the interests of the donors and the public.

29
30 **SECTION 7. REVIEWING COMPLIANCE.** Compliance with this [act] is
31 determined in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time a decision is made or
32 action is taken, and not by hindsight.

33 **SECTION 8. APPLICATION TO EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS.** This
34 [act] applies to institutional funds existing on or established after the effective date of this [act].
35 As applied to institutional funds existing on its effective date, this [act] governs only decisions
36 made or actions taken after that date.

1 **SECTION 9. RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND**
2 **NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT.** This [act] modifies, limits, and supersedes the federal
3 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq.) but
4 does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101 of that act (15 U.S.C. Section 7001(a)) or
5 authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103 of that act (15 U.S.C.
6 Section 7003(b)).

7 **SECTION 10. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION.** In
8 applying and construing this Uniform Act, consideration must be given to the need to promote
9 uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

10 **SECTION 11. EFFECTIVE DATE.** This [act] takes effect

11 **SECTION 12. REPEAL.** The following acts and parts of acts are repealed:

12 (a) [The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act]