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- ULC’s efforts reduce the need for individuals and businesses to deal with different laws as they move and do business in different states.
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- Uniform Law Commissioners donate thousands of hours of their time and legal and drafting expertise every year as a public service, and receive no salary or compensation for their work.
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- ULC is a state-supported organization that represents true value for the states, providing services that most states could not otherwise afford or duplicate.
UNIFORM FAMILY LAW ARBITRATION ACT

The Committee appointed by and representing the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in preparing this Act consists of the following individuals:

BARBARA ANN ATWOOD, University of Arizona – James E. Rogers College of Law, 1201 E. Speedway, P.O. Box 210176, Tucson, AZ 85721-0176, Chair

LORIE FOWLKE, 2696 N. University Ave., #220, Provo, UT 84604

MICHAEL B. GETTY, 430 Cove Towers Dr., #503, Naples, FL 34110

GAIL HAGERTY, Burleigh County Court House, P.O. Box 1013, 514 E. Thayer Ave., Bismarck, ND 58502-1013

ELIZABETH KENT, Commission to Promote Uniform Legislation, c/o Legislative Division, Department of the Attorney General, 425 Queen St., Honolulu, HI 96813

DEBRA LEHRMANN, Supreme Court of Texas, Supreme Court Bldg., 201 W. 14th St., Room 104, Austin, TX 78701

MARY QUAI, House Legislative Services, Louisiana House of Representatives, P.O. Box 44486, Baton Rouge LA 70804

HARRY TINDALL, 1300 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 1550, Houston, TX 77056-3081

CAM WARD, 124 Newgate Rd., Alabaster, AL 35007

DAVID ZVENYACH, 707 10th St. NE, Washington, DC 20002

LINDA D. ELROD, Washburn University School of Law, 1700 SW College Ave., Topeka, KS 66621, Reporter

EX OFFICIO

RICHARD T. CASSIDY, 100 Main St., P.O. Box 1124, Burlington, VT 05402, President

WILLIAM W. BARRETT, 600 N. Emerson Ave., P.O. Box 405, Greenwood, IN 46142, Division Chair

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ADVISORS

PHYLLIS G. BOSSIN, 105 E. 4th St., Suite 1300, Cincinnati, OH 45202-4054, ABA Advisor

HELEN E. CASALE, 401 Dekalb St., 4th Floor, Norristown, PA 19401-4907, ABA Section Advisor

DOLLY HERNANDEZ, 2665 S. Bayshore Dr., Suite 1204, Miami, FL 33133, ABA Section Advisor

LARRY R. RUTE, 212 SW 8th Ave., Suite 102, Topeka, KS 66603, ABA Section Advisor

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

LIZA KARSAI, 111 N. Wabash Ave., Suite 1010, Chicago, IL 60602, Executive Director
Copies of this act may be obtained from:

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
111 N. Wabash Ave., Suite 1010
Chicago, Illinois  60602
312/450-6600
www.uniformlaws.org
## Prefatory Note

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UNIFORM FAMILY LAW ARBITRATION ACT

Prefatory Note

Family law arbitration offers parties an alternative to negotiation, litigation, collaborative law, mediation or court-sponsored methods of dispute resolution. In arbitration, the parties, usually spouses, agree to submit one or more issues arising from the dissolution of their relationship to an arbitrator, who is a neutral third party, for resolution. The arbitrator makes a decision, called an award, based on the facts presented. Unlike litigation, parties choose the arbitrator or the method of selecting the arbitrator and pay the arbitrator’s fee. Arbitration awards typically are subject to limited judicial review. In exchange, arbitration offers an alternative for those who want an experienced decision-maker in a proceeding that is potentially faster, more confidential, and less adversarial.

The Uniform Law Commission has promulgated two arbitration acts – the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1955 and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act in 2000. Every state has one of these arbitration statutes which are used extensively in labor and commercial law. Arbitration has been advocated for family law disputes as early as the 1960s. See Coulson, Family Arbitration – An Exercise in Sensitivity, 3 Fam. L.Q. 22 (1969). Most states have little law on the topic of family law arbitration and rely on their commercial arbitration statutes.

Arbitration clauses began to appear in premarital and mediated settlement agreements partly because increasing numbers of contested family law cases have flooded court dockets, resulting in delays in getting hearings and trials. In 1990, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML) adopted Rules for Arbitration of Financial Issues. In 1999 North Carolina enacted the first comprehensive family law arbitration act patterned on the Uniform Arbitration Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-41 to 62. In 2005, the AAML adopted a Model Family Law Arbitration Act, patterned after North Carolina and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (2000). Although no state has adopted the AAML Model Act, the AAML conducts trainings to certify family law arbitrators. The American Arbitration Association has developed a family dispute service and offers arbitration, as well as mediation services.

Courts have held that parties may arbitrate property and spousal support issues because parties may release property rights by contract. Because the agreement to arbitrate is a contract, the parties are bound. Spencer v. Spencer, 494 A.2d 1279 (D. C. App. 1985). Arbitration awards are subject to limited review and appeal rights. Child-related issues, however, present different issues because of the court’s traditional role as parens patriae acting to protect the child. Additionally, child-related issues are never “final” because they are modifiable throughout a child’s minority.

Several states have enacted court rules or statutes authorizing arbitration of all issues arising at divorce, including property, spousal maintenance, child custody and child support. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. FAM. L. PRO. R. 67(c); MICH. COMP. L. §600.5071 (parties may stipulate to binding arbitration governing property, child custody, child support, parenting time, spousal support, attorneys’ fees, enforceability of prenuptial and postnuptial agreements, allocation of debt, and “other contested domestic relations matters.”); N.J. SUP. CT. R. 5:1-5 (2015).
The Uniform Law Commission Executive Committee appointed the Family Law Arbitration Study Committee in April 2012. After considering the feasibility and desirability of a uniform or model act on family law arbitration for several months, the Study Committee unanimously recommended that a drafting committee be appointed to develop an act on family law arbitration. The Study Committee further suggested that the act need only contain the features of arbitration law that are essential for family law arbitration and are typically not addressed by commercial arbitration statutes. The Study Committee envisioned an act that would incorporate by reference the existing structure of a state’s commercial arbitration statutes – whether it is the original Uniform Arbitration Act of 1955 (UAA) or the 2000 Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA). In 2013 the Uniform Law Commission approved a drafting committee to write a Family Law Arbitration Act.

The Committee originally tried to draft a free-standing act addressing family law arbitration in full, rather than a partial act with references that incorporate other arbitration law in the state. As the drafting process developed, it appeared a free-standing act would repeat much of the existing arbitration law. Therefore, the final Act incorporates by reference a state’s existing arbitration law—whether it be the RUAA or the UAA—for many steps in the arbitration process. The UFLAA expressly tracks certain RUAA provisions that are necessary for family law arbitration and do not appear in the UAA, such as sections giving arbitrators the power to conduct arbitration in a manner appropriate to the fair and expeditious disposition of the proceeding, recognizing the parties’ rights to engage in discovery, and providing arbitrator immunity.

The UFLAA potentially covers the arbitration of any contested issue arising under the enacting state’s family law. See Section 3. Typical issues would be property division, allocation of debt, spousal support, parenting time, child support, interpretation of marital agreements, and attorneys’ fees. Importantly, the Act excludes certain status determinations, such as the termination of parental rights or the granting of an adoption, from the arbitrator’s authority. The UFLAA does not cover agreements to arbitrate according to the tenets of a particular religion or before a religious tribunal.

A central question was whether disputes about child custody or child support should be subject to arbitration. While states disagree, most states now permit arbitration of child custody and child support as long as meaningful judicial review of the awards is preserved. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.5; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1.1; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7.2; TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.0071; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 802.12. In at least one state, courts have held that parents have a constitutional right to resolve their custody disputes by arbitration. See Fawzy v. Fawzy, 973 A.2d 347 (N.J. 2009). A minority of states exclude some or all child-related issues from contractual arbitration, either by statute or by case law. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-66 (binding arbitration is not permitted to resolve child visitation, custody, or support); Goldberg v. Goldberg, 1 N.Y.S.3d 360 (App. Div. 2015) (finding child custody is not subject to arbitration because of court’s exclusive parens patriae authority but allowing arbitration of child support as long as the award complies with the Child Support Act). In order to provide needed guidelines for the majority of states, including a requirement for vigorous judicial review, the Act presumptively extends to child-related disputes. In deference to the minority of states opposed to arbitration of child-related issues, however, the Act includes an opt-out provision.
under Section 3.

The UFLAA provides several safeguards to protect the *parens patriae* power of the court to protect children. Section 14 requires that arbitration proceedings involving child-related disputes must be recorded, and under Section 15 any award affecting children must spell out the underlying reasons. Sections 16 and 19 provide for robust judicial scrutiny of child-related awards. A court cannot confirm an award determining child custody or child support unless it finds that the award complies with applicable law and is in the child’s best interests. Another safeguard for a child is Section 12 which provides that if an arbitrator finds that a child is the subject of abuse or neglect, the arbitration must stop and the arbitrator must report his or her findings to the appropriate state authority. In addition, if domestic violence is evident between the parties, a court—not the arbitrator—decides whether arbitration may proceed.

One policy issue concerned whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) might preempt a state family law arbitration statute if the state law imposed special requirements inconsistent with the FAA. As a general rule, family law is state law. State courts have jurisdiction over family law disputes and presumably can set out the parameters for family law arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) establishes a strong nationwide policy favoring the enforceability of arbitration agreements in contracts affecting interstate commerce. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Section 2 of the FAA expressly covers agreements to arbitrate existing controversies as well as future disputes that may arise between the parties. 9 U.S.C. § 2. The Supreme Court has construed the FAA to preempt state laws that categorically prohibit the arbitration of a particular type of claim or impose special requirements on arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, ___U.S.____,132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam) (invalidating a state policy that categorically barred enforcement of arbitration clauses in nursing home admission agreements); Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Lombardi, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (invalidating a state law that required arbitration clauses to be in underlined capital letters on first page of contract).

A problem of preemption can arise if the family law matter has interstate aspects. Because conflicts over marital property or spousal maintenance often have interstate elements, agreements to arbitrate such conflicts could potentially fall within the FAA, and courts have recognized as much. See In re Provine, 312 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App. 2009) (noting FAA not applicable because all marital property was in Texas); Verlander Family Ltd. Partnership v. Verlander, 2003 WL 304098 (Tex. App. Feb. 13, 2003) (unpublished) (FAA applicable because parties held assets in family partnership located in both Texas and New Mexico). As a result, the Act tracks the language of the FAA regarding the general validity of arbitration agreements. Ordinary contract defenses (lack of voluntariness, fraud, duress, and the like) remain available as a basis to challenge the validity of an arbitration agreement at the time of enforcement.

A point of contention during the drafting was whether to permit pre-dispute arbitration agreements—that is, agreements to arbitrate a dispute that may arise in the future. The use of pre-dispute agreements in consumer contracts of adhesion has been the subject of widespread criticism. In family law arbitration, however, actual consent to the process is a prerequisite, whether in an earlier agreement or an agreement entered into at the time of marital dissolution. The inclusion of arbitration clauses in premarital agreements is fairly common, and courts have enforced such clauses so long as the premarital agreement itself is valid and the clause is not
otherwise subject to challenge. See, e.g., LaFrance v. Lodmell, ___ A.3d ___, 2016 WL 4505748 (Conn. Sept. 6, 2016) (upholding agreement to arbitrate in premarital agreement); Kelm v. Kelm, 623 N.E.2d 39 (Ohio 1993) (upholding enforceability of arbitration clause in premarital agreement to arbitrate child support and spousal support); LINDA J. RAVDIN, PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS – DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATION 286-89 (ABA 2011) (providing practice guidelines on including arbitration clauses in premarital agreements). In addition, there is no built-in bias favoring one party over the other in family law arbitration. Instead, arbitrators are selected by the parties or the court, often bringing specialized expertise to the parties’ particular dispute. The parties might choose a family law specialist who has represented both fathers and mothers, a retired domestic relations judge, or another professional to arbitrate all, or just a part, of a case.

With respect to child-related disputes, however, the state’s strong interest in protecting children warrants greater restrictions. The Act bars a pre-dispute arbitration agreement of child-related issues unless the parties reaffirm the agreement after the dispute arises or the agreement was incorporated in a court decree in a family law proceeding—such as a marital settlement agreement. See UFLAA Section 5.

Family law arbitration is on the rise across the United States, but state law in general has not kept up with the trend. The Uniform Family Law Arbitration Act provides needed guidelines for this growing form of dispute resolution to ensure that the process is fair and efficient for the participants and protects the interests of vulnerable family members.
UNIFORM FAMILY LAW ARBITRATION ACT

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This [act] may be cited as the Uniform Family Law Arbitration Act.

SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS. In this [act]:

(1) “Arbitration agreement” means an agreement that subjects a family law dispute to arbitration.

(2) “Arbitration organization” means an association, agency, board, commission, or other entity that is neutral and initiates, sponsors, or administers an arbitration or is involved in the selection of an arbitrator.

(3) “Arbitrator” means an individual selected, alone or with others, to make an award in a family law dispute that is subject to an arbitration agreement.

(4) “Child-related dispute” means a family law dispute regarding [legal custody, physical custody, custodial responsibility, parental responsibility or authority, parenting time, right to access, visitation], or financial support regarding a child.

(5) “Court” means [the family court] [insert name of a tribunal authorized by this state to hear a family law dispute].

(6) “Family law dispute” means a contested issue arising under the [family] [domestic relations] law of this state.

(7) “Party” means an individual who signs an arbitration agreement and whose rights will be determined by an award.

(8) “Person” means an individual, estate, business or nonprofit entity, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal entity.

(9) “Record”, used as a noun, means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium
or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

(10) “Sign” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:

(A) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or

(B) to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process.

(11) “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. [The term includes a federally recognized Indian tribe.]

Legislative Note: In paragraph (4), a state should insert the term used under state law to refer to a dispute over custodial responsibility and parenting time for a child. In paragraph (6), a state should insert the term used under state law to refer to the family or domestic relations law of the state.

Comment

The definition of “arbitrator” includes one or more individuals. Family law arbitration ordinarily involves only a single neutral arbitrator, selected by the parties or by the court. It is possible, however, that parties might want a panel of three arbitrators to resolve a particularly complex or contentious issue. In that event, the normal practice would be to have each party independently select an arbitrator and for the two independent arbitrators to jointly select a third arbitrator.

“Arbitration organization” tracks the definition in the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 1(1). Under UFLAA Section 5, an arbitration agreement must identify the arbitrator, a method of selecting the arbitrator, or an arbitration organization from which the arbitrator will be drawn. Several professional organizations maintain lists of arbitrators that meet their own screening standards. In addition, entities associated with family courts may offer arbitration services.

Two key terms in the act are “family law dispute” and “child-related dispute.” A family law dispute incorporates the domestic relations law of the particular state. In most states, the subject matters within family or domestic relations law include issues relating to defining, classifying, valuing, and dividing real and personal property; determining and allocating debt; awarding alimony, maintenance, or spousal support; determining custodial responsibility, parenting time, and child support; construing and enforcing agreements—premarital, postmarital or marital incident to a divorce; and awards of attorney fees. In some states marital tort issues may be included. In other words, each state’s family or domestic law will dictate the potential scope of a family law arbitration in that state unless a state excludes a particular category of dispute under Section 3. State law will provide the meaning of “child,” “parent,” and “spouse,”
for example, and will determine whether claims arising out alternative relationships such as civil
unions are covered. Similarly, if state law authorizes nonparents under defined circumstances to
seek access to a child, that category of claim would fall within this act and be subject to
arbitration if all relevant parties agreed to arbitrate.

A child-related dispute, in turn, is a subset of a family law dispute and includes all
aspects of custodial responsibility, parenting time, and child support. If state policy requires, a
state may exclude child-related disputes from arbitration under Section 3.

The terms “person” “record,” “sign,” and “state” comport with the current definitions
used in other uniform laws.

SECTION 3. SCOPE.

(a) This [act] governs arbitration of a family law dispute.

(b) This [act] does not authorize an arbitrator to make an award that:

(1) grants a [legal separation], [divorce] [dissolution of marriage], or annulment;

(2) terminates parental rights;

(3) grants an adoption or a guardianship of a child or incapacitated individual; [or]

(4) determines the status of [dependency] [a child in need of protection] [:][or]

[(5) determines a child-related dispute] [:] or

(6) determines [other specified dispute to be excluded from arbitration]].

Legislative Note: In the bracketed language in subsection (b)(1) and (4), a state should insert
the appropriate term used under state law.

If a state wants to exclude child-related disputes from arbitration under this act, it should
enact subsection (b)(5). If a state excludes child-related disputes from arbitration, the state
should delete the following provisions from the act: Sections (5)(c); 12(c); 13(c)(5) and (12);
14(b); 15(c); 16(c); and 19(b), (c), and (d); and the introductory phrase in Section 15(b).

If a state wants to exclude other family law disputes from arbitration, it should enact
subsection (b)(6) and identify the category of dispute to be excluded.

Comment

In most states, a family law dispute would include the interpretation and enforcement of
premarital and other agreements between the parties; the characterization, valuation and division
of property and allocation of debt; awards of alimony; custodial responsibility and parenting
time; child support; and award of attorney’s fees. If a state enacts the UFLAA, the parties can choose to have an arbitrator decide any family law dispute that could be decided by a judge, except the status determinations listed in this section. The arbitrator cannot divorce the parties, grant an adoption or guardianship, terminate parental rights, adjudicate a child in need of care, or the like. Parties may not delegate these powers to the arbitrator.

The trend appears to be in the direction of permitting arbitration of child-related disputes so long as courts retain their essential role in overseeing awards affecting children. See Vanderborgh v. Krauth, 370 P.3d 661 (Colo. App. 2016); Brazzel v. Brazzel, 789 S.E.2d 626 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016); In re Marriage of Golden and Friedman, 874 N.E.2d 927 (Ill. 2012); Harvey v. Harvey, 680 N.W.2d 835 (Mich. 2004); Vanderheiden v. Marandola, 994 A.2d 74 (R.I. 2010). In fact, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that parents have a constitutional right to resolve their custody disputes by arbitration. See Fawzy v. Fawzy, 973 A.2d 347 (N.J. 2009).

Nevertheless, a minority of states exclude child-related disputes from arbitration altogether. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Goldberg, 1 N.Y.S.3d 360 (App. Div. 2015) (because of court’s exclusive parens patriae authority, arbitrator may not decide child custody dispute but could decide child support); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-66(c) (arbitration shall not include issues related to child custody, visitation, or support). Subsections (b)(5) and (6) are bracketed provisions permitting states to carve out child-related disputes and additional categories of disputes from arbitration. The Legislative Note explains that the carve-out option allows a state to exclude child custody or child support from arbitration and identifies later subsections of the Act that should be deleted if child-related disputes are excluded. The last bracketed subsection would allow states to choose to exclude child custody but not child support or to identify another area, such as parentage, that the legislature does not want parties to arbitrate.

SECTION 4. APPLICABLE LAW.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this [act], the law applicable to arbitration is [cite this state’s statutes and procedural rules governing contractual arbitration].

(b) In determining the merits of a family law dispute, an arbitrator shall apply the law of this state, including its choice of law rules.

Comment

Subsection (a) incorporates by reference a state’s existing law and procedure applicable to arbitration. To date, about one-third of the states have enacted the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. In the majority of states, the Uniform Arbitration Act is still in effect. The RUAA contains more detailed procedures than the UAA. A state using the UAA may want to incorporate some provisions of the RUAA.

Subsection (b) provides that the merits of the case will be determined by the law of the forum state, including its choice of law principles. In general, family courts apply forum law to
the disputes that fall within their jurisdiction. In most cases, parties can consent to personal jurisdiction but not subject-matter jurisdiction. Under this subsection, the parties may choose to use the law of another state to apply to their dispute if permissible under forum law. For example, parties might enter into a post-nuptial agreement and select the law of a particular state to govern the agreement’s interpretation. If they included an arbitration clause in the agreement, the arbitrator would apply the law chosen by the parties if a court of the forum state would do so. If, however, child custody is at issue, jurisdiction is determined under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, and the law of the state with jurisdiction applies.

Because of the privacy and flexibility of arbitration, couples can use some creative alternatives in their choice of law. The subject of pet custody, for instance, is of interest to a growing number of family law clients. Through private arbitration agreements, parties could define the decision-making criteria governing custody of family pets, so long as the agreement does not violate the forum's choice-of-law rules.

Except for child-related awards, an isolated error of law is not a basis for vacating an award under this act. Nevertheless, an arbitrator’s complete disregard of forum law might be subject to challenge as action beyond the arbitrator’s authority. See Section 19(a)(4); Washington v. Washington, 770 N.W.2d 908 (Mich. App. 2009) (awards are not subject to vacatur for mere mistake of law, but clear disregard of controlling law could be ground for vacating). Also, states may enact additional grounds for vacating awards through the bracketed provision in Section 19(a)(7).

Because of the state’s parens patriae responsibility to protect children, judicial review of child-related awards is rigorous. Accordingly, with respect to child-related disputes, the arbitrator’s failure to follow applicable law is a basis for vacating the award. See Section 19(b). Additionally, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and the Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Family Support Act will determine jurisdiction for child-related disputes.

Any federal law applicable to the family law dispute will govern of its own force. With regard to child-related disputes, for example, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738A, may be relevant to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction.

**SECTION 5. ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.**

(a) An arbitration agreement must:

(1) be in a record signed by the parties;

(2) identify the arbitrator, an arbitration organization, or a method of selecting an arbitrator; and

(3) identify the family law dispute the parties intend to arbitrate.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), an agreement in a record to arbitrate a
family law dispute that arises between the parties before, at the time, or after the agreement is made is valid and enforceable as any other contract and irrevocable except on a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.

(c) An agreement to arbitrate a child-related dispute that arises between the parties after the agreement is made is unenforceable unless:

(1) the parties affirm the agreement in a record after the dispute arises, or

(2) the agreement was entered during a family law proceeding and the court approved or incorporated the agreement in an order issued in the proceeding.

(d) If a party objects to arbitration on the ground the arbitration agreement is unenforceable or the agreement does not include a family law dispute, the court shall decide whether the agreement is enforceable or includes the family law dispute.

Comment

Arbitration is a matter of contract. Arbitrators derive their authority to resolve the dispute from the parties’ agreement. Therefore, the agreement to arbitrate is the foundational document that governs the arbitration. The court cannot unilaterally order the parties to arbitration without an agreement. See Budrawich v. Budrawich, 115 A.3d 39 (Conn. App. 2015) (absent specific agreement between parties, trial court lacked authority to require parties to arbitrate child support question). The parties, however, can voluntarily choose to arbitrate one or more issues.

To ensure that parties voluntarily enter an arbitration agreement, the agreement must be in a record which identifies the arbitrator or method of selecting the arbitrator and the family law dispute the parties want to arbitrate. Among the factors that a court might consider in determining if the agreement was voluntary would be whether parties knew what they were waiving and understood the essential features of arbitration. Arbitration as a means of resolving family law disputes must be a voluntary and informed choice of the parties, not an alternative that is the product of coercion or a contract of adhesion. See Mich. Comp. L. § 600.5072 (requiring that parties acknowledge in a record that they have been informed of the essential features of arbitration, including that arbitration is voluntary, binding, and right of appeal is limited; arbitration is not recommended for cases involving domestic violence; the arbitrator will decide each issue assigned to arbitration and the court will enforce the decision; the parties may consult with an attorney before and during the arbitration process; and the parties are obligated to pay for arbitration).

The UFLAA recognizes that the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in premarital
agreements is fairly common and courts generally accept them. See, e.g., LaFrance v. Lodmell, ___A.3d___, 2016 WL 4505748 (Ct. 2016); Kelm v. Kelm, 623 N.E.2d 39 (Ohio 1993). In addition, the core mandate of the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 2) (FAA) applies to any agreement to arbitrate an existing or subsequent dispute arising out of a contract affecting interstate commerce. A case in which divorcing spouses have agreed to arbitrate competing claims to property located in more than one state or interests in a multi-state business would likely be construed as involving interstate commerce. Indeed, marital or community property often includes real property, accounts in financial institutions, interests in business entities, and retirement benefits, whether federal, state or private. Thus, the FAA may apply to those family law arbitration agreements involving interstate property, broadly defined.

This section provides that the arbitration agreement is enforceable as any other contract and irrevocable except on grounds for revocation of a contract at law or equity. The language is drawn from the FAA and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA). There is a rich body of case law on the issue of enforceability of arbitration agreements. As with ordinary contract law, the agreement may be challenged at the time of enforcement on the basis of duress, fraud in the inducement, unconscionability, or other traditional grounds. See Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (2008). In a few states, courts have enforced agreements to arbitrate family disputes according to the tenets of a particular religion or before religious tribunals. See, e.g., Berg v. Berg, 927 N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 2011). Because this act has no application to religious arbitration, the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate under religious doctrine is governed by other law of the state.

With respect to child-related awards, the general enforceability of agreements to arbitrate disputes that might arise in the future does not apply. Subsection (c) bars pre-dispute arbitration agreements for child-related awards unless the parties reaffirm the agreement after the dispute arises or the agreement was incorporated in a court decree—such as a marital settlement agreement.

Subsection (d) makes clear that, if challenged, the validity of an agreement to arbitrate is for the court to decide, not an arbitrator. Similarly, if in question, the court decides whether a particular family law dispute is subject to arbitration. See Lippman v. Lippman, 20 So. 3d 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (a shareholder agreement requiring arbitration of all claims arising from the agreement that was incorporated into a final judgment of divorce did not create an omnibus agreement to arbitrate all post-dissolution marital disputes).

The allocation of authority is non-waivable. In this respect, the UFLAA differs from the RUAA. While the RUAA likewise gives the court the power to decide both questions, that default is waivable by the parties. See RUAA §§ 4 and 6(b). Because of the state’s interest in ensuring the fair resolution of family law disputes, the UFLAA requires that the court determine the basic question whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and whether a dispute is subject to the agreement.

**SECTION 6. NOTICE OF ARBITRATION.** A party may initiate arbitration by giving notice to arbitrate to the other party in the manner specified in the arbitration agreement
or, in the absence of a specified manner, under the law and procedural rules of this state other than this [act] governing contractual arbitration.

Comment

Consistent with many other provisions of the UFLAA, this section permits parties to choose their own method of initiating an arbitration or to fall back on the arbitration law of the forum state. The parties may want to provide for notice as for a civil suit under state law or chose a more informal process by letter, email, or phone call. The Uniform Arbitration Act (1955) has no general notice provision. It does provide that notification of a hearing be sent by registered mail not less than five days before the hearing. UAA § 5. The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (2000) § 2 provides that except as otherwise provided, a person gives notice to another person by taking action that is reasonably necessary to inform the other person in the ordinary course, whether or not the other person acquires knowledge of the notice. A person has notice if the person has knowledge of the notice or has received notice. A person receives notice when it comes to the person’s attention or the notice is delivered at the person’s place of residence or place of business or other place the person has held out as a place of delivery for such communications.

SECTION 7. MOTION FOR JUDICIAL RELIEF.

(a) A motion for judicial relief under this [act] must be made to the court in which a proceeding is pending involving a family law dispute subject to arbitration or, if no proceeding is pending, a court with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.

(b) On motion of a party, the court may compel arbitration if the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement that complies with Section 5 unless the court determines under Section 12 that the arbitration should not proceed.

(c) On motion of a party, the court shall terminate arbitration if it determines that:

(1) the agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable;

(2) the family law dispute is not subject to arbitration; or

(3) under Section 12, the arbitration should not proceed.

(d) Unless prohibited by an arbitration agreement, on motion of a party, the court may order consolidation of separate arbitrations involving the same parties and a common issue of
law or fact if necessary for the fair and expeditious resolution of the family law dispute.

Comment

This section provides the framework for motions for judicial relief. Motions must be filed in the court where the family law proceeding is pending or, if no proceeding is pending, in a court with proper jurisdiction. Motions for judicial relief are made and heard in the manner provided by law or rule of court for making and hearing motions. Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 5 provides that unless a civil action involving the agreement to arbitrate is pending, notice of an initial motion must be served in the manner provided by law for the service of a summons in a civil action. Otherwise notice of the motion is given in the manner prescribed by law or rule of court for serving motions in pending cases.

If necessary, a party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement may file a motion in court to compel arbitration. Conversely, a party opposing arbitration may file a motion to terminate arbitration. In either case, the court must determine whether the agreement is enforceable and covers the dispute. Both the Uniform Arbitration Act § 2 and the RUAA § 7 contain more detailed procedures for compelling or staying arbitration. Therefore, the state’s procedural rules for arbitration will be used. In addition, the UFLAA allows a party to file a motion under subsection (c) to terminate arbitration based on a finding of family violence or child abuse under Section 12.

Subsection (d) permits consolidation of related arbitrations when it would lead to a fair and efficient resolution of the family law dispute. For example, a divorcing couple’s assets might include a family business. If the parties agreed to arbitrate the dissolution of the business, the consolidation of that arbitration with the core family law arbitration might be appropriate. A decision on consolidation must be based on whether it is necessary for the fair and expeditious resolution of the family law dispute, not whether it might serve the interests of one party. This provision is more restrictive than the RUAA’s consolidation provision (§ 10) in that it requires that the arbitrations to be consolidated involve the same parties. The RUAA concerns commercial arbitration where a more liberal consolidation policy makes sense.

SECTION 8. QUALIFICATION AND SELECTION OF ARBITRATOR.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), unless waived in a record by the parties, an arbitrator must be:

(1) an attorney in good standing admitted to practice or on inactive status [or a judge on retired status] in a state; and

(2) trained in identifying domestic violence and child abuse [according to standards established under law of this state other than this [act] for a judicial officer assigned to
hear a family law proceeding].

(b) The identification in the arbitration agreement of an arbitrator, arbitration organization, or method of selection of the arbitrator controls.

(c) If an arbitrator is unable or unwilling to act or if the agreed-on method of selecting an arbitrator fails, on motion of a party, the court shall select an arbitrator.

*Legislative Note:* If a state has judicial education requirements on the topics of domestic violence and child abuse, the state should enact the bracketed language in subsection (a)(2). A state that does not have such requirements should delete the bracketed language.

**Comment**

The default qualifications for an arbitrator under this section are that he or she be a lawyer in good standing admitted to practice or on inactive status or a judge on retired status and have training in recognizing intimate partner violence and child abuse. The default requirements reflect the importance of the decisions that family law arbitrators make and the need for arbitrators to be sensitive to the presence of family violence.

Nevertheless, parties may choose to waive the requirements in selecting a particular individual. Because parties may want an arbitrator with unique expertise, experience, or reputation, this section authorizes parties to select whomever they please. An arbitrator selected by the parties in the agreement or in a later written designation does not have to meet the default requirements. The parties may want an arbitrator for only one part of a case, such as to resolve a dispute about competing values on a rare collection, or to unravel a complex multi-state business entity.

The parties’ agreed-on selection of an arbitrator may sometimes fail. When an arbitrator cannot serve due to unforeseen circumstances or resigns, subsection (c) directs the court to choose the arbitrator. This subsection tracks Revised Uniform Arbitration Act §11.

**SECTION 9. DISCLOSURE BY ARBITRATOR; DISQUALIFICATION.**

(a) Before agreeing to serve as an arbitrator, an individual, after making reasonable inquiry, shall disclose to all parties any known fact a reasonable person would believe is likely to affect:

(1) the impartiality of the arbitrator in the arbitration, including bias, a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration, or an existing or past relationship with a party,
attorney representing a party, or witness; or

(2) the arbitrator’s ability to make a timely award.

(b) An arbitrator, the parties, and the attorneys representing the parties have a continuing obligation to disclose to all parties any known fact a reasonable person would believe is likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator or the arbitrator’s ability to make a timely award.

(c) An objection to the selection or continued service of an arbitrator and a motion for a stay of arbitration and disqualification of the arbitrator must be made under the law and procedural rules of this state other than this [act] governing arbitrator disqualification.

(d) If a disclosure required by subsection (a)(1) or (b) is not made, the court may:

(1) on motion of a party not later than [30] days after the failure to disclose is known or by the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to the party, suspend the arbitration;

(2) on timely motion of a party, vacate an award under Section 19(a)(2); or

(3) if an award has been confirmed, grant other appropriate relief under law of this state other than this [act].

(e) If the parties agree to discharge an arbitrator or the arbitrator is disqualified, the parties by agreement may select a new arbitrator or request the court to select another arbitrator as provided in Section 8.

**Comment**

The disclosure section is taken mainly from Section 12 of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act and requires arbitrators to reveal any fact or relationship that might affect the arbitrator’s impartiality. The parties may agree to higher standards of disclosure.

An ongoing duty of disclosure rests on the arbitrator as well as the parties and their attorneys. One addition here to the disclosures listed in the RUAA is the requirement to reveal facts bearing on the arbitrator’s “ability to make a timely award.” The relative speed of the arbitration process is one of its advantages, particularly within the family law context.
The failure to make a required disclosure can result in suspension of the arbitration, the vacating of an award, or other relief. See Section 19(a)(2). If nondisclosure does not result in evident partiality or other prejudice, the court may refuse relief.

**SECTION 10. PARTY PARTICIPATION.**

(a) A party may:

(1) be represented in an arbitration by an attorney;

(2) be accompanied by an individual who will not be called as a witness or act as an advocate; and

(3) participate in the arbitration to the full extent permitted under the law and procedural rules of this state other than this [act] governing a party’s participation in contractual arbitration.

(b) A party or representative of a party may not communicate ex parte with the arbitrator except to the extent allowed in a family law proceeding for communication with a judge.

**Comment**

Section 10 (a)(1) recognizes that a party may be represented by an attorney throughout the arbitration process and is patterned after Uniform Arbitration Act § 6 and Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 16. Some states may require that the attorney be licensed in the state.

Section 10(a)(2) gives a party an absolute right to be accompanied by an individual who will not be called as a witness nor act as an advocate. This provision was, in part, a response to concerns expressed by groups who wanted to ensure that a victim of domestic violence could be accompanied by a support person during the arbitration. The accompanying person, however, does not have the right to take the place of the lawyer or advocate for the party.

Section 10(b) provides that as in family law court proceedings, there should be no ex parte communications with the decision-maker except under limited circumstances defined by other law.

**SECTION 11. TEMPORARY ORDER OR AWARD.**

(a) Before an arbitrator is selected and able to act, on motion of a party, the court may enter a temporary order under [insert reference to this state’s statutes or rules governing issuance
of a temporary order in a family law proceeding].

(b) After an arbitrator is selected:

(1) the arbitrator may make a temporary award under [insert reference to this state’s statutes or rules governing issuance of a temporary order in a family law proceeding]; and

(2) if the matter is urgent and the arbitrator is not able to act in a timely manner or provide an adequate remedy, on motion of a party, the court may enter a temporary order.

(c) On motion of a party, before the court confirms a final award, the court under Section 16, 18, or 19 may confirm, correct, vacate, or amend a temporary award made under subsection (b)(1).

(d) On motion of a party, the court may enforce a subpoena or interim award issued by an arbitrator for the fair and expeditious disposition of the arbitration.

Comment

Parties in family law cases often seek temporary orders to maintain the status quo or provide interim remedies pending resolution of the case. Temporary restraining orders, both personal and economic, are common. The parties may have already obtained some temporary orders before submitting the case to arbitration or may decide to seek such orders after arbitration has begun. The court retains the authority to issue temporary orders before arbitration starts. Once arbitration begins, the arbitrator can issue temporary awards, subject to the court’s power to confirm, correct, amend, or vacate under subsection (c).

Typical orders are for temporary child support, maintenance, residency of the child, restraints on the selling of real and personal property, access to bank accounts, and attorney fees. If for some reason the arbitrator is unavailable to act on an urgent request or cannot provide an adequate remedy, a party can file a motion for the court to provide appropriate relief. Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 8 addresses the court’s ability to grant provisional remedies before the arbitrator is appointed and authorized to act or if there is an urgent matter that the arbitrator cannot act in a timely manner to protect the effectiveness of the arbitration proceeding. UFLAA provisions are broader.

A party may move under subsection (d) for a court to enforce temporary awards entered under this section or other sections of the act.

SECTION 12. PROTECTION OF PARTY OR CHILD.

(a) In this section, “protection order” means an injunction or other order, issued under the
domestic-violence, family-violence, or stalking laws of the issuing jurisdiction, to prevent an individual from engaging in a violent or threatening act against, harassment of, contact or communication with, or being in physical proximity to another individual who is a party or a child under the custodial responsibility of a party.

(b) If a party is subject to a protection order or an arbitrator determines there is a reasonable basis to believe a party’s safety or ability to participate effectively in arbitration is at risk, the arbitrator shall stay the arbitration and refer the parties to court. The arbitration may not proceed unless the party at risk affirms the arbitration agreement in a record and the court determines:

(1) the affirmation is informed and voluntary;
(2) arbitration is not inconsistent with the protection order; and
(3) reasonable procedures are in place to protect the party from risk of harm, harassment, or intimidation.

(c) If an arbitrator determines that there is a reasonable basis to believe a child who is the subject of a child-related dispute is abused or neglected, the arbitrator shall terminate the arbitration of the child-related dispute and report the abuse or neglect to the [state child protection authority].

(d) An arbitrator may make a temporary award to protect a party or child from harm, harassment, or intimidation.

(e) On motion of a party, the court may stay arbitration and review a determination or temporary award under this section.

(f) This section supplements remedies available under law of this state other than this [act] for the protection of victims of domestic violence, family violence, stalking, harassment, or
similar abuse.

Comment

Section 12 provides that if a party is subject to an order of protection or if the arbitrator otherwise finds that a party's safety or ability to participate effectively in the arbitration is at risk, the arbitration must be suspended unless the party who is at risk reaffirms the desire to arbitrate and a court allows it. The presence of domestic or intimate partner violence can vitiate the voluntariness of the consent to arbitrate. Most family lawyers routinely screen for domestic violence. An arbitrator needs to be sensitive to the potential for violence that could adversely affect a party’s ability to participate freely and voluntarily in the process.

If there is a protective order in place or the arbitrator suspects abuse that would impair a party’s ability to participate in the arbitration, the arbitrator must refer the parties to the court. The court, in turn, must ensure that the requirements of subsection (b) are met before authorizing the arbitration to continue. Nothing precludes a party at any time from seeking a protection order from the appropriate court.

Subsection (c) reflects the principle that where a child’s safety is at risk, judicial oversight is essential and arbitration of a child-related dispute is no longer appropriate. Thus, if the arbitration involves a child-related dispute and the arbitrator has a reasonable basis to suspect abuse or neglect of a child, the arbitrator must terminate the arbitration and report the abuse and neglect to the appropriate authorities. Many states impose a similar duty on mediators. See Hinshaw, Mediators as Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse: Preserving Mediation’s Core Values, 34 FLA. ST. U.L.REV. 271 (2007).

Where the parties’ circumstances require immediate attention, subsection (d) recognizes that the arbitrator has the power to enter a temporary award. Any interim award or determination by the arbitrator under this section can be reviewed by the court.

Subsection (e) allows a court to protect vulnerable parties by staying the arbitration pending review of any determination or award made under this section. If an arbitrator refused to terminate arbitration after a party alleged violence or child abuse, for example, the party could file a motion with the court for a de novo review.

Subsection (f) makes clear that nothing in this Act is meant to replace the state remedies for protecting victims of domestic or family violence, stalking, harassment or abuse and neglect.

SECTION 13. POWERS AND DUTIES OF ARBITRATOR.

(a) An arbitrator shall conduct an arbitration in a manner the arbitrator considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition of the dispute.

(b) An arbitrator shall provide each party a right to be heard, to present evidence material
to the family law dispute, and to cross-examine witnesses.

(c) Unless the parties otherwise agree in a record, an arbitrator’s powers include the power to:

(1) select the rules for conducting the arbitration;
(2) hold conferences with the parties before a hearing;
(3) determine the date, time, and place of a hearing;
(4) require a party to provide:
   (A) a copy of a relevant court order;
   (B) information required to be disclosed in a family law proceeding under law of this state other than this [act]; and
   (C) a proposed award that addresses each issue in arbitration;
(5) meet with or interview a child who is the subject of a child-related dispute;
(6) appoint a private expert at the expense of the parties;
(7) administer an oath or affirmation and issue a subpoena for the attendance of a witness or the production of documents and other evidence at a hearing;
(8) compel discovery concerning the family law dispute and determine the date, time, and place of discovery;
(9) determine the admissibility and weight of evidence;
(10) permit deposition of a witness for use as evidence at a hearing;
(11) for good cause, prohibit a party from disclosing information;
(12) appoint an attorney, guardian ad litem, or other representative for a child at the expense of the parties;
(13) impose a procedure to protect a party or child from risk of harm, harassment,
or intimidation;

(14) allocate arbitration fees, attorney’s fees, expert-witness fees, and other costs to the parties; and

(15) impose a sanction on a party for bad faith or misconduct during the arbitration according to standards governing imposition of a sanction for litigant misconduct in a family law proceeding.

(d) An arbitrator may not allow ex parte communication except to the extent allowed in a family law proceeding for communication with a judge.

Comment

The powers of an arbitrator, which may be set by the arbitration agreement, depend to a large extent on what the parties agree the arbitrator is to decide. This section draws on the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act §§ 15, 17, and 21 to recognize broad powers of an arbitrator, unless the parties agree otherwise. These powers include to select the rules for the arbitration; conduct the prehearing conferences and the hearing; administer oaths to parties and witnesses; allow any party to conduct prehearing discovery by interrogatories, deposition, requests for production of documents, or other means; determine the admissibility of evidence; and subpoena witnesses or documents upon the arbitrator’s own initiative or request of a party. In addition, this section recognizes powers that may be uniquely necessary in the family law context, such as the power to meet with a child, appoint a representative for the child, and impose procedures to protect a party or child from risk of harm. Also, this section authorizes the arbitrator to sanction bad faith conduct according to state law governing misconduct in family law proceedings.

The arbitrator does not have power to alter the terms of the arbitration agreement or to award a remedy other than in accordance with the law. Ex parte communications between a party and the arbitrator are prohibited except to the extent permitted under other law.

SECTION 14. RECORDING OF HEARING.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or required by law of this state other than this [act], an arbitration hearing need not be recorded unless required by the arbitrator, provided by the arbitration agreement, or requested by a party.

(b) An arbitrator shall request a verbatim recording be made of any part of an arbitration hearing concerning a child-related dispute.
Comment

The general default rule established by this section is that an arbitration hearing need not be recorded. That rule, however, is subject to various exceptions. The hearing must be recorded if the arbitrator requires it, the arbitration agreement so provides, or any party requests it. Importantly, because of the parens patriae responsibility of the court to protect children, this section requires that a verbatim record be made of any part of an arbitration hearing concerning a child-related dispute. That mandate is not waivable by the parties. The goal is to ensure that there is a sufficient record for the trial court to review to determine whether the arbitrator applied the relevant law and whether the award furthers the child’s best interest.

SECTION 15. AWARD.

(a) An arbitrator shall make an award in a record, dated and signed by the arbitrator. The arbitrator shall give notice of the award to each party by a method agreed on by the parties or, if the parties have not agreed on a method, under the law and procedural rules of this state other than this [act] governing notice in contractual arbitration.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), the award under this [act] must state the reasons on which it is based unless otherwise agreed by the parties.

(c) An award determining a child-related dispute must state the reasons on which it is based as required by law of this state other than this [act] for a court order in a family law proceeding.

(d) An award under this [act] is not enforceable as a judgment until confirmed under Section 16.

Comment

Section (a) is patterned after Uniform Arbitration Act § 8 and Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 19 which both require the award to be in writing and signed by the arbitrator. The UFLAA allows parties to determine the manner of giving notice of the award or leave it to the state’s arbitration law. Under the UAA, the arbitrator must deliver a copy to each party personally or by registered mail, or as provided in the agreement. Under the RUAA, the arbitrator must give notice (defined in RUAA § 2) of the award including a copy of the award to each party to the arbitration proceeding.

Although the RUAA does not create a default requirement for a “reasoned award,” the
UFLAA in this section does establish such a default, subject to the parties’ agreeing otherwise. The default is based on the state’s interest in ensuring that arbitrators follow the law and act fairly and carefully in resolving family law disputes. Most statutes contain descriptions for classifying property as marital or nonmarital and list factors for distribution. If the parties choose to forego a reasoned award, they can do so with respect to monetary disputes between themselves.

Section (c) recognizes that child-related awards are subject to a rigorous standard of review. Therefore, the award must state the reasons on which it is based in the same manner that is required of a family court under state law. The parties cannot waive this requirement. Most states require findings of fact and conclusions of law, sometimes on all statutory factors. A sufficient record is necessary in order for a court to determine whether the arbitrator complied with state law. See Fawzy v. Fawzy, 973 A.2d 347 (N.J. 2009). On the issue of child support, federal law requires that all state guidelines establish a presumptive award. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b) (2). There must be written findings of fact as to why deviation from the state guidelines is in the best interests of the child. See 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(f).

Subsection (d) makes clear that an award is not enforceable as a judgment until confirmed. Similarly, a decree of divorce, separation, or annulment requires judicial action. If a party fails to comply with an award before it is confirmed, that non-compliance is not punishable by contempt. Non-compliance, however, might give rise to sanctions once the award is confirmed, if the award provided for the imposition of sanctions. A failure to pay child support as required by an award, for example, might give rise to liability for interest on the unpaid amounts once the award is confirmed.

SECTION 16. CONFIRMATION OF AWARD.

(a) After an arbitrator gives notice under Section 15(a) of an award, including an award corrected under Section 17, a party may move the court for an order confirming the award.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), the court shall confirm an award under this [act] if:

(1) the parties agree in a record to confirmation; or

(2) the time has expired for making a motion, and no motion is pending, under Section 18 or 19.

(c) If an award determines a child-related dispute, the court shall confirm the award under subsection (b) if the court finds, after a review of the record if necessary, that the award on its face:
(1) complies with Section 15 and law of this state other than this [act] governing a child-related dispute; and

(2) is in the best interests of the child.

(d) On confirmation, an award under this [act] is enforceable as a judgment.

Comment

On motion of a party, a court has a duty to confirm an award if no party is challenging it. That duty to confirm is consistent with general arbitration law. See Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 22. For a child-related award, however, even when no party has raised a challenge, the court may not confirm unless it finds that the award complies with state law and is in the best interests of the child. The court may make that determination on the face of the award or, if necessary, by reviewing the record.

The need for judicial oversight to determine that the award complies with state law and is in the best interest of the child rests on the state’s parens patriae responsibility. The approach in this section subjects the arbitration award to a standard of judicial review similar to the review typically given to a parenting agreement achieved through negotiation or mediation. Just as parties cannot make a binding agreement as to child custody without judicial approval, an arbitration award of child custody requires some additional scrutiny by the court, even when both parties accept the award, to ensure the award complies with the law of the state. In some states, the law requires a judge to make a finding on the factors listed in the statute. If no factors are listed, the judge would not confirm the award. See Zupan v. Zupan, 230 P.3d 329 (Wyo. 2010).

Similarly, by federal mandate all states require the use of child support guidelines. If there is no child support worksheet as required by state law and the amount of child support is not the amount on the tables, the judge would not confirm the award.

SECTION 17. CORRECTION BY ARBITRATOR OF UNCONFIRMED AWARD. On motion of a party made not later than [30] days after an arbitrator gives notice under Section 15(a) of an award, the arbitrator may correct the award:

(1) if the award has an evident mathematical miscalculation or an evident mistake in the description of a person, thing, or property;

(2) if the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits on the issues submitted; or

(3) to clarify the award.
Comment

This section is based on Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 20. A party by motion to the arbitrator may seek a correction of an award for mathematical or descriptive mistakes, for errors of form not going to the merits, or to clarify the award. If the award is corrected, the arbitrator has a duty to give notice of the changed award.

SECTION 18. CORRECTION BY COURT OF UNCONFIRMED AWARD.

(a) On motion of a party made not later than [90] days after an arbitrator gives notice under Section 15(a) of an award, including an award corrected under Section 17, the court shall correct the award if:

(1) the award has an evident mathematical miscalculation or an evident mistake in the description of a person, thing, or property;

(2) the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the issues submitted; or

(3) the arbitrator made an award on a dispute not submitted to the arbitrator and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the issues submitted.

(b) A motion under this section to correct an award may be joined with a motion to vacate or amend the award under Section 19.

(c) Unless a motion under Section 19 is pending, the court may confirm a corrected award under Section 16.

Comment

This section tracks the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 24 for the most part. It allows a party to file a motion with the court to correct the award for mathematical or descriptive mistakes, errors of form not affecting the merits, and mistake in deciding an issue not submitted to the arbitrator. In general, UFLAA Sections 17 and 18 together give parties a choice as to seeking a correction from the arbitrator or from the court in the first instance, but a motion to the arbitrator has a shorter timeline. In addition, as long as the motion is timely, a party may seek a correction from the court of an award that has already been corrected by the arbitrator.
SECTION 19. VACATION OR AMENDMENT BY COURT OF UNCONFIRMED AWARD.

(a) On motion of a party, the court shall vacate an unconfirmed award if the moving party establishes that:

(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;

(2) there was:

   (A) evident partiality by the arbitrator;

   (B) corruption by the arbitrator; or

   (C) misconduct by the arbitrator substantially prejudicing the rights of a party;

(3) the arbitrator refused to postpone a hearing on showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 13, so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party;

(4) the arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s powers;

(5) no arbitration agreement exists, unless the moving party participated in the arbitration without making a motion under Section 7 not later than the beginning of the first arbitration hearing; [or]

(6) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice under Section 6 of the initiation of arbitration, so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party[; or]

(7) a ground exists for vacating the award under law of this state other than this [act]].

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), on motion of a party, the court shall
vacate an unconfirmed award that determines a child-related dispute if the moving party establishes that:

(1) the award does not comply with Section 15 or law of this state other than this [act] governing a child-related dispute or is contrary to the best interests of the child;

(2) the record of the hearing or the statement of reasons in the award is inadequate for the court to review the award; or

(3) a ground for vacating the award under subsection (a) exists.

(c) If an award is subject to vacation under subsection (b)(1), on motion of a party, the court may amend the award if amending rather than vacating is in the best interests of the child.

(d) The court [shall][may] determine a motion under subsection (b) or (c) based on the record of the arbitration hearing and facts occurring after the hearing [or may exercise de novo review].

(e) A motion under this section to vacate or amend an award must be filed not later than [90] days:

(1) after an arbitrator gives the party filing the motion notice of the award or a corrected award; or

(2) for a motion under subsection (a)(1), after the ground of corruption, fraud, or other undue means is known or by the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to the party filing the motion.

(f) If the court under this section vacates an award for a reason other than the absence of an enforceable arbitration agreement, the court may order a rehearing before an arbitrator. If the reason for vacating the award is that the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means or there was evident partiality, corruption, or misconduct by the arbitrator, the rehearing
must be before another arbitrator.

(g) If the court under this section denies a motion to vacate or amend an award, the court may confirm the award under Section 16 unless a motion is pending under Section 18.

**Legislative Note:** If state law permits an arbitration award to be vacated on grounds other than those listed in subsection (a)(1) – (6), the state may enact bracketed subsection (a)(7) to make those grounds equally available under this act.

If a state wishes to authorize discretionary de novo review of an arbitration award in a child-related dispute, it should enact the “may” in subsection (d) and the bracketed language at the end of the subsection. If a state does not want to authorize de novo review, it should enact the “shall” in subsection (d) and omit the bracketed reference to de novo review at the end of the subsection.

**Comment**

The language in subsection (a) tracks the traditional narrow grounds for vacating an arbitration award found in both the Uniform Arbitration Act § 12 and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 23. To avoid frustrating the purpose of arbitration, courts must give appropriate deference to arbitration awards. The court does not consider the sufficiency or weight of the evidence or otherwise consider an attack on the merits. See Brinckerhoff v. Brinckeroff, 889 A.2d 701 (Vt. 2005).

Under section (a)(2)(A), the evident partiality standard requires “clear evidence of impropriety” and the “evidence of bias or interest of an arbitrator must be direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain or speculative.” Ormsbee Development Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 1982). See also In re Marriage of Shults, 2015 WL 9459743 (Kan. App. Dec. 23, 2015) (unpublished) (fact that arbitrator represented the attorney for one party seventeen years earlier did not amount to evident partiality). Under subsection (a)(4), to show an arbitrator exceeded his or her powers, the party must show the arbitrator either acted beyond the terms of the arbitration agreement or acted in complete disregard of the law. See Giraldi v. Morrell, 892 P.2d 422 (Colo. App. 1994); Washington v. Washington, 770 N.W.2d 908 (Mich. App. 2009).

Some states go beyond the RUAA in authorizing additional grounds for vacating arbitration awards. The bracketed subsection (a)(7) authorizes a court to vacate family law arbitration awards on the basis of those additional grounds. If state law, for example, permits parties to agree that an award can be challenged for errors of law, the bracketed language would authorize a court to review an award for errors of law if the parties have so agreed.

Child-related awards are reviewed under a separate mandatory standard. Under subsection (b), the award must comply with applicable law and must be in the child’s best interests. Moreover, the record and statement of reasons in the award itself must be adequate for the court to exercise its review. Subsection (c) permits a court to amend an award rather than
vacate if amendment would be in the child’s best interests. Amendment might be an appropriate option, for example, if the arbitrator has misapplied the state’s child support guidelines and the child support determination can be easily corrected without a further evidentiary hearing.

Subsection (d) contains a discretionary de novo review option. While some states authorize discretionary de novo review as a way of ensuring that children’s interests are protected, others limit judicial review of child-related awards to the record in the arbitration proceeding and later-occurring facts. Compare Harvey v. Harvey, 680 N.W.2d 835 (Mich. 2004) (requiring de novo review of arbitration award determining child custody), with N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7.2(T) (providing that review of arbitration award must be based on arbitration record and any facts arising after arbitration hearing). The bracketed provision allows states to choose between these competing approaches. See Vanderborgh v. Krauth, 370 P.3d 661 (Colo. App. 2016) (finding no violation of the father’s due process rights or of child’s rights when the trial court used its discretion to decline to exercise de novo review of arbitration award; the court had the power to order a de novo hearing if found necessary).

The bracketed 90-day time period for filing a motion to vacate is the time frame most often found in family law arbitration statutes. A state may insert a different time period if it wants. The act provides two alternative measures of time: no later than 90 days after notice of the award, or, when an award is challenged on the ground of “corruption, fraud, or other undue means,” no later than 90 days after the corruption, fraud, or undue means is known or should have been known. If the fraud is not discovered until after the award has been confirmed, then a party’s recourse would be to challenge the confirmed award under other law governing challenges to judgments. For example, if fraud were discovered 30 days after notice of an award and the award remains unconfirmed, a party would have 90 days from the time of discovery in which to bring the challenge. If fraud were discovered after the award has been confirmed, however, then any challenge would be governed by the state’s rules for vacating judgments.

SECTION 20. CLARIFICATION OF CONFIRMED AWARD. If the meaning or effect of an award confirmed under Section 16 is in dispute, the parties may:

(1) agree to arbitrate the dispute before the original arbitrator or another arbitrator; or

(2) proceed in court under law of this state other than this [act] governing clarification of a judgment in a family law proceeding.

Comment

A confirmed award may be so ambiguous that clarification is required. Under this section, the parties may agree to arbitrate any dispute arising from the ambiguity, or they may proceed according to state law in clarifying a judgment.
SECTION 21. JUDGMENT ON AWARD.

(a) On granting an order confirming, vacating without directing a rehearing, or amending an award under this [act], the court shall enter judgment in conformity with the order.

(b) On motion of a party, the court may order that a document or part of the arbitration record be sealed or redacted to prevent public disclosure of all or part of the record or award to the extent permitted under law of this state other than this [act].

Comment

Subsection (a) follows Revised Uniform Arbitration Act §25(a) and requires the court to enter judgment after confirming, vacating, or amending an award. The entry of judgment is an important judicial act that may be necessary to give rise to enforceable legal obligations under the award.

The opportunity for privacy is often a key attraction of arbitration for couples at the point of marriage dissolution. Subsection (b) recognizes that the court may seal or redact documents or records to prevent public disclosure to the extent allowed under applicable law. This is important to prevent bank account and other numbers, private business information, and other items from being public record. In addition, parties are free as a matter of contract to agree that evidence disclosed during the arbitration should remain confidential. If a party were to breach such a confidentiality agreement, the remedy for the aggrieved party would be contractual.

SECTION 22. MODIFICATION OF CONFIRMED AWARD OR JUDGMENT. If a party requests under law of this state other than this [act] a modification of an award confirmed under Section 16 or judgment on the award based on a fact occurring after confirmation:

(1) the parties shall proceed under the dispute-resolution method specified in the award or judgment; or

(2) if the award or judgment does not specify a dispute-resolution method, the parties may:

(A) agree to arbitrate the modification before the original arbitrator or another arbitrator; or

(B) absent agreement proceed under law of this state other than this [act]
governing modification of a judgment in a family law proceeding.

Comment

Post-decree modifications of court orders are well-known in family law. Family law decrees involving spousal support, custodial responsibility, or child support may be subject to modification under state law based on material and continuing changes in circumstances. Child-related issues are generally modifiable throughout a child’s minority, subject to varying limitations under state law.

This section provides that parties may proceed on requests for modification of a confirmed award by various routes. If a dispute-resolution method for modification is specified in the award or judgment, that method should be followed. If no method is specified, then the parties can agree to arbitrate or, in the absence of agreement, proceed in court under state law governing modifications of family court decrees. If the parties do opt for arbitration, they may return to arbitration with the same arbitrator, or they may choose a different arbitrator.

SECTION 23. ENFORCEMENT OF CONFIRMED AWARD.

(a) The court shall enforce an award confirmed under Section 16, including a temporary award, in the manner and to the same extent as any other order or judgment of a court.

(b) The court shall enforce an arbitration award in a family law dispute confirmed by a court in another state in the manner and to the same extent as any other order or judgment from another state.

Comment

This section clarifies that a confirmed award is a judgment of the court and can be enforced as any other judgment, including the use of contempt, fines, and other enforcement remedies. Awards confirmed by a court in another state will be entitled to the same full faith and credit as any court judgment from a sister state. If there is a confirmation of an award from another state, full faith and credit requires that it be honored as a judgment.

SECTION 24. APPEAL.

(a) An appeal may be taken under this [act] from:

(1) an order [granting or] denying a motion to compel arbitration;

(2) an order granting [or denying] a motion to stay arbitration;

(3) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) an order correcting an award;

(5) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or

(6) a final judgment.

(b) An appeal under this section may be taken as from an order or a judgment in a civil action.

Legislative Note: If a state wants to authorize an immediate appeal from an order granting a motion to compel arbitration, it should enact the bracketed language in subsection (a)(1). If a state wants to authorize an immediate appeal from an order denying a motion to stay arbitration, it should enact the bracketed language in subsection (a)(2).

Comment

The appeals section tracks the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 28 and Uniform Arbitration Act § 18, with the exception of the bracketed terms in subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2). The bracketed terms would, in effect, level the playing field in determining appealability of trial court rulings on motions to compel arbitration and to stay arbitration. Under the RUAA and UAA, trial court rulings that delay arbitration—orders that refuse to compel arbitration or orders that stay arbitration—are immediately appealable, but trial court orders compelling arbitration or refusing to stay arbitration are not immediately appealable. The bracketed terms in this section give states the option of expanding appealability in the family law context.

SECTION 25. IMMUNITY OF ARBITRATOR.

(a) An arbitrator or arbitration organization acting in that capacity in a family law dispute is immune from civil liability to the same extent as a judge of a court of this state acting in a judicial capacity.

(b) The immunity provided by this section supplements any immunity under law of this state other than this [act].

(c) An arbitrator’s failure to make a disclosure required by Section 9 does not cause the arbitrator to lose immunity under this section.

(d) An arbitrator is not competent to testify, and may not be required to produce records, in a judicial, administrative, or similar proceeding about a statement, conduct, decision, or ruling
occurring during an arbitration, to the same extent as a judge of a court of this state acting in a judicial capacity. This subsection does not apply:

(1) to the extent disclosure is necessary to determine a claim by the arbitrator or arbitration organization against a party to the arbitration; or

(2) to a hearing on a motion under Section 19(a)(1) or (2) to vacate an award, if there is prima facie evidence that a ground for vacating the award exists.

(e) If a person commences a civil action against an arbitrator arising from the services of the arbitrator or seeks to compel the arbitrator to testify or produce records in violation of subsection (d) and the court determines that the arbitrator is immune from civil liability or is not competent to testify or required to produce the records, the court shall award the arbitrator reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and reasonable expenses of litigation.

Comment

Immunity for arbitrators is essential if arbitration is to serve the purpose of helping parties resolve disputes and alleviating crowded court dockets. Without the cloak of immunity, individuals will be unwilling to serve in the important and demanding role of family law arbitrator. This section tracks Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 14. Likewise, the bar against arbitrator testimony parallels the approach of the RUAA and protects the integrity of the arbitration process. In the interest of child protection, the family law arbitrator nevertheless has a duty to report child abuse or neglect under Section 12.

Immunity for other professionals engaged in the arbitration process, such as guardians ad litem, would be determined according to other law. See, e.g., Vlastelica v. Brend, 954 N.E.2d 874 (Ill. App. 2011).

SECTION 26. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION. In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.
SECTION 27. RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT. This [act] modifies, limits, or supersedes the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq., but does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of that act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001(c), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103(b) of that act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7003(b).

SECTION 28. TRANSITIONAL PROVISION. This [act] applies to arbitration of a family law dispute under an arbitration agreement made on or after [the effective date of this [act]]. If an arbitration agreement was made before [the effective date of this [act]], the parties may agree in a record that this [act] applies to the arbitration.

SECTION 29. EFFECTIVE DATE. This [act] takes effect . . . .